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Abstract
In the context of neoliberal multiculturalism, indigenous activists face a fundamental
dilemma. While they organize as indigenous peoples to negotiate and demand from states
new terms of citizenship, activists recognize that new forms of accommodation for such
demands exist within state institutions. However, indigenous organizations also discover that
certain demands exceed these new spaces of participation. I argue that territorial autonomy is
one such demand because it challenges the existing power imbalances between indigenous
peoples and the state.
Not surprisingly, territorial autonomy is a common goal of many emerging forms of
indigenous activism in contemporary Latin America. Based on new understandings of
“indigenous territories” and “autonomy,” indigenous collective action uses the language of
territorial autonomy to challenge the framework and functioning of neoliberal
multiculturalism at the local level. By studying neoliberal multiculturalism as a form of
government over indigenous populations at a local level, this study engages with broader
perspectives that address state formation as a cultural process that involves the formation of
and control over citizens’ subjectivities through specific forms of citizenship.
This approach to indigenous activism allows me to examine the complexity of ongoing
political negotiations between indigenous subjects and the neoliberal state. Compliance with
the neoliberal parameters of citizenship continues to be sought by post-Washington
Consensus states, however, demands for territorial autonomy and the practices of land
reoccupations remind us that indigenous activism offers a legitimate alternative form of
politics. This is a politics aimed at taking back what has been lost or perceived as lost by a
group via collective action. In this study, I call this form of politics “redemptive.” In
exploring redemptive politics, my study privileges the local level of indigenous activism.
Through a study of the Mapuche, the indigenous peoples of southern Argentina, I argue that
the local level is a fundamental space in which to address the exchanges, negotiations, and
conflict between indigenous peoples and the state, especially in cases where they constitute a
minority of the national population.
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To understand the meaning and impact of new kinds of Mapuche activism and new forms of
indigenous collective identity, this dissertation addresses three dimensions of indigenous
politics: the configuration of indigenous collective identities and their translation into
political organizations; the configuration and consolidation of such identities as the result of
ongoing resistance, negotiations, and accommodation with the state; and the conflicts around
demands for territorial autonomy that often result in the criminalization and rejection of
indigenous demands by the state because they exceed the limits of indigenous citizenship
under neoliberal multiculturalism. All three dimensions are studied privileging the local
level, which this study argues is fundamental to address in the contexts in which those wh
self-identify as indigenous peoples are a minority of the national population. Thus, I claim
that the study of indigenous politics must privilege the ways in which new forms of activism
negotiate and enter into conflict with the state against the background of neoliberal
multiculturalism, a cultural project of governing indigenous subjects that is compatible with
the expansion of global capitalism and the reach of modern state institutions.
This thesis relies on a field study of contemporary indigenous mobilization in Argentina
through which the Mapuche have become politically organized. Through an analysis of the
ways in which Mapuche activists organize in a particular locality, the province of Neuquén in
southern Argentina, this dissertation contributes to the theoretical understanding of collective
identity formation and indigenous activism in contexts where indigenous peoples are a
minority of the national population. Building on interdisciplinary contributions on state
formation, citizenship, and collective identity formation, I argue that in the context of
minority indigenous mobilization, territorial struggles and the importance of the local
political level are crucial for understanding how collective identities are configured and how
indigenous activists engage with the state in interesting ways to advance their claims. In this
study, I look at the formation of collective identities through processes of contestation,
struggles and conflict and also of negotiation and accommodation with institutions,
discourses, and practices of the state and the forms of citizenship it sustains. Accordingly,
this study on contemporary Mapuche activism advances our understanding of how
indigenous collective identities are formed as the result of ongoing interactions between
indigenous activists and the state.
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Preface
In early October 2009, my plans to start conducting formal interviews with Mapuche activists
in Argentina were underway after a long period of planning at a distance of more than 10,000
kilometers from where the fieldwork was to take place. The year before, I had visited the
“remote” southern Argentinean province of Neuquén and its capital (that holds the same
name) for the first time so that I could begin networking with Mapuche organizations. On
that occasion I decided to spend most of my time in this region of Patagonia meeting
Mapuche activists and explaining my research project to them to ensure that its objectives
were of interest to them. Given that the visit was short, I decided to leave the formal
interviewing for a second visit.
When I returned to Neuquén city on the following year, I was determined to begin with the
interviews immediately. Returning to the field sites that I had visited the previous year,
however, meant being confronted with changes in the lives of people that I had met before.
Upon reflection, some of those changes proved to be symptomatic of the processes I aim to
address in this thesis. They included, but were not limited to, some Mapuche activists
working now with government agencies dealing with indigenous “issues”; the experience by
some communities of violent police repression for the first time since their official
recognition by the government in the 1960s; and finally, the creation of new networks and
organizations within the Mapuche movement to deal with specific concerns, such as human
rights abuses and the court system. I also recognized some important continuities. For
example, the generation of Mapuche leaders who began their activism in the 1970s were still
clashing with traditional authorities in some communities and, most importantly, Mapuche
communities under a new leadership remained determined to reoccupy ancestral territories
and to continue their struggles for self-representation and control over the territories they
already inhabit.
Shortly after my arrival in 2009, I lined up the first interview with activists from the
Confederación Mapuche de Neuquén (Mapuche Confederation of Neuquén). My excitement
about this opportunity to finally interview activists who have been at the forefront of
Mapuche mobilization for the last three decades was hard to contain. I arrived at the ruka
xi

(community house) early, driving a vehicle borrowed from a family member that helped me
to reach Northern Patagonia from my home town located in the pampas region of Argentina,
more than 1,000 kilometres away. Mate tea was prepared and I took it as indication that I was
being expected and welcomed. Looking back, however, it is probably true that mate would
have been served regardless of the interest my research project was generating but at the time
it helped me to gain some confidence in what I was about to embark on: an ethnographic
study of Mapuche local activism around claims for territorial autonomy. By mid-morning the
ruka was in full swing with many activists conducting their day-to-day activities, including
making phone calls, updating web sites, reading the local, regional, and national newspapers
to find material related to indigenous issues, organizing cultural events, including an
1

upcoming Mapu-Punk concert, amongst others. I knew my fieldwork was off to a good start
when the person I was to interview joined us at the ruka. My first interview went relatively
well for at least an hour until all the mobile phones in the ruka began to ring.
Many cell phones began to go off at once, and it became evident that something important
was happening. When phones had started to ring a few days before that morning of the
interview it was to receive the good news that a court order had halted a Chinese-owned gold
mining corporation from moving into the territory of a Mapuche community. The court had
sided with the Mapuche because the affected community had not been consulted, and thus no
informed consent had been given. In fact, when I met many activists at the beginning of my
visit in October 2009, they were planning a visit to this community to celebrate the court
order. But nothing suggested this time that whoever was making the phone calls was
delivering good news. In fact, the calls were from members of Huenctru Trawel Leufu, a
Mapuche community located 130 kilometres south of Neuquén city. That morning a court
order allowed elite police forces to enter this community’s territory to end their blockade of a
natural gas company operating there without their consent. As tensions between Mapuche
and police forces escalated, and in order to prevent the intensification of violence and
conflict, activists from the Confederación Mapuche were called in to mediate. The urgency
and the need for mediation were more immediate after an incident that had ended with a

1

Weeks later, I attended the Mapu-Punk concert and even though I decided not to include it in more detail in
my dissertation, it gave me the opportunity to see first hand some of the ways in which Mapuche identities are
continuously changing, particularly for new generations of activists.
xii

police officer thrown from his motocross after an altercation with a Mapuche on horseback.
The good news for activists in Neuquén, and for me as an observer that day, was that we had
a confirmed ride to Huenctru Trawel Leufu.
As we were on our way to Huenctru Trawel Leufu, we learned we were soon to face another,
unanticipated obstacle. The province of Neuquén had been an epicenter of social protest
against neoliberal adjustment policies throughout the 1990s. The privatization of oil and gas
companies in the region, coupled with the economic recession, resulted in thousands of
workers losing their jobs in the province. It was here that the movement of the unemployed
that later expanded throughout Argentina first emerged. While the intensity of social conflict
was fading by 2009, many unemployed workers were still using the strategy of road
blockades to demand, among other things, unemployment subsidies and severance packages.
On the day of the Huenctru Trawel Leufu incidents, unemployed workers from a local gas
company were blocking the roads. Since the emergence of piqueteros (as the movement of
the unemployed were known), Mapuche activists have been trying to address the tensions
that exist between the claims of both groups. By the time of my visit in October 2009, such
tensions had receded as a result of previous networking and negotiations. The temporary
alliance between the Confederación and piqueteros was put to the test on the day we drove to
Huenctru Trawel Leufu. In less than one hour from our arrival at the site, the blockade was
lifted temporarily for us to pass. Negotiations between the two groups had been successful.
What preceded and followed the urgent phone call that day, in October of 2009, is a good
illustration of Mapuche struggles and of the political context in Argentina today. These are
best characterized as involving: a permanent state of negotiation and engagement with state
institutions; discussions amongst indigenous activists and members of local communities
over the most appropriate strategies to defend their territories; pressure for activists to defend
the interests of the communities they represent and to engage with other popular movements;
and efforts to mediate between Mapuche community interests and those of the state, the
private sector, and of activists themselves. These are but a few examples of contextual
conditions that help to set the stage for contemporary indigenous mobilization. This context
is not unique to Southern Argentina but characterizes, in fact, much of today’s relationship
between states and their indigenous populations throughout Latin America.
xiii

After centuries of political invisibility and marginalization, Mapuche communities and other
indigenous peoples in Argentina have begun to organize and mobilize in ways that are
similar to those of other indigenous movements in Latin America. What makes the case of
the Mapuche particularly interesting is that they face specific challenges in organizing
politically at the national level because their numbers are low and they are, therefore, a
considerable minority in the two countries where they live, Argentina and Chile. The
organizational challenges faced by Mapuche activists in a minority context are one
dimension this study addresses. Another, equally important dimension, is the cultural and
political impact on indigenous activism and collective identity formation of recent
transformations of the state and new forms of citizenship.
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Chapter 1

1

Introduction

In recent decades, indigenous peoples have demanded more inclusive forms of
citizenship from Latin American states. For indigenous organizations, these demands
address historical forms of political and social exclusion. In challenging prevailing
notions of citizenship, indigenous peoples have also been contesting assimilationist
policies of the past and the roles that states have assigned to them. Furthermore, in some
areas they have challenged discourses of mestizaje. While referring to the racial mix of
Spanish descendants and Indians, mestizaje has also been used as a political discourse
aimed at eroding the uniqueness of indigenous identities. In doing this, indigenous
peoples have been challenging existing political institutions through their demands for
increasing autonomy, control over the territories they inhabit, self-representation, and the
recognition of the multi-ethnic composition of states (Urban and Sherzer 1991; Díaz
Polanco 1997; Assies et al. 2000; Warren and Jackson 2002; Langer and Muñoz 2003;
Postero and Zamosc 2004; Yashar 2005). Additionally, indigenous peoples have been at
the forefront of recent waves of social protest against the implementation of neoliberal
policies because, according to indigenous leaders, these have resulted in higher rates of
unemployment, poverty, and inequality and they have constituted a direct threat to their
possession and control over their territories (Escobar and Alvarez 1992; Alvarez et al.
1998; Stahler-Sholk et al. 2007; Hall and Fenelon 2009; Silva 2009). Yashar (1998), in
particular, shows how neoliberal policies have threatened some of the social safety nets
acquired by indigenous peoples from welfare states in the past. Mapuche mobilization in
contemporary Argentina resonates with this wider re-emergence of indigenous
mobilization.
These demands, in turn, have taken place in the context of two important political
changes in the region. The first one of these changes is the return to representative rule in
Latin American countries and a set of constitutional reforms that included, for the first
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time in most cases, the recognition of the multi-ethnic composition of those societies and
the incorporation of a new set of rights for citizens as a result of their indigenous
2

condition (Van Cott 2000). The second change is the recognition of indigenous rights
and their incorporation into international law thus influencing indigenous activists at the
local level (Brysk 1994). This increasing recognition of indigenous rights at the
international level is also a result of the efforts and negotiations of indigenous activists
mobilizing beyond the state. Thus, indigenous peoples have been active participants in
international forums formerly reserved to governments (Bodley 2008; Blaser et al. 2010).
In order to do this, indigenous leaders have relied on broader networks that connect them
with other indigenous organizations, environmental and human rights groups, and other
non-indigenous supporters (Stavenhagen 2009). For example, indigenous delegates have
been active participants in negotiations taking place within the United Nations (UN)
during debates in the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues and were instrumental in
the establishment of the UN Decade of Indigenous Peoples (1995-2004). Furthermore,
they pressed states to adopt the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in
September 2007, seeing such declaration as a major step in the formal recognition of their
rights as part of the fundamental body of international human rights protection. Within
the framework of the International Labour Organization, indigenous leaders participated
in deliberations on the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention number 169 of 1989
which abandoned earlier assimilationist approaches in order to recognize a series of new
rights, including the right of indigenous peoples to be consulted before the execution of
development projects in areas they inhabit. Finally, indigenous leaders and their
organizations have participated in drafting consultations within the Organization of
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According to Donna Lee Van Cott (2000), the constitutional reforms of the 1990s, which she refers to as
“multicultural constitutionalism,” have allowed indigenous peoples to frame their demands in ways that
could be included in these legal documents and redefine the terms of their citizenship in order to protect
their rights as individuals and as indigenous peoples. Yashar (2005) also argues that the agenda of
indigenous claims is usually constructed around the idea that there is a set of special rights given their
condition of native peoples, such as the existence of autonomous spheres of jurisdiction under indigenous
customary law, or the right to maintain distinct identities within a state, for example.

3

American States for the American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(Niezen 2006).

3

States have typically responded by recognizing new rights and adopting new mechanisms
to accommodate demands for more participation in areas that affect life in indigenous
communities. However, a gap between the recognition of new rights and their
implementation in practice remains, thus resulting in ongoing conflicts between the state
and citizens who self-identify as indigenous (Edelman 1999; Gustafson 2002; Hale 2004;
De la Peña 2005; Jackson and Warren 2005; Stavenhagen 2009). This dissertation
attempts to address this gap between the collective demands of indigenous peoples and
state responses, and to explain why conflicts between indigenous movements and the
state persist.
To study these tensions, I place an emphasis on the ways in which indigenous activists
construct their political (i.e., collective) identity in their ongoing negotiation and
contestation with the state at the local level. I suggest that a focus on essentially local
initiatives is significant in order to understand contemporary indigenous political
mobilization in contexts where indigenous peoples are a considerable minority of the
overall population. I focus on the Mapuche peoples in Neuquén, Argentina, in order to
demonstrate how one group, for example, is engaged in an ongoing process of
negotiation, accommodation, and resistance with the state and with a dominant form of
citizenship that affects indigenous peoples directly: neoliberal multiculturalism. This
study will demonstrate that despite the absence of an indigenous movement at the
national scale, indigenous groups such as the Mapuche are involved in interesting forms
of negotiation, accommodation, and resistance with the state on a daily basis. As
anthropologist Gavin Smith (1989) has argued in the case of indigenous peasants in Peru,
experiences of political struggle are inseparable from daily struggles for a livelihood. In
other words, local historical experiences matter as they inform the characteristics of

3

Some indigenous demands have also been incorporated in the discourses, institutions, and practices of
development agencies. Usually framed under “ethnodevelopment” or multiculturalism, international
institutions such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank have adopted mechanisms
that take into consideration the impact of their policies and programs on indigenous communities.
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political mobilization and organization. This approach to the topic of indigenous activism
at the local level in contexts where indigenous peoples are a minority allows me to frame
some questions that give direction this dissertation. I start by asking how collective
identities are formed, and what is their impact on and relationship with indigenous
activism? Under which circumstances do these identities form? More specifically, what is
the relationship between new collective identities and neoliberal multiculturalism? What
place do collective identities have in the new forms of indigenous political activism in
Northern Patagonia? And finally, how are collective identities formed and expressed at
the local level of indigenous activism in minority contexts?

1.1 The case for studying Indigenous Political Identities and
Organization in Minority Contexts

The dissertation focuses on contexts where indigenous peoples are a considerable
minority of the overall population. This focus, in turn, helps to build the argument that
even in contexts where indigenous peoples are a minority, indigenous organizations are
able to extract recognition of collective rights from the state and also to resist specific
practices they see as detrimental to their political objectives and their new collective
identity as peoples. It is important to point out that the increasing body of literature that
studies indigenous movements in Latin America tends to privilege the nation-state level
of analysis (Postero and Zamosc 2004). While the literature often acknowledges the
importance of the local, most studies, particularly in the field of political science, tend to
make a strong commitment to the nation-state level as a privileged site at which to study
the politics of indigenous mobilization (Yashar 2005; Sieder 2002; Van Cott 2000, 1994;
Urban and Sherzer 1991). I argue, however, that in contexts where indigenous peoples
are a minority, the bulk of struggles, negotiation, and contestation between indigenous
peoples and the state takes place at a local level. This is the case even when the
interaction between indigenous activists and state institutions is framed within broader
forms of state practices, citizenship, and collective identities that are transnational in

5

nature (Andolina, Laurie, and Radcliffe 2009; García 2005; Hale 2004). In this regard,
one of the main contributions of this dissertation is to address the gap that exists in the
literature on indigenous movements in minority contexts. I show that for the Mapuche
living in Northern Patagonia the extraction of political gains - in the form of recognition
of new rights, for example – and possibilities to resist are within reach. This, I maintain,
constitutes a form of indigenous politics in its own right.

1.2 Methodological Approach and Research Questions

The dissertation suggests that the ongoing gap between the official recognition of
indigenous rights and their implementation in practice can best be explained through a
qualitative approach informed by ethnographic accounts at the local level that places the
experience of indigenous peoples and the formation of collective political identities at the
centre of analysis. My approach to ethnography shares many of the assumptions of
institutional ethnography (Smith 2006). According to sociologist Dorothy Smith,
institutional ethnography is committed to “exploration and discovery” (2006, 1).
However, this discovery takes place “beyond any one individual’s experience” in order to
analyze and place emphasis in the mapping out of the ways in which people’s activities
are coordinated (2006, 1). I conduct this type of ethnographic discovery in the context of
local organizations, such as the Confederación Mapuche de Neuquén, and I take as
central the experience of Mapuche activists in coordinating their efforts and political
claims vis-à-vis local Mapuche communities and other dimensions of regional and
national politics.
Methodologically, my focus begins with the formation of Mapuche political identities as
a process of negotiation and contestation with the state. This focus serves, in turn, to
explain the characteristics of contemporary forms of Mapuche organizations and their
activism. Central to contemporary Mapuche activism is the set of demands around
territorial autonomy. It is indeed in such instances that activists confront specific state
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practices that contradict the formal recognition of indigenous rights. Claims for
territorial autonomy, in other words, combine struggles for self-representation,
indigenous control over decisions affecting the places they inhabit, and the recognition of
such places as ancestral territories. Defined as such, demands for territorial autonomy are
in contradiction with what neoliberal multiculturalism has to offer to indigenous peoples.
Furthermore, the methodological strategy of this dissertation addresses three dimensions
of indigenous politics that are important to study but tend to be neglected in political
science. These dimensions are: first, the formation of indigenous collective identities and
their translation into political organizations; second, the configuration and consolidation
of such identities as the result of ongoing resistance, negotiations, and accommodation
with the state; and, third, the conflicts around demands for territorial autonomy that often
result in the criminalization and rejection of certain type of indigenous claims by the
state. All three dimensions are studied privileging the local level. Based on this analysis,
my argument is that in the context of indigenous mobilization, collective identities are
configured as the result of the ongoing processes of contestation, struggles and conflict
but also of negotiation and accommodation with institutions, discourses, and practices of
the state.
To carry out an analysis of the three features of identity formation mentioned above
requires ethnographically informed fieldwork that includes, above all, an engagement
with indigenous activists, their allies, and the communities they aim to represent. I rely
on interviews and participant observation I conducted in some Mapuche communities
across the province of Neuquén and in Neuquén city during October 2009. Since then, I
have maintained a relationship with Mapuche activists and have followed the political
process they are engaged in. My most recent visit to the region was in May 2013. My
ethnographic study is complemented by documents produced by the organizations and by
the reporting of indigenous conflicts in the local media. The interviews and participant
observation focused on the process of organization by attending meetings, workshops,
and Mapuche Parleys, and also on mobilizations, for example, by observing land re-
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occupations and mass protests. The secondary sources complemented the analysis and
4

offered a sense of the reaction of state officials to this Mapuche activism.

1.3 The Case: Mapuche Activism in Neuquén, Argentina

Argentina is a place where increasing contention between the state and indigenous
peoples is taking place, and where around 2.4% of the population self identify as
indigenous. However, years of indifference, indecision, and failed policies make a
realistic estimation of the indigenous population in Argentina difficult. Three aspects
contribute to shape the characteristics of indigenous politics in Argentina today, including
demographic factors, provincial identities, and the characteristics of natural resource
management after the constitutional reform of 1994 that transferred ownership of subsoil
resources (e.g., oil, minerals) to the provinces. As Postero and Zamosc suggest, there is
always a series of factors that affect the dynamics of indigenous mobilization, including
“the demography of the countries or regions in which they act; the history of relations
with the state and the assimilation policies the state has implemented; the place
indigenousness plays in the imaginary of the nation; and the political system and
traditions of the country” (2004, 3). These reforms have made provincial governments the
target of many demands for territorial autonomy. The next sections explore in some detail
the demographic characteristics of indigenous peoples in Argentina and the relevance of
the provincial political context to understand indigenous politics in the country that serve
to position Mapuche activism in Northern Patagonia.

4

All translations from Spanish to English are mine. This includes interviews, documents, and newspaper
articles.
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1.3.1

Indigenous peoples in Argentina

As stated above, only around 2.4 per cent of the population in Argentina self-identifies as
5

indigenous. Furthermore, many indigenous peoples living in Argentina today tend to
live in provinces that are located at a considerable distance from Buenos Aires. And
although this demographic factor per se is not sufficient to understand the complexity of
indigenous mobilization, the low numbers often pose additional challenges for
indigenous activists to organize across the country. Arguably, this may also affect the
kinds of relations and negotiations that indigenous organizations establish with the state.
According to the 2010 Census, the provinces with the highest indigenous population are
Chubut (8.5% of Argentina’s overall indigenous population), Neuquén (7.8%), Jujuy
(7.7%), Río Negro (7.1%), Salta (6.5%), and Formosa (6.1%). All these provinces border
neighbouring countries. The census also shows that the provinces included in the
southern region of Patagonia (Neuquén, La Pampa, Chubut, and Río Negro), where
Mapuche communities are located, show a growth of more than 1% in the last ten years
of those who self-identify as indigenous.
The “minority” status of indigenous peoples in Argentina is an important feature of
indigenous politics as it is also connected to the construction of hegemonic provincial
identities. While the endorsement of hegemonic forms of national identities in Argentina
by state institutions has tended to ignore ethnic differences, provincial identities have
tended to incorporate the presence of indigenous populations in some ways, albeit not in
the forms indigenous leaders expected. Although Argentina has been constructed by elite
discourses as a country with “no indigenous peoples,” the demographic and cultural
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A group of scientists from the University of Buenos Aires has determined that roughly 60% of the
national population has DNA that can be traced to indigenous peoples. This shows the complexity of
considering indigenous populations as a “minority.” The issue is clearly more ideological –with its
subsequent political ramifications- than purely demographic (Moledo 2005). Martínez Sarasola (2005) puts
the number of indigenous peoples living in communities at 1.5% of the total population. In 2006,
Argentina’s National Institute of Statistics and Census (INDEC) published the results of the first count of
indigenous population based on self-identification markers: only 402,921 people (1% of the population)
perceived themselves as indigenous or first-generation indigenous descendants (INDEC 2006). By 2010,
the number of households with at least one person who self-identifies as indigenous or as indigenous
descendant was 368,893, accounting for 3.03% of Argentinean households (INDEC 2010). Counting the
population and not households brings down the count to almost 2.38 per cent (INDEC 2010).
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landscape of some provinces offers a stark contrast to a country “with no Indians.”
Certain provinces not only have up to a quarter of their population who self-identify as
indigenous but in some instances provincial identity incorporates “markers” of
indigenous culture. Neuquén, the focus of this study, is a case in point.
Overall, indigenous politics in Argentina has been characterized by the weakness of
organizations or movements on a national scale. Focusing on the level of national
mobilization can consequently lead to important analytical blind-spots in the study of
indigenous mobilization in contemporary Argentina. In other words, while no strong
indigenous organizations representing different ethnicities at the national level exist
today, this study of Mapuche activism in Northern Patagonia serves to demonstrate that
the local level of analysis is an important dimension of indigenous politics today as it is
in this realm that negotiations – including resistance and accommodation – between
indigenous organizations and the state are forged. After all, it is at the local level, where
many indigenous peoples are currently organizing to defend their territories, demand their
right for self-representation, and ensure levels of autonomy to determine how certain
affairs within their communities should be addressed.

1.3.2

Neuquén

The province of Neuquén is located in the southwest of Argentina, in the northern end of
6

Patagonia region, bordering Chile to the west. The city of Neuquén is the provincial
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Patagonia is the Southern region of Argentina and includes five provinces: Neuquén; Río Negro; Chubut;
Santa Cruz; and Tierra del Fuego. Some criteria of classification include the province of La Pampa in the
region as well. Northern Patagonia is a sub-region of Patagonia that includes the provinces of Neuquén and
Río Negro. Other than the Mapuche, the other two indigenous peoples in Patagonia are the Ona and the
Tehuelche. Data from the latest Census (INDEC 2010) shows that while 27,813 respondents self-identified
as Tehuelche, 2,761 self-identified as Ona. The comparison between the 2004-05 Complementary Survey
of Indigenous Peoples and the 2010 Census shows a considerable increase in the number of people who
self-identified as indigenous. In the 2004-05 Survey, there were only 4,300 respondents who self-identified
as Tehuelche and 505 who self-identified as Ona. The case of the Ona (or Selk’nam) is noticeable as it
shows the impact of indigenous activism in contemporary Argentina. Official discourses, for example, have
maintained that the Ona had supposedly disappeared. In 1999, for instance, Clarín, one of Argentina’s most
influential newspapers, reported the death of the “last Ona” (Clarin 1999). Since 2000, however, Ona
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capital and largest city in Patagonia and is located in the east of the province, 1,100
kilometres south from Buenos Aires. The province of Neuquén, in fact, is a case of
relatively recent institutional consolidation. The (violent) presence of the state started to
be felt in the region in the last two decades of the nineteenth century during the selfproclaimed “Conquest of the Desert” conducted by the central government through the
national army and resulting in the destruction of indigenous communities inhabiting this
territory up to that moment (Díaz and Falaschi 2002). The territory of today’s province of
Neuquén was the last region of Northern Patagonia to be occupied by the military
expeditions in the late nineteenth century. Before this occupation the area was considered
one of the most important points of encounter between populations on both sides of the
Andes. In fact, this section of the Andes was considered a space of encounters rather than
divisions or boundaries. Furthermore, the paths that connected both sides of the Andes
across Neuquén’s territory were usually under the control of indigenous communities. In
turn, this control was often a decisive factor in indigenous participation as intermediaries
in trading between the Pampas region – mostly under the control of Buenos Aires - and
the emerging urban centres in Chile.

1.3.3

Mapuche peoples in contemporary Neuquén

The Mapuche constitutes the largest group amongst those who self-identify as indigenous
in Argentina today. Despite this group’s place as a considerable minority in the overall
national population, it has been at the centre of social and political conflicts over
territorial autonomy in Northern Patagonia. In Neuquén, for example, those who identify
as Mapuche constitute 15% of the province’s population. Almost one quarter of the
Mapuche living in Argentina today are in this province.

families have been organizing to demand the Tierra del Fuego government the granting of land titles for
their communities and to question notions of racial purity (Gordillo and Hirsch 2003, 20).
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Since the 1970s, the Mapuche and other indigenous peoples have mobilized politically to
voice specific demands to the state (Maybury-Lewis 1991; Carrasco 2002; Briones 2005).
To be sure, instances of indigenous resistance existed prior to this decade but the
contemporary features of this current mobilization can be found in the process of
indigenous political organization that began in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since then,
new Mapuche activists have demonstrated a notable capacity to organize and mobilize in
order have their demands heard. This dissertation is a testimony to that political process
and to the ways in which the state has responded. Moreover, the notoriety of Mapuche
mobilization in a country like Argentina has to do with the following factors: the early
experiences of Mapuche political organization during the 1970s, particularly under the
military dictatorship (1976-1982) and in a wider context of human rights mobilizations;
the impact of the return of democracy since 1983; the formal recognition of indigenous
rights in provincial legislation and in the national constitution of 1994; the consolidation
of neoliberal policies in the 1990s and their effect on regional development; the
experience of other forms of social mobilization contesting such policies; and finally, the
importance of the regional, provincial political context in which indigenous mobilization
takes place. All these characteristics that mark contemporary Mapuche mobilization are
discussed in more detail in the following chapters.
The experiences of radical mobilization and military authoritarianism in the late 1960s
and early 1970s serve as the background to explain earlier attempts at indigenous
organization. In Neuquén, for example, Mapuche activists created the Confederación
Indígena Neuquina (CIN) in 1971 (today known as the Confederación Mapuche de
Neuquén) and conducted their first futa trawun (parliament) in 1972 with the assistance
of members of the Catholic Church in that province (Serbín 1981; Sarasola 2004). The
military dictatorship of 1976-1983 forced many activists to retreat and, in the case of
Mapuche activists in Neuquén the emphasis during this period was on working internally,
within the communities and in alliance with Catholic bishop Jaime de Nevares and other
human rights activists. Present-day Mapuche activism is, in some ways, a direct result of
that historical context.
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1.4 Neoliberal Multiculturalism and Territorial Autonomy at
the Centre of Mapuche Political Identity

Mapuche politics today seems to corroborate the work of scholars who have highlighted
the contradictions that are inherent under neoliberal multiculturalism (Hale 2004; García
2005; Postero 2007; Andolina, Laurie, and Radcliffe 2009). The notion of neoliberal
multiculturalism is central to my analysis. According to Hale (2006), it refers to a
cultural project that includes a selective recognition of indigenous rights in order to make
such rights and a broader neoliberal order of capitalist accumulation compatible. In a
more general sense, neoliberal multiculturalism disciplines indigenous subjects and their
collective identities while responding to some of their demands (Postero 2007).
Focusing on Mapuche claims for territorial autonomy, this work proposes that the gap
between recognition of rights and their implementation is best explained as a result of
neoliberal multiculturalism as it works in practice. As such, the notion of neoliberal
multiculturalism becomes relevant to make sense of the gap between recognition and
implementation but also to understand the process of Mapuche political identity
formation. My emphasis is on neoliberal multiculturalism as it works in practice in order
to elucidate the ways in which it shapes indigenous collective subjectivities in localized,
everyday practices of political mobilization (Andolina, Laurie, and Radcliffe 2009).
I am also suggesting that collective identities are not always the result of articulations of
forms of belonging of a group that existed prior to political mobilization and
organization, a tendency found in historical institutional approaches (Van Cott 2000;
Yashar 2005; Mattiace 2009; Martí i Puig 2010). On the contrary, collective identity
formation is the result of a process that involves negotiation, accommodation, and
confrontation between indigenous peoples and the state. My study approaches this study
by adopting an interdisciplinary framework that helps me understand the constitutive role
of culture and collective identities in processes of state formation, citizenship, and
neoliberalism. This framework borrows predominantly from anthropological studies and
allows me to study indigenous politics in minority contexts by incorporating more clearly
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the contingent nature of indigenous mobilization at the local level and the complexity of
everyday indigenous organization (García 2005; Escobar 2008; Andolina, Laurie, and
Radcliffe 2009).

1.4.1

Neoliberal Multiculturalism

Neoliberal multiculturalism privileges certain forms of collective identity over others,
leading to the inclusion of indigenous demands in rather limited ways. In this sense, this
dissertation on Mapuche activism builds on Hale’s (2004) notion of neoliberal
multiculturalism that a selective recognition of indigenous rights is compatible with
neoliberalism, while also privileging the study of local practices as a site of negotiation
and contestation between indigenous peoples and the state (Escobar 2008; García 2005).
According to Hale, when indigenous organizations advance demands that are deemed
unacceptable or illegitimate according to the neoliberal logic under which multicultural
neoliberalism operates, states often react by criminalizing or deeming such demands
inappropriate. In practice, for example, indigenous activists spend most of their time
engaging with the judicial system, addressing eviction notices, and contesting official
discourses of government officials who ignore their claims. Moreover, during
confrontations with security forces, and with tear gas in the air, Mapuche leaders find
themselves arguing with state officials about whether their demands are legitimate for
“Indians” to address, and whether these make them “good” or “bad” Mapuche.
For indigenous peoples many of the state policies of recognition under neoliberal
multiculturalism tend to address some of the historical and legal discrimination that
negate their right to exist within the nation-states as distinct groups. However, the work
of anthropologist Claudia Briones (1998) on the Mapuche has raised some concerns
about the reach of contemporary indigenous rights under state-sponsored
multiculturalism. The author suggests that such recognition has made possible the
expansion of the state into new areas that indigenous peoples had reserved for
themselves. For example, neoliberal multiculturalism increases the chances of state
intervention in the internal affairs of indigenous communities as well as the formation of
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a new indigenous subject that is constructed as the “expected interlocutor” vis-à-vis the
state. Hale (2004) makes a similar point when he illustrates the gap between these
expectations that states place on their (native) citizens and the possibilities for indigenous
mobilization with the notion of indio permitido (permitted Indian). The work of María
Elena García (2005) has also emphasized that unequal power relations prevail as they did
in previous historical moments despite official multiculturalism. In sum, political and
economic inequalities under neoliberal multiculturalism, and their effect on indigenous
peoples, tend to remain unchanged despite the recognition of new rights.

1.4.2

Territorial autonomy

The focus of this work on Mapuche demands for territorial autonomy in a context of
negotiation between organizations demanding more inclusive forms of citizenship and the
state illustrates a contentious process that has at its core the contradiction between
neoliberal multiculturalism and the formation of indigenous collective identities. This
process shows that indigenous peoples do not always participate willingly in projects of
accommodation that states have to offer. The reason for that in Northern Patagonia today
is that some Mapuche collective identities and their organizations are incompatible with
the aspirations of the state and local versions of neoliberal multiculturalism. By making
their demands for territorial autonomy central to their collective identity, the Mapuche
become political subjects with the potential to push states for more meaningful changes
in their citizenship regimes vis-à-vis their indigenous populations. Their actions bring to
the forefront the need for the state to address past abuses, current injustices, and future
paths to take to satisfy any aspirations to a more fair intercultural society.
For Mapuche peoples today, control over their territory implies that they will live
according to the values and norms of their own worldviews. The notion of territory, in
fact, is central for Mapuche activists in Neuquén as control over it reinforces indigenous
identity and is considered a place where different indigenous philosophies and
worldviews emerge (Surralés and García Hierro 2005). States however often see these
territories in different ways, for example, as administrative units with specific regimes of
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ownership, or as spaces in the hand of businesses and market forces which have their own
ends in relation to local natural resources. Two principles have informed the relationship
of states with indigenous peoples: territorial integrity as a sign of state sovereignty; and
the protection of some sectors of society which in turn share some of the interests of the
state. For indigenous peoples, the combination of these goals has translated into the
official non-recognition of, or limitations on, territorial autonomy (Urteaga Crovetto
2000). In some cases, it is difficult to estimate what would happen if and when regimes of
territorial autonomy were to be implemented. Still, Mapuche activists argue that this
should not be a reason for states to deny the implementation of what they have
recognized as legitimate indigenous rights.
Despite some obvious advantages, the use of the concept of territorial autonomy runs the
risk of being misrepresented and used against indigenous people. Taken by those
opposing indigenous peoples’ demands, the term can be interpreted as a claim for
political secession. Territorial integrity has been a fundamental dimension of the modern
state and as a result any claims that could suggest that this integrity is in peril will
encounter open resistance. Throughout Latin America however, indigenous activism has
hardly centered on demands to break free from nation-states. On the contrary, territorial
autonomy is often the expression of struggles for political self-representation and control
over resources. This set of demands includes control over the internal affairs of
indigenous communities, control over natural resources and their exploitation, and the
possibility of creating institutions of political representation according to the cultural
practices of a community. In a nutshell, this is what the notion of autonomy entails for
most indigenous movements today (Blaser et al. 2010). The quest for autonomy involves,
in other words, the possibility to control the affairs of indigenous communities in their
own terms. According to anthropologist John Bodley, autonomy should be seen as the
possibility of indigenous peoples exercising “control over [their] own affairs, on their
own terms, [and] within their own territories” (2008, 185).
The point that my study on Mapuche politics also tries to make is that while there is
nothing “natural” or “essential” about placing territorial autonomy at the centre of
Mapuche political identity, it is important to emphasize that the notion of a “Mapuche
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territory” is key to understand the relationship between Mapuche activists and the state,
including the characteristics that the negotiation, tensions, and conflicts between the two
adopt. The notion of a territory, however, does not merely consist of a rural space
endowed with natural resources that exists in isolation from mainstream society in an
idyllic time. As Surralés and García Hierro (2005, 11) point out, there is “a wide range of
possibilities in terms of peoples’ material and symbolic ties with their territories.” The
notion of indigenous territories, for example, may also include urban spaces, as many
Mapuche Youth organizations living in the cities of Northern Patagonia have clearly
articulated.
Historically, the meanings attached to territories have not been exempt from conflicts
related to processes of state formation (Domínguez 2001). Before and after the political
independence of former colonies, for example, white settlers considered the territories
under the control of indigenous peoples as “deserts” or terra nullious, that is, land
belonging to no one. As Briones (1998) suggests, it is also the case that state formation
and the importance of certain territories change over time, varying according to different
historical contexts (e.g., colonial expansion, early liberal republicanism, modern statebuilding). Land, for example, constituted the main resource and basis of contention that
mediated the social relationships between groups in the early stages of modern state
formation in Argentina, particularly since the second half of the 19th century. Since then,
land constituted the core of diverse policies of territorialisation that the state has used to
deal with the so-called Indian Question, which included the creation of reservations,
national parks or Christian “civilizing” missions (Briones 1998, Gordillo 2004). Thus
indigenous demands for territorial autonomy cannot be dissociated from historical
circumstances of state formation and social change, particularly at those times when
states have adopted models of capitalist accumulation that affect some of these territories
and the spatial conception one has of them directly.
The neoliberal state, with its emphasis on expanding global capitalist forces, poses a
direct threat to many indigenous communities. However, despite their resistance, the
consolidation of an approach to development that privileges investment in extractive
industries, agro-industrial businesses, and private tourism, to name a few, puts the
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possibilities of indigenous communities controlling the fate of the territories they inhabit
at risk.
This brief account serves to demonstrate how the centrality of demands for territorial
autonomy makes the conflicts between states and indigenous peoples more explicit and
sharper. In sum, territorial autonomy today is at the centre of what authors like Arturo
Escobar (2001, 2008) have termed “a politics of place.” Place refers to an “anchoring
point,” a “source of livelihood and culture,” and a “space where socio-natural worlds are
produced.” (Escobar, Rocheleau, and Kothari 2002, 28) In this sense, a “politics of place”
has the goal of integrating these dimensions included in the idea of place as well as
defending them from the interests of states and/or global capital. For many indigenous
peoples, place continues to be important. It is so, Escobar argues, because no matter how
unstable, affected by power relations, porous, or socially constructed the experience of
being connected with a particular location can be, place still provides a “sense of
“groundedness, a sense of boundaries, and connection to everyday life.” (2001, 140) As
this dissertation demonstrates, in more detail in the following chapters, Mapuche politics
in Neuquén offers an illustration of indigenous politics in contemporary Argentina as
place-based in the sense that Escobar and others see it (Radcliffe 2005; Andolina, Laurie,
and Radcliffe 2009).

1.5 Theories: State Formation, Collective Identities, and
Neoliberal Citizenship

This dissertation builds on the existing literature that explains the formation of
indigenous collective identities by focusing on the historical interaction between states
and indigenous peoples (Yashar 2005) as well as on those approaches that privilege the
socio-economic context in which such relationship takes place (Hale 2002; García 2005).
It also relies on the work of authors who have privileged the study of local dynamics to
understand global or transnational processes affecting indigenous politics (Andolina,
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Laurie, and Radcliffe 2009; Escobar 2008). The dissertation uses this interdisciplinary
approach in order to offer insight into the limitations of neoliberal multiculturalism in
practice and the ways in which collective identities are a product of localized contestation
and negotiation with states. It demonstrates how the quest for territorial autonomy of
Mapuche activists today is the result of the ongoing process of negotiation and
contestation vis-à-vis state practices and the result of specific historical conjunctures.
Moreover, the argument has broader implications for the ways in which one
conceptualizes the intersection between state formation, citizenship, and collective action
in Latin America. It is also a reminder that this era has been characterized, perhaps too
soon for indigenous peoples, as “post-neoliberal.” The following sections expand on the
specific contributions that the existing literature provides to this study on Mapuche
politics.

1.5.1

Institutions Matter: The contribution of historical
institutionalism

The study of institutions has been an important contribution to studies of indigenous
politics (Yashar 2005; Sieder 2002; Van Cott 2000, 1994; Urban and Sherzer 1991). This
is important because, until recently, mainstream political studies have traditionally
ignored the ethnic dimension of Latin American politics. Many studies conducted during
the 1980s and 1990s tended to privilege the study of democratization with a particular
emphasis on notions such as “transition” or “consolidation” (Huntington 1991). Since
then, more nuanced studies have rendered such characterization of politics in the region
problematic (O’Donnell 1994; 1996). After the 2000s, the emergence of indigenous
organizations and the politicization of indigenous identity of the previous two decades
was reflected in studies that privileged the analysis of the institutional transformations
that, according to some authors, explain and shape indigenous movements (Van Cott
2000, 2005; Sieder 2002; Stavenhagen 2009). Within the studies that privilege the
interaction of identity politics with institutional transformations, the contributions of
Deborah Yashar (2005) are central.
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As stated above, Yashar identifies a clear connection between the emergence of
indigenous movements and institutional changes, particularly of what the author refers to
as “regimes of citizenship” (2005, 6). Focusing on the cases of Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru,
Guatemala, and Mexico, Yashar argues that the emergence of indigenous movements on
a national scale is explained as the result of three main factors: changes in citizenship
regimes that pose a direct threat to existing de facto local autonomies; the existence of
previous trans-community networks that improve the capacity of indigenous
organizations to mobilize; and the existence of a “political associational space” that
sustains such mobilization.
This dissertation also privileges the intersection between identity politics and the state.
As Yashar explains, institutions matter and states in particular have the capacity to
privilege certain collective identities over others. Moreover, by opening new spaces of
participation, for example, the state also provides incentives to accommodate some
political identities (Jackson 1995). I may add that states can also restrict, repress and
deem illegitimate certain identities and types of activism that are seen as threatening to
their mechanisms of rule and control. In this kind of analysis, the state becomes a point of
departure to analyze the ways in which it shapes collective identities in practice. But, as
Yashar warns, the study of the state cannot be taken at face value. In order to understand
ongoing conflicts between states and indigenous peoples, for example, one needs to move
beyond an analysis of institutions. This calls for a closer look at state formation as a
cultural process that involves the constitution of collective identities as well as changes in
the systems of signification (Melucci 1996; Steinmetz 1999). Furthermore, the analysis
must include the ways in which states privilege certain subjectivities, specific forms of
knowledge, and some cultural practices over others. And while I agree with Yashar’s
point that it is important to consider the actual reach of the state and not just its
intentions, I maintain that the analysis can only be enhanced and made more compelling
if one pays closer attention to those cultural, critical approaches to state formation that
favour the formation of certain subjectivities over others. Since this understanding of
state formation is central to my argument, I elaborate on this approach in the following
chapter.
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Following Yashar, I also maintain that a careful look at citizenship helps to understand
the ways in which states and indigenous peoples interact. But citizenship, I argue, needs
to be understood as more than the status of legal subjects belonging to a political
community. A more encompassing approach needs to include the possibility of
understanding citizenship as a claim – including resistance – as well as a mechanism for
governing subjectivities. In short, citizenship is not limited to what states give to their
subjects in the form of rights. Citizenship also includes the demands and claims that
subjects make to states. Finally, in this process of negotiation over rights and claims,
citizenship also becomes a set of mechanisms and discourses that states use to govern the
identity and actions of their subjects. This understanding of citizenship as both resistance
and government, and its relation to the study of state formation from a cultural
perspective is elaborated in the following chapter.
Finally, I adopt Yashar’s suggestion that political identities are contingent and open to
change. Furthermore, I maintain that such identities have to be explained in relation to
institutional as well as cultural changes although they are not always malleable or fixed.
As García (2005) points out, collective identities are plural and as markers of political
mobilization they are dynamic and change according to different historical contexts. In
other words, there is always room for citizens to challenge and resist aspects of any given
process of state formation or citizenship, a point that Nancy Postero (2007) also
emphasizes in her study of “post-multicultural citizenship” in Bolivia.

1.5.2

Neoliberal citizenship

To understand Mapuche politics in contemporary Argentina, and indigenous politics in
minority contexts more generally, we need to recognize that indigenous activism takes
place in a context where states offer not only “political associational spaces”, as Yashar
has suggested, but also opportunities to participate in the design and implementation of
programs and policies that affect the livelihoods of indigenous communities: in other
words, specific efforts by states to accommodate indigenous peoples through a number of
initiatives that go beyond the passive guaranteeing of association spaces in which citizens
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can participate. But conflict between indigenous peoples and the state persists despite
such accommodations and my study of Mapuche politics suggests that the reasons for
such conflict can be found in the neoliberalization of indigenous citizenship that
privileges certain types of indigenous identities and demands over others.
Gavin Smith’s (1989) classic study of peasant struggles in Peru serves to elucidate some
of the points I try to make in this dissertation. Smith argues that there is a clear
interconnection between political mobilization, including collective subjectivities, and
development strategies. Furthermore, the author demonstrates something that is central to
my argument, namely, that local initiatives that manifest themselves as diverse forms of
resistance (e.g., land occupations, road blockades) are central to understand contemporary
indigenous activism (Smith 1989, 12). In the case of Argentina, this approach is crucial
as otherwise the hitherto apparent passivity of indigenous movements on a national scale
could suggest that indigenous politics in the country is non-existent. As García points out,
“privileging the large-scale politics of protest can often result in missing other equally
important but less visible arenas of contention” (2005, 188). Paraphrasing Smith, my goal
is not to ask why Mapuche communities resist or which Mapuche organizations do so
more effectively or better than others but rather how Mapuche resistance is put together
(1989, 25). A closer look at local dynamics in Mapuche communities, for example, can
also demonstrate what Smith has shown for the case of Peru: that “intense” political
struggles are “inseparable” from daily struggles for a livelihood (1989, 12). As a result,
understanding the ways in which collective identities are forged and the role such
identities play in political struggles requires a historical analysis of development
strategies adopted by states (Smith 1989, 14). The idea of these “cultural” struggles (i.e.,
identity-based) is that they are also the result of an engagement with the present that is
always mediated by history and collective memory (Smith 1989, 25).
Needless to say, this approach does not suggest that local resistance happens all the time,
or that all local political initiatives will lead to some final horizon of liberation. The point
of focusing on local indigenous activism is to demonstrate how for the most part
Mapuche activism today is the result of a negotiation with the state (and amongst activists
themselves) that includes resistance and opposition as much as accommodation and
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(temporary) alliances. To study the quest for accommodation, I turn to more recent
studies of the relationship between neoliberalism, which is understood as a new set of
discourses and practices of development, and indigenous politics. I borrow from Charles
Hale (2002) the notion of neoliberal multiculturalism to address the tensions that exist
between indigenous resistance, neoliberalism, and multicultural citizenship.
Charles Hale (2002) provides a more recent analysis of the ways in which development
strategies, states, and indigenous movements are interconnected. According to this
author, multicultural policies in Latin America are the cultural manifestation of the
dominant neoliberal order. In this context, some indigenous demands are permitted,
encouraged, and legitimized as long as they do not enter into conflict with neoliberal
projects of capitalist accumulation. The notion of indio permitido, or the “permitted
Indian”, further illustrates Hale’s point that while certain indigenous identities are
tolerated and even encouraged, others are challenged and deemed illegitimate.
María Elena García’s (2005) work on indigenous identity, development, and what she
calls “multicultural” activism in Peru, also contributes to my study of contemporary
Mapuche politics. Garcia shows, for example, how the local dimension of indigenous
activism is relevant to understand the ways in which neoliberal multiculturalism affects
indigenous activism and how indigenous leaders respond to the new expectations of
indigenous citizenship. In other words, the “political performance” of the state, including
its discourses and practices, are often felt at the local level. Moreover, the author’s
emphasis on the local serves to give a nuanced view of Mapuche struggles in Argentina
over the meaning and content of indigenous citizenship under neoliberal
multiculturalism.
The following chapters show in more detail the results of my analysis. By adopting an
interdisciplinary framework that renders cultural processes central for our understanding
of state formation, citizenship, and collective action, my goal is to demonstrate how
collective identity formation matters to understand indigenous politics. Furthermore, my
study reveals the results of adopting this interdisciplinary approach ethnographically in
order to engage with the local dimension of indigenous activism, especially in those
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contexts where indigenous peoples are a minority. By paying close attention to collective
identity formation and claims for territorial autonomy at the local level, I show how
Mapuche activists are deeply involved in a process that includes new forms of political
organization, the creation of new spaces for indigenous participation within the
bureaucratic structures of the state, and instances of open conflict that result in the
criminalization of Mapuche demands. All these dimensions of Mapuche activism, in turn,
are deeply connected to the discourses and practices of neoliberal multiculturalism.

1.6 Plan of the Dissertation

The following chapters expand on the issues discussed in this Introduction. Chapter 2
discusses the theoretical perspectives available to understand the recent transformations
in the relationship between states and indigenous peoples, namely the neoliberalization of
the state, its forms of citizenship, and the ways in which collective identities are formed.
Chapter 3 addresses the historical process of state formation in Argentina with a
particular emphasis on the discourses and policies implemented in order to accommodate
the so-called “Indian Question” in Argentina up to the present. This chapter and the ones
that follow draw on in-depth interviews, internal documents from Mapuche
organizations, and media reports to describe the challenges associated with Mapuche
mobilization in Northern Patagonia and the ways in which new political identities are
forged and negotiated with the state. Their particular focus is Neuquén and the
experience of the Confederación Mapuche de Neuquén.
Chapter 4 explores the emergence of a new Mapuche political subjectivity, and it focuses
on the work of the Confederación Mapuche in order to address three dimensions of this
new political subjectivity: first, the quest for self-representation; second, the construction
of Mapuche demands through the notion of interculturalidad; and finally, the meaning
that the work of the CMN has for Mapuche communities defending their territories.
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Chapter 5 places Mapuche mobilization in the local political context and examines the
experience of Mapuche mobilization that resulted in the formal recognition of indigenous
rights at the provincial level, in new projects of accommodation in which Mapuche
activists are “invited” to participate, and finally in the strategies of appropriation by
activists as new forms of resistance given the specific constraints. In other words, this
chapter focuses on instances of Mapuche political mobilization that resulted in the
recognition of new rights and on instances of accommodation.
Chapter 6 bring the experiences discussed in the previous two chapters together in order
to analyze specific instances of the struggle for territorial autonomy and state responses
to it. It does so by focusing on the strategies of recuperaciones territoriales (territorial reoccupations), and by exploring the increasing criminalization of Mapuche mobilization as
a key element in the state’s response.
The Conclusion summarizes the findings and puts forth a proposal on how the experience
of Mapuche mobilization and organization around demands for territorial autonomy
serves to illustrate the complex relationship between the state, citizenship and indigenous
peoples under neoliberal multiculturalism.
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Chapter 2

“[…] There comes a moment when one asks oneself: Is it possible that the
quest for the true word compels us to shush so many people? What exactly
is the meaning of this evasion that tends to disqualify the verbiage of every
proffered message in favour of the mute eloquence of one who is not
heard?” (Rancière 1989, 11)

2

Indigenous peoples and the state: Toward a political
and conceptual approach

Mapuche activism in contemporary Argentina echoes some of the dynamics of
indigenous politics in other parts of Latin America. For example, the Mapuche have
adopted new forms of political organization that emphasize ethnic identity and have
pressured state officials to recognize new, collective rights. This indigenous group,
however, is only a minority of the country’s population. In order to understand the ways
in which political activism takes place in contexts where indigenous groups are a
minority, we need to adopt an interdisciplinary framework that privileges the local
dimensions of collective action. As James C. Scott (1990) has forcefully argued,
subordinate groups engage with forms of resistance at the local level, even if these are
rarely recognized as political by those who study them simply because they do not always
adopt overt political action. Such explicit political action is unquestionably important but
in contexts where indigenous peoples are a minority, it is often rare. We need a
conceptual lens, therefore, that pays closer attention to the cultural dynamics of state
formation, citizenship, and collective action as locally situated processes. By adopting
such a framework, the local activism of groups such as the Mapuche in contemporary,
neoliberal, Argentina can be seen as politically relevant, and not simply as a set of local
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and isolated events. Neoliberal multiculturalism entails a superficial form of state
recognition of ethnic difference that limits, in practice, certain forms of indigenous
activism. In my study, I focus on state-sponsored initiatives and the formation of political
collective identities and forms of indigenous activism at the local level that have
indigenous rights at their core. It is at the local level, I argue, where state-sponsored
neoliberal multiculturalism and indigenous activism interact. I also privilege the local
level because it is there where indigenous peoples negotiate with and challenge the state,
especially in contexts where indigenous groups are a minority of the national population.
Modern states in Latin America have been forced from the start to address the existence
of indigenous populations under their expanding rule. The state’s concern with the
inclusion of indigenous populations in the emerging nations was often referred to as the
“Indian Question” and it has its roots in the colonial period. Since the 19th century, states
have attempted to address the Indian Question by designing specific mechanisms of
inclusion and exclusion of indigenous peoples. Such mechanisms constitute what
Deborah Yashar (2005) and others refer to as citizenship regimes that are designed by
states to include and exclude the population within their national territory, including
indigenous peoples. In the present context, both the state and citizenship regimes have
been transformed as a result of neoliberalism. By defining the goals of the state, for
example, these transformations also inform the conditions under which contemporary
Mapuche activism takes place.
In this chapter I outline the elements of my framework by engaging with the critical
scholarship on state formation, citizenship, and collective identities. I first address the
role of institutions in understanding modern state formation and suggest that we need to
look at the constitutive role of cultural processes and systems of signification to
understand state formation. This focus on cultural processes enables us to see how states
and their mechanisms of rule are always open to contestation from below. I then review
the concept of citizenship, which I argue is central to understand contemporary
indigenous activism and its relationship to the state. Even in contexts where they are a
minority, indigenous peoples have been able to secure new spaces of participation within
the institutional structure of states as a result of changing forms of citizenship. Such
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spaces, however, are not simply about the recognition of new rights. They are also a form
of discipline, control, and regulation that provides access to participation but also
imposes constraints on political pressure from below. In other words, citizenship operates
as a mechanism both of inclusion and exclusion, and it involves a language of discipline
and resistance.
Understanding state formation and its institutions as cultural practices, and citizenship as
including discipline and control, allows me to characterize neoliberalism as a form of
state intervention that informs a particular kind of citizenship regime (Foucault 1991). I
turn to a discussion of how the state and citizenship regimes have been transformed as a
result of neoliberal forms of rule, to establish a connection between these changes and the
concept of neoliberal multiculturalism, which I argue is central to understand Mapuche
activism in contemporary Argentina. Neoliberal multiculturalism informs the ways in
which the present relationship between indigenous peoples and the state is understood. I
then engage with the literature on social movements and collective action in order to
adopt from these analyses those conceptual tools that help us better understand the
relationship between the political context in which they take place and the cultural
processes involved in social mobilization. Finally, I turn to anthropological studies on
ethnic movements that have privileged the ways in which ethnic identities are socially
constructed in a context of ongoing mobilization and interaction with social institutions.
These sociological and anthropological debates provide important concepts to understand
indigenous politics as local practices of engagement with the neoliberal state and its
forms of citizenship. Before turning to a discussion of state formation and citizenship, I
offer an overview of the evolving preoccupation of modern Latin American states with
their indigenous populations.

2.1 Making citizens: indigenous peoples and the state in
Latin America
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The contemporary image of indigenous leaders throughout Latin America negotiating
with state officials for the recognition and implementation of their collective rights
signals a changing relationship between Indians and the state in the region, as many
observers point out. These forms of indigenous activism are increasingly taking place in
countries where indigenous peoples are a considerable minority of the national
population. This relationship has deep historical roots that are connected with a process
of modern state formation (García 2005; Clark and Becker 2007; Postero 2007). Central
to this relationship is the question of the place of indigenous peoples in the state, and
citizenship is at the core. Indeed, ongoing tensions between states and their indigenous
populations in the region have been central since the colonial period. The label of
“Indian,” rooted in a racial classification, has its origins in the colonization of the
American continent and has been part of the ongoing process of state formation up to the
present.

7

According to Quijano, the label of “Indians” emerged as the crystallization of “otherness”
during colonial America. For him, the idea of race was naturalized and used as a
justification for the subordination of Indians to Europeans (Quijano 2000; Mignolo
2005). Following this author, one can identify power exercised along a “racial axis” as a
founding product of colonial domination that nonetheless survived the end of
colonialism. Indeed, this form of domination based on race did not disappear with the
end of colonialism and social hierarchies based on racial principles were perpetuated by
newly independent Latin America, where indigenous peoples continued to occupy the
lowest rungs of society.
The imposition of colonial rule also inaugurated new forms of domination that varied
across the vast geographies conquered due to regional differences in colonial
administration and to pre-existing native structures that the conquerors did not always
erase. Thus, whereas in some latitudes the Spanish Crown left some pre-existing tribute
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Before the colonial period there were no such identity markers. Thus, the organization of society along
the lines of race and racial identity has its origins in the colonization of the American continent. In that
context, colonial administrations consolidated their power over society by categorizing colonial subjects as
“Indian”, “Black” or “Mestizo” (Quijano 2000; Mignolo 2005).
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systems, as in Ecuador or Bolivia, in other areas the Crown did not subjugate or conquer
territories under the control of indigenous peoples. This gave indigenous communities
considerable levels of de facto autonomy. This autonomy, however, was not absolute. It
was not until after the revolutionary period of independence in the early nineteenth
century that areas such as Patagonia were conquered. During the colonial period, the
relationship of particular geographies to the world market limited the extent of
indigenous autonomies. In addition, existing forms of racial subordination contributed to
the control over labour (in the forms of slavery, serfdom, or albeit rarely, waged labour)
and resources by colonial administrations. Thus, under colonialism, race and labour
relations reinforced and increasingly became dependent on each other. Since then,
Indians have provided the colonizers with two necessary sources for the economic
exploitation of their domains, namely their labour and their land, including the resources
indigenous peoples previously controlled (Quijano 2000).
Political independence and the republican liberal ideas of the nineteenth century created
new means of addressing the existence and location of indigenous populations in the
newly formed, independent states. For example, in many parts of Latin America the race
and labour relations created after centuries of colonial administration changed as new
ideas of nationhood emerged during the revolutionary period. In practice, Indians
remained marginalized in the political elites’ quest for social modernization and progress
(Bodley 2008). At best, Indians as such were expected to disappear and adopt the national
identity of a mestizo (mixed race), an identity that in the mind of the elites could
overcome the colonial racial tensions of the past by guaranteeing some degree of social
homogeneity and sentiments of belonging. In Bolivia, Ecuador and Mexico, for example,
political elites articulated national ideologies of mestizaje according to which the nation
was constructed along the lines of a mixed race. The political impact of this decision
meant in practice the maintenance of the economic and political status of political elites
and the marginalization of contemporary Indians who refused to be incorporated into the
nation in terms that negated their pre-Columbian past.
New forms of racism and exclusion emerged with this push by states to create ideas of, or
institutions based on, social homogeneity. In fact, as Balibar and Wallerstein (1991)
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argue, racism and nationalism go hand in hand with historical processes of state
formation. According to Balibar (1991), racism is neither autonomous nor primary but a
social relation that goes well beyond the behaviour of “irrational” subjects and is to be
found embedded in social and political institutions. Furthermore, racism resides in
practices as well as discourses and social representations articulated around the “stigmata
of otherness.” In Balibar’s terms, “it is this combination of practices, discourses and
representations in a network of affective stereotypes which enables us to give an account
of the formation of a racist community […] and also of the way in which, as a mirror
image, individuals and collectivities that are prey to racism […] find themselves
constrained to see themselves as a community” (Balibar 1991, 18).
When national territories were redefined and the need to secure them by force was
recognized, the populations living in those areas were immediately placed under the
control of central authorities. More specifically, if these populations possessed different
political allegiances, had a de facto control over the territories they inhabited, belonged to
a cultural group that was considered by the elites to be part of a barbaric past, or if these
groups attempted to resist the expansion of central authorities, the result was often their
mass-annihilation. Those who were spared were placed under the control of institutions
with the goal of assimilating them into the emerging modern nations. At times, the elites
also conceived as a natural and inevitable evolutionary process the elimination of those
populations that they considered inferior. In practice, uncontrolled frontiers, military
force, and the non-violent extension of administrative control explain the loss of
autonomy and self-sufficiency of indigenous peoples (Bodley 2008, 37).
In the twentieth century, the consolidation of the welfare-corporatist state and populist
discourses of indigenismo reframed the so-called Indian Question as a Social Question. In
effect, a new citizenship regime was ushered in that integrated indigenous peoples as
poor peasants, and as part of an ostensibly non-racialized pueblo. The concepts of
populism and indigenismo are difficult to define. However, they help to explain the
relationship between indigenous peoples and the state throughout much of the past
century. As a discursive framework and a set of practices, populism links the interests of
the state (and often of a ruler) with those of el pueblo (the people). In populist discourse,
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the nation and “the people” share the same interests, which in turn are often presented
against those of the old oligarchies. Under populism, el pueblo adopts abstract
characteristics in relation to oppositional forces (e.g., landed oligarchies, imperial
interests) and appears as a category that includes indigenous peoples, peasants, informal
workers, and the urban working class. In general, populism gave collective action a
language that frequently moved beyond discourses of class, nationality, or ethnicity
(Laclau 1977; Albó 1994; Roberts 1995; Conniff 1999; Cammack 2000; Svampa 2004).
One of the main challenges of populism vis-à-vis indigenous peoples was how to create a
homogeneous notion of citizenship and nationhood, and indigenismo proved to be an
attractive approach. The nationalism of the Latin American welfare-corporatist era is
often characterized by the attempt of political leaders to reduce the “Indian problem” to
its minimal expression through the assimilation of Indians into a homogenous idea of
“the nation.” Education systems and the formation of national unions, for example, have
been institutional conduits for this incorporation. In general terms, from a top-down
perspective it was assumed that the rural Indian would disappear to give way, for
instance, to a “Bolivian peasant” or an “Ecuadorian peasant.” Furthermore, the
emergence of the peasant as a marker of socio-economic identity has been seen as a sign
of the disappearance not only of the “Indian” as a political category but also as the end of
ongoing forms of racial discrimination. This was seen as the result of an inexorable
process of economic and political – as well as social and cultural - modernization.
If the appeals to el pueblo generated new spaces to articulate popular demands that
emerged from class, ethnic, and racial tensions, indigenismo made an effort to
incorporate, specifically, indigenous populations into the nation and to critique the
prevalent racism of the liberal republicanism of the nineteenth century. In fact,
indigenismo consists of an attempt to integrate indigenous issues into prevailing ideas of
nationhood. According to Mignolo (2005), indigenismo was a category for the
manifestation of national ideologies in the hands and minds of the non-indigenous.
Giraudo and Lewis, have characterized indigenismo as a “diverse political, economic, and
cultural movement that celebrated indigenous people and their traditions, on the one
hand, but usually also called for their modernization, assimilation, and ‘improvement,’ on
the other” (2012, 3). With such characteristics, indigenismo was adopted as an ideology
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of modern state building, both in areas where indigenous populations were large, as in
Mexico or Peru, and where the Indian population was small, as in Brazil. As these
authors maintain, the outcomes of indigenismo varied depending on the political and
social contexts in which it became dominant.
Under indigenismo, new policies were proposed and implemented. Through these
policies, states provided institutional support that celebrated indigenous traditions and
provided mechanisms to secure the provision of some government services for
indigenous communities. However, Indians themselves “did not have any role to play or
anything to say” in these policy decisions, resulting in paternalism and a disregard of
indigenous participation in the decisions that affected them directly (Mignolo 2005, 102).
Indigenismo has been criticized for being ineffective and paternalistic, for its goal of
assimilating Indians into mainstream society, and for ignoring the state’s responsibility
for genocide and ethnocide (Giraudo and Lewis 2012, 5). Indigenismo has also been
criticized for not addressing the root cause of unjust political and economic systems that
contributed to indigenous exploitation and as such for helping to preserve the status quo
(Bonfil Batalla 1977; Díaz Polanco 1997; Giraudo and Lewis 2012).
The dominant place of indigenismo in the discourses of nation-building and stateformation during the first half of the twentieth century was largely unchallenged, and it
8

remained so until the 1970s and early 1980s. During the 1970s, in the context of
generalized radical mobilizations throughout Latin America, indigenous activism gained
more visibility. By the 1980s, these struggles blended with the resistance to structural
adjustment and economic austerity plans that became dominant in the region. During the
same period, and in the context of international pressure for the recognition of indigenous
rights, Latin American states responded to indigenous demands by granting them new
cultural rights and by officially acknowledging the multi-ethnic composition of societies
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While at the ideological level indigenismo was put into question and was severely criticized in the 1970s
and 1980s, particularly during the VIII Inter-American Indigenist Congress, states in the region continued
developing policies under its framework. The VIII Congress, however, pointed to the severe limitations of
indigenista policies, criticizing their underlying strategies of control of indigenous organizations and
struggles across the region (Giraudo and Lewis 2012).
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in their constitutions and laws. The notion of “neoliberal multiculturalism” captures the
paradoxes that exist between this formal recognition of indigenous rights and the lack of
improvement in the living conditions that most indigenous peoples still experience.

2.2 State formation: from “neutral” institutions to the
constitutive role of culture

A historical account of Indian-State relations in Latin America highlights the ways in
which regimes of citizenship change over time and how these processes are related to
modern state formation. In other words, when it comes to understanding the historical
relationship between Indians and states, institutions matter. Institutions, for example,
frame the spaces within which indigenous demands can be articulated and contested.
Moreover, indigenous mobilizations are arguably part of the long history of modern state
formation in Latin America. In such ongoing negotiations, which involve accommodation
as well as resistance, both indigenous identities and the state are affected. In this section I
argue, following Steinmetz (1999), that the study of the state needs to move beyond
mainstream institutional analysis and include the constitutive role of cultural processes
and systems of signification. This is critical for understanding the relationship of
indigenous activism to the state as one involving accommodation and resistance. This
conceptualization opens new perspectives that privilege, for example, the transformation
of state subjects through regimes of citizenship.
There is a vast literature on the state and state formation from an institutional perspective.
Mainstream variants of this literature tend to view state institutions as neutral arenas
where divergent social interests are represented. Many of these studies, in fact, follow a
narrow reading of Max Weber’s work on the modern state. As an ideal type, such a state
is characterized by clear territorial boundaries and the legitimate monopoly of coercive
power (Weber 1958). Charles Tilly, for example, has defined states as “coercion wielding
organizations that are distinct from households and kinship groups and exercise clear
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priority in some respects over all other organizations within substantial territories”
(quoted in Steinmetz 1999, 8). More recently, some approaches have focused on the
state’s reach and functional imperatives to regulate society (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and
Skocpol 1985; World Bank 1997). The presumed neutrality of state institutions in
mainstream analyses, however, has been challenged by pluralist theories (Mann 1984),
Marxism (Althusser 1971; Gramsci 1975; Marx 1998), neo-Marxism (Carnoy 1984;
Amin 1991), and most eloquently by feminist approaches (Enloe 1989; McKinnon 1989;
Brown 1992).
Institutional perspectives typically assume that states have a predetermined set of core
functions and historical tasks. This has been challenged by authors who have tried to
understand states as state formation and to see them as processes that are purely
contingent and characterized as localized historical relations and practices and discourses
of political rule that matter (Corrigan and Sayer 1985; Foucault 1991; Corrigan 1994;
Rose 1999; Dean 2010; Hansen and Stepputat 2001; Lemke 2001; Abrams 2006). For
these authors, state institutions re-produce power relations that are pre-determined by
earlier struggles and conflict (Mallon 1994). Making explicit this historicity helps us
understand current conflicts, negotiations between states and indigenous peoples, and the
possibilities for change.
A growing literature on Latin American indigenous politics that relies on a historical
understanding of the state as state formation has rightly emphasized the fundamental role
that different patterns of development and capitalist expansion have played in the process
of state formation (Cardoso and Faletto 1979; Wade 1997; Clark and Becker 2007). For
the case of Argentina, for example, historian Halperin Donghi (2005) has shown how
export-oriented models of economic growth, extensive agriculture in estancias (large
estates), and traditional industries have influenced the distribution of power among elites,
the formation of political projects of nation-building, and the decisions that have affected
indigenous groups directly.
Recent post-colonial approaches to the state remind us of the importance of colonial
legacies in the study of present-day indigenous politics and nation-states. According to
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post-colonialism, contemporary transnational capital and forms of state violence interact
with colonial legacies underpinning state formation on the periphery of global capitalism
(Badie 2000; Young 2001; Asad 2004; Shapiro 2004; Hill 2005). Control, or political
sovereignty, over territory has traditionally defined the European-based model of the
modern nation-state. This approach assumes that the central institutions of the state
exercise assertive physical control over the space defined within internationally
recognized boundaries. The consistency and apparent straightforwardness of this notion
disappears, however, when non-Western realities are taken into account. In postcolonial
societies the “margins” of state control, or those areas where the state does not reach,
gain relevance. It is in those spaces where the imagined state and its very real institutions,
including those of law and order, attempt to bring those populations that are marginal into
the scope of the nation. Das and Poole explain the relevance of these margins in the
following terms:
“Located always on the margins of what is accepted as the territory of
unquestioned state control (and legitimacy), the margins […] are
simultaneously sites where nature can be imagined as wild and
uncontrolled and where the state is constantly refounding its models of
order and lawmaking. These sites are not merely territorial: they are also
[…] sites of practices on which law and other state practices are
colonized by other forms of regulation that emanate from the pressing
needs of population to secure political and economic survival.” (2004, 8)
This study relies on critical approaches to the state that highlight cultural processes as
foundational – or constitutive – for understanding state formation (Steinmetz 1999).
Culture, as Raymond Williams has reminded us, is “one of the two or three most
complicated words in the English language.” (Williams 1983, 87 quoted in Steinmetz
1999, 4) However, a conceptual approximation to culture is necessary if it is assumed to
be constitutive of social reality. As such, culture can be seen as the “systems of meaning
and the practices in which they are embedded.” (Steinmetz 1999, 7) By state formation,
critical scholars refer to the creation of “durable states and the transformations of basic
structural features of these states – including material practices as well as the
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intersubjective understandings in which they are embedded.” (Steinmetz 1999, 8)
According to critical authors, the analysis of state formation should abandon the search
for the essence of the state and focus instead on the cultural and material practices that
reproduce relations of power (Corrigan 1994; Steinmetz 1999).
My approach builds on five interrelated assumptions that help articulate my argument on
the mutual constitutive role of indigenous collective identities and state formation. First, I
assume that states are never formed once and for all but are best understood as an
“ongoing process of structural change” (Steinmetz 1999, 9), which highlights the forms
of state rule over its citizens (Corrigan and Sayer 1985). This assumption focuses on how
rule is accomplished, and on what Philip Corrigan (1994) refers to as a “new grammar of
politics.” The obvious is thus problematized and broader frameworks that define the
terms in which contestation can occur come into view. My second assumption is that the
power of the state as such does not decline necessarily with transformations in capitalism.
For example, in the context of capitalist globalization, the state has been transformed and
has adopted forms of citizenship that rely on new preferred identities (Evans and Ayers
2006; Robinson 2008). These new forms of state have led some authors to refer to the
“neoliberalization” of the state (Schild 2000, 2007). My third assumption is that states
have the power, through discourses and practices, to shape the framework within which
collective action takes place and where collective identities flourish. In sum, state power
can organize – and divide – subjectivities (Sayer 1994). In this sense, the projection of
state power relies on the construction of hegemony. Following Gramsci, for example,
William Roseberry defines hegemony as a “common material and meaningful framework
for living through, talking about, and acting upon social orders characterized by
9

domination.” (1994, 361) In this sense, states play a fundamental role in reproducing
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Echoing the work of Antonio Gramsci, this conceptualization of domination brings into prominence the
critical role of civil society in challenging and also consolidating forms of domination. In his concern for
emancipatory collective action, Gramsci looks into the capacity of the state to transform the “horizons” of
individuals and groups in such a way that particular regimes of domination are the result of an unstable
combination of consent and coercion. At the same time, attention is placed on the capacity of collective
actors to articulate demands that defy domination. This is what Gramsci conceives as counter-hegemonic
movements. A further explanation of the relationship between the state and institutions of civil society that
Gramsci suggested was further theorized by Althusser in his notion of the “ideological state apparatus.”
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hegemony. The fourth assumption is that ongoing attempts by states to frame collective
action and the emergence of new identities encounter efforts at legitimization and
contestation “from below” (Corrigan and Sayer 1985; Mallon 1994). This is the result of
the ways in which hegemony operates. As Roseberry reminds us, rather than a “finished
ideological formation,” hegemony refers to “a problematic, contested, political process of
domination and struggles.” (1994, 358) Finally, a fifth assumption is that state formation
involves a spatial logic in which states construct spaces through a series of practices that
shape the contours of territories with profound implications for those who inhabit them
(Radcliffe 2001).
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Furthermore, the spatial dimension of state formation is based on

“specific geographical tools and knowledges” and on “imaginative geographies and
images.” (Radcliffe 2001, 124) The state, in other words, is always the result of
historically situated practices and ideas.
In conclusion, the study of indigenous activism and its relationship to the state begins by
paying some attention to institutions. However, in order to understand the complexities of
contemporary indigenous activism under neoliberal multiculturalism, such studies must
adopt a framework that privileges a more dynamic analysis of state formation as a
cultural process open to transformation and the influence of marginalized groups.
Considering the ways in which states implement policies and reproduce dominant
discourses is important in shaping the possibilities of contestation. Equally important is to
focus on how indigenous peoples, for example, can take advantage of state functions. By
adopting a framework that allows us to see the state as a set of heterogeneous, fragmented
practices, we have more possibilities for acknowledging the potential influence that
indigenous peoples can exert on the institutions of the state. Furthermore, such
framework pays close attention to the dominant discourses that the state reproduces.

And even a Weberian notion of “bureaucracy” highlights the rationalization of social life under the modern
state in order to legitimate domination and affect the possibilities of social change (Sharma and Gupta
2006).
10

A certain degree of success in this process is, of course, the accomplishment of undisputed control of a
territory by states.
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2.3 Citizenship: Spaces of participation and discipline

Central to contemporary indigenous activism and its relationship to the state is the
changing nature of citizenship regimes in Latin America. Through different discourses
and practices, states are able to recognize subjects as citizens or, as Das and Poole have
suggested, to turn them into “lawful subjects of the state.” (2004, 8) In doing this, states
have the capacity to define which individuals (or groups) are lawful members of a
political community. By converting subjects into citizens, states legitimize not only their
actions but also their objectives (Negri 1989). Citizenship, in short, shapes a political
community by defining who its members are. If states can define who is a citizen by
granting specific legal rights, they can also, directly or indirectly, exclude others who do
not fit the established membership criteria (Lister 2003). This politico-legal
understanding of citizenship has been central in emphasizing how states can provide
entitlements and guarantees to those who are recognized as members of a given political
community. Citizenship as a political and civil status continues to be relevant today,
especially in contexts where being granted political status as a citizen determines who
lives and who dies, or who lives under what conditions. Refugees are a case in point. My
approach to citizenship begins with T. H. Marshall’s classic formulation of citizenship as
a formal recognition by states of political, civil, and social rights. Given the histories of
exclusion of indigenous peoples as such by Latin American states, contemporary
indigenous activism has focused on the right to participate in politics, to have equal
protection under the law, and to be given social protection. Such claims for equality,
however, have been recently transformed by claims new demands for recognition of
collective rights based on cultural difference.
Citizenship, however, entails more than legal status and rights granted by states. I argue
that citizenship must be understood as a form of active political participation. In practice,
this form of citizenship refers to different forms of activism that often aim at expanding
existing rights or pushing for the recognition of new ones. In other words, citizenship
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claims are also important to understand how and why citizenship regimes change over
time. This “enlarged” conception of citizenship approaches political participation as
encompassing a redefinition and negotiation not only of politics but also of economic,
social, and cultural practices (Alvarez et al. 1998). The view of citizenship as
participation and negotiation, however, is incomplete if it does not include a third
dimension that focuses on the ways in which citizenship not only frames recognized
rights and the possibilities for their contestation, but also includes the view that
citizenship can be equally conceived as a form of government. Relying on Aihwa Ong
(2006), I see citizenship fundamentally as a form of governmental discipline, which
defines, legitimizes, and protects some subjects and not others. The following subsections examine these views on citizenship in more detail.

2.3.1

Citizenship as membership, status, and rights

In the most conventional sense citizenship is defined as a formal status given to members
of a political community usually conceived of as the nation-state (Kymlicka and Norman
1994; Turner 2009). This status is typically defined in terms of rights and obligations thus
guaranteeing, in theory, formal equality amongst citizens – or “equality of status,” as
Eckert (2011) calls it. The main emphasis of this politico-legal view of citizenship has
been on the capacity of the state to grant entitlements and protection to its members.
However, as many have argued, the formal recognition of political membership cannot
guarantee political participation or equality under the law. This is T. H. Marshall’s point
of departure in his classic work on citizenship.
T. H. Marshall (1994) focused on the content of citizenship, that is, on the set of rights
that citizenship entails. Marshall’s study began by focusing on the relationship between
the formal rights of citizenship and social inequality. Considering the case of Great
Britain, Marshall proposed to divide citizenship into three components: civil; political;
and social. Civil rights are those that guarantee equal protection under the law. These are
the rights “necessary for individual freedom” and include “freedom of speech, thought
and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to
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justice” (1994, 173). Such rights are guaranteed by the court system. Political rights
guarantee individuals the ability to vote and participate in political life. Social rights are
those that provide social protection for those who are marginalized in society. According
to Marshall, social rights include “the whole range from the right to a modicum of
economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to
live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society”
(1994, 173). These rights are guaranteed by the educational system and public services.
Marshall’s work is useful because it reminds us that political rights alone, or those which
are often associated with mainstream understandings of citizenship, do not guarantee
meaningful participation by all citizens , or as full members, of a given political
community. Furthermore, Marhsall argued that rights also entail a “public duty” to
exercise some of those rights (1994, 174). In his discussion on elementary education, for
example, Marshall argued that, “the duty to improve and civilize oneself is therefore a
social duty, and not merely a personal one, because the social health of a society depends
upon the civilization of its members” (1994, 175). He also listed paid work as a central
responsibility of citizens. Finally, in contexts of great social inequality, Marhall’s account
of citizenship is attractive. He suggested, for example, that the “equality implicit” in the
concept of citizenship undermines social inequality (1994, 175).

11

Marshall’s work, however, can be criticized on many grounds. Marshall’s notion that
social citizenship can diminish inequality and reduce class conflict did not materialize as
he initially suggested (Schild 2000). In a recent analysis of T. H. Marshall’s contribution
to the study of citizenship, Bryan Turner (2009) highlights four weaknesses. First,
Marhall did not provide an account of the mechanisms that permitted the extension of
citizenship. Rather, Marshall’s take on citizenship relied on an evolutionary framework.
In doing this, Marshall often ignored the role of working-class struggles, for example, in
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Marshall’s account of citizenship is based on the experience of Great Britain and describes a historical
trajectory that evolves from civil (18th century) to political (19th c.) and social (20th c.) rights. In the context
of Latin America, some authors have shown that the recognition of social rights has often taken place in the
absence of political and civil ones (Jelin 2003). For a critique of Jelin’s take on Marshall’s model, see
Schild (2000).
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the expansion of social citizenship. The second criticism is that Marshall relied on a
“uniform and coherent concept” and ignored different historical contexts outside Europe
(2009, 69). Third, Marshall’s account of citizenship did not establish connections
between ethnic and racial divisions and national citizenship. As Turner suggests,
Marshall’s theory was “as blind to race and ethnicity as it was to culture” (2009, 69).
Others have highlighted the gender bias in Marshall’s account of citizenship, particularly
as the preferred place to claim entitlements is the “masculine world of work” (Young
1995; Schild 2000; Lister 2003). Finally, Marshall’s approach had “little or nothing to
say about duties and obligations” and so it assumed the presence of “relatively passive”
citizens protected by the state from the uncertainties of capitalism (Turner 2009, 69).
In the unequal context of Latin America, the debate on citizenship has highlighted the
profound gap that exists between formally recognized rights and citizenship in practice
(Rosaldo 1990; Alvarez et al. 1998; Schild 2000; Jelin 2003). Corrigan and Sayer (1985),
writing about a different context, have reminded us that those who are socially
marginalized face additional challenges when it comes to the exercise of citizenship
rights in their everyday life:
“For the materially subordinated […] this is also their limitation: not just
in the negative sense of their ideality [of rights], their unrealizability, for
most peoples most of the time […], but in the strongly positive sense that
construction of social identity […] actively denies the possibility of
expressing the real experience of difference, of material subordination,
politically, as anything other than ‘personal’ and ‘private’ misfortune
(Corrigan and Sayer 1985, 187).
Marshall’s trilogy assumes a progressive evolution of one set of rights giving way to the
next set and so on. In practice, however, regions like Latin America show that this
evolution has not taken place and, in some cases, an “involution” has, in fact, taken place
in the recent period producing in practice a regression of rights once acquired by social
sectors. Moreover, in other cases there have been recent attempts to recognize collective
rights as a means of overcoming the ostensible limitations of individual rights. The wave
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of legal recognition of indigenous rights through Latin America since the 1980s discussed
above is an illustration. These rights have been granted to groups by virtue of their
cultural difference (Yashar 2005).

2.3.2

Citizenship as active political participation

Citizenship is also seen as an act of agency that involves a set of struggles for the
expansion and/or recognition of social and political rights (Lister 2003; Hordijk 2005;
Kabeer 2005; Eckert 2011). This dimension of citizenship refers to specific forms of
activism that aim at expanding the rights – and obligations – already in place, or at
recognizing new ones. In contrast to Marshall’s approach that sees citizenship as the
result of what states decide to do with it, the emphasis on political activism highlights the
struggles of disadvantaged groups to expand or establish new rights of citizenship. The
importance of progressive social movements, for example, lies precisely in their capacity
to challenge the boundaries within which states and dominant actors in society define the
possibilities of citizenship. Moreover, social movements also have the potential to
amplify the contradictions between what citizens and the state expect from each other. In
fact, recent notions of citizenship tend to associate the term with those on-going practices
in which citizens contest, renegotiate, and reinterpret what is given to them as rights. In
their study of democratization in Latin America after years of civil strife and military
dictatorships, for example, some scholars have stressed the obstacles that exist when
citizens attempt to exercise recognized rights (Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar 1998;
Dagnino 2003). In this sense, citizenship becomes a “negotiated relationship” between
states and subjects and/or the emergence, or re-constitution, of active social subjects
(Dagnino 2005; Pallares 2007).
Other scholars suggest that citizenship consists of enacting a form of active, collective
politics that, according to its civic republican and communitarian roots, moves beyond
the interest of individual citizens (Lister 2003, 25). The communitarian ideal of
citizenship, however, has been criticized on grounds of its narrow conception of the
political, its rigid separation of public and private spheres, its appeal to gender-neutral
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universalism and the common good, and the demanding nature of the obligations it
entails (Lister 2003). Feminists have been at the vanguard of these critiques of the classic
civic republican model of citizenship. Feminist scholars have argued that conventional
definitions of active engagement in the formal political process have been formulated
with male experiences in mind. By artificially drawing a line between the political and
the non-political, citizenship understood as political participation tends to exclude other
spheres that can matter more to women, such as working conditions, social and political
life, and child-raising, to name a few. Political action, feminists suggest, exceeds the
boundaries of institutional channels defined by states. Second, the appeals to
universalism and impartiality have been criticized on the grounds that such appeals
render invisible the very forms of exclusion that disadvantaged groups attempt to address
(Young 1995). Finally, the republican ideal of citizenship as active political participation
in pursuit of a common good can reinforce current inequalities favouring only a minority
– of men, usually - as few other groups (or, as very few others) would have the time, for
example, to engage and fulfil their obligations as citizens. As Lister has pointed out,
“time is a resource for citizenship, generally skewed in favour of men” (2003, 200). The
author refers to the demanding nature of the obligations citizenship entails for women in
the following terms:
“Given the sexual division of labour and of time, this minority is likely to
be predominately male, as was the ideal citizen of classic republicanism
who was largely freed from the necessity to labour and to meet his bodily
requirements, facilitated by the ranks of non-citizens – women and slaves”
(2003, 34).
Proponents of the republican communitarian view of citizenship expect that through
political participation, excluded groups will be transformed into political actors in their
own right. Approaching citizenship as active political participation addresses the concern
about static conceptualizations of citizenship as a set of civil, political, and social rights
granted by states. However, although citizenship understood in the republican sense is
valuable in this sense, it is too narrow as it does not contemplate the possibility, or fact,
that political participation is itself a form of regulated activity. This regulation, in turn,
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comes from specific rules, contents, and expectations of citizenship. To overcome this
narrowness I suggest a third dimension to my understanding of citizenship in this study,
one that builds on a more recent body of literature that sees citizenship as governing
forms of discipline and regulations of the politically possible. Understood as a form of
discipline and state regulation, the notion of citizenship becomes central to understand
the impact of the neoliberal state and its relationship to indigenous political activism only
if it allows us to speak about a neoliberal regime of citizenship which creates spaces for
participation which enables certain forms of agency but nevertheless regulated them. In
the case of indigenous peoples, for example, indigenous citizenship adopts its forms
throughout the ongoing mobilization of indigenous activists within the context of a
specific regime of citizenship, a neoliberal citizenship regime. In the sense that
citizenship regimes regulate indigenous mobilization, I also conceive citizenship as
“technologies of government,” as Aiwa Ong (2006, 16) has argued. By privileging a
notion of citizenship as active but governed or regulated participation, my study of
indigenous politics emphasizes the ways in which rights, for example, become part of
broader governing strategies that define, evaluate, and protect “certain categories of
subjects and not others” (Ong 2006, 16). The following section elaborates on the
disciplining nature of citizenship in more detail.

2.3.3

Citizenship as discipline and regulation

Citizenship has become a form of discipline in which political claims are addressed by
the regulatory practices and discourses of the state, generally in terms of rights (Brown
1994; Schild 2000, 2007; Kim 2010). Aihwa Ong, for example, argues that citizenship is
a cultural process of “subjectification” in which political power “produces consent
through schemes of surveillance, discipline, control, and administration” (Ong 1996, 737,
cited in Lister 2003). Furthermore, Ong (1990) suggests that citizenship also regulates
different categories of racialized or “cultural” subjects depending on their location within
the nation-state and within the global economy. Following Corrigan and Sayer (1985),
Ong defines cultural citizenship as “the cultural practices and beliefs produced out of
negotiating the often ambivalent and contested relations with the state and its hegemonic
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forms that establish the criteria of belonging within a national population and territory”
(1990, 264).
Conceived as a way of governing subjectivities, citizenship has the capacity to set up the
framework of expectations for political action (Corrigan and Sayer 1985; Pallares 2007).
Citizenship also makes explicit the ways in which states expect their subjects to act and
behave (Schild 2000). In this sense, my approach to the notion of citizenship as a form of
regulation is broader than Yashar’s definition of a citizenship regime that only includes
the questions of access (who?), form (what?), and content of citizenship (which rights?)
(Yashar 2005, 47). Eckert (2011), for example, suggests that citizenship implies practices
that carry out historical expectations about what states ought to do and what kind of
relations they should maintain with their subjects. Studying those practices allows us to
focus on the limits of citizenship in practice. Seeing citizenship as regulation, I bring
attention to those mechanisms of inclusion that involve more than simple coercion by
states. In a state’s quest for legitimacy, mechanisms of inclusion that aim at eliciting
political legitimacy matter and they have profound consequences for citizens. In this
context of building legitimacy, states identify those subjects who contest not only their
policies and functions but also their very existence, and attempt to transform them into
citizens – that is, into members of the political community with some sense of belonging.
By engaging in this process of “citizen-making” states reconstitute themselves. Equally
important, transformations occur at the level of collective identities and political
practices. Studying citizenship with this regulatory dimension in mind allows us to see
the transformation of states, citizenship, and subjects as an active process that involves
negotiation, accommodation, and resistance between states and their citizens.
By taking this approach to citizenship as discipline and regulation, but one that is also
open to the influence of those who are the targets of such forms of government, this
dissertation proposes that resistance by marginalized groups needs to be understood not
only as open confrontation but also as a set of cultural practices that involve negotiation
and conflict over dominant symbols of meaning (Deleuze 1988; Scott 1990; Foucault
1991). For the case of indigenous peoples in Latin America, it is clear how states can
define the terms through which their institutions relate to citizens (Yashar 2005). States
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typically articulate policies according to pre-existing relations of power. As for the
particularities of different states, regardless of the capacity of their institutions to reach
the majority of their population and territory through their policies, they are still able to
define who has political membership, which rights are to be included, and what
institutional mechanisms will be put in place to grant access to rights, or to make them
effective. This set of state abilities, namely to define who is a citizen, what rights are
included, and which institutions are in charge of their implementation, define, according
to Yashar (2005), a citizenship regime. Keeping this notion of a citizenship regime in
mind, I suggest that these three components involve technologies of government and
regulation. I now turn to a discussion of the problem of the neoliberalization of the state
and citizenship to understand the context in which the contemporary political activism of
indigenous peoples takes place.

2.4 The neoliberalization of the state and citizenship

2.4.1

The neoliberal state

In its often-cited definition, neoliberalism refers to a core set of neoclassical economic
policies. In the 1990s, this set of policies came to be known as the “Washington
Consensus,” a term coined by economist John Williamson. Such policies include but are
not limited to: the liberalisation of financial transactions and the emphasis on capital
markets; fiscal austerity; cut-backs in social spending and subsidies for public provisions;
reform of tax systems; liberation of trade; deregulation of industry; and flexibilization of
labour markets (Robinson 2008). In theory, these policies aimed at withering the role of
the state in the economy and enhancing that of the market.
In this study, neoliberalism is understood as more than a set of economic policies. I argue
that neoliberalism is also a historically specific state form with a specific citizenship
regime. In this sense, the notion of neoliberalism that I use in my study does not assume
the weakening of state power at the hands of the market. Rather, it sees the neoliberal
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state as a process that shifts its attention from some fields and expands and consolidates
into new fields of citizens’ lives (Steinmetz 1999; Brodie 2005; Svampa 2005). My
approach to neoliberalism builds on the critical, interdisciplinary literature that sees state
formation as a cultural process (Corrigan and Sayer 1985; Steinmetz 1999; Hansen and
Stepputat 2001; Lemke 2001). As a specific state form, neoliberalism affects the life of
its citizens, not only in material terms – as in impacting the ways in which people subsist
– but also in the ways in which collective identities and forms of belonging are
configured.

12

As a form of state, neoliberalism frames citizen participation by

encouraging some forms of participation and suppressing, marginalizing, eroding, or
undermining others. Contestation, in this context, still occurs and studying it allows us to
make visible the otherwise supposed neutrality of power relations that states seek to
consolidate (Corrigan and Sayer 1985; Foucault 1991; Rose 1999; Dean 2010).
As a form of state, neoliberalism relies on the implementation of public policies that aim
to create community consent and support for its market-oriented policies and also for its
political project of changing relations between state and society (Rancière 1992a, 1992b).
Thus, the transformation of the state under neoliberalism cannot be understood only in
opposition to the wishes of those citizens who mobilize against the political
transformation that this form entails. Neoliberalism also shapes individual and collective
political goals by providing new opportunities for citizen participation within the
institutional framework of the state. In the field of poverty reduction through
development aid, for example, the “poor” are given new forms of empowerment and
responsibility to manage specific programs that target them as the main beneficiaries
(Ilcan and Lacey 2011).
Following anthropologist Charles Hale, I suggest that the neoliberal state is compatible
with multiculturalism, understood as the official recognition of indigenous rights. In this
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States have the capacity to govern not only individual behaviour but also the social relationships that
shape everyday life and the regulation of subjectivities (e.g., families, education, public health). This is
possible because states can “define, in great detail, acceptable forms and images of social activity and
individual and collective identity; they regulate, in empirically specifiable ways, much – very much, by the
twentieth century – of social life” (Corrigan and Sayer 1985, 3).
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sense, he has suggested that state-sponsored multiculturalism entails the “selective
recognition” of indigenous rights. Under the wave of recognition of new rights based on
cultural difference, indigenous peoples are still targets of subject formation (Hale 2006,
35). In Hale’s words:
“The recognition of cultural difference gives states and, equally
important, civil society and transnational organizations, greater
prerogative to shape the terms of political contestation, to distinguish
between authentic and ersatz expressions of identity, between acceptable
and disruptive cultural demands. Neoliberal multiculturalism thrives on
the recognition of cultural difference, and by extension, on high-stakes
distinctions between those cultural rights that deserve recognition and
those that do not” (2006, 35).
The study of neoliberalism as a form of state highlights its capacity to shape the
possibilities of mobilization and contestation for citizens, and also the outcomes of such
mobilization. A closer look at neoliberalism from the perspective of citizenship helps to
make this more apparent.

2.4.2

Neoliberal Citizenship as the basis of Neoliberal
Multiculturalism

The view of citizen participation and the struggles to make civil, political, and social
rights real in contexts of global power and inequality is relevant for the study of
collective action (Jelin 2003; Pousadela 2005). In Latin America, indigenous peoples
mobilize against the encroachment on their land and the destruction of their livelihoods
caused by the expansion of extractive industries, such as oil and mineral extraction. In
some cases, indigenous mobilization opposes the expansion of these industries in
indigenous territories altogether. In others, indigenous peoples claim a fair share of the
resources the exploitation of these global commodities brings. States are often the target
of these forms of mobilization because they are seen as the main supporters of the
industries or because they often turn a blind eye to the social and environmental effects of
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their actions. In this context, indigenous activists often make claims to the state in the
belief that conditions of marginality and disenfranchisement will be addressed if they
gain recognition of new rights and new identities. This description of indigenous
activism, however, misses some important points and it is not sufficient to understand an
equally important dimension of indigenous politics today, namely, the new opportunities
for participation within the institutional structures of the neoliberal state.
The approach that privileges only what movements do is limited because the emergence
of the neoliberal state and concomitant forms of citizenship also result in new spaces for
citizenship involvement, even for those who are marginalized. These are, of course,
always regulated spaces of participation. Under the welfare state and the emphasis on
industrialization, for example, labour unions were a privileged space to mediate the
interests of workers and the state. With the consolidation of neoliberalism, states have
implemented changes in these mechanisms of mediation between society and the state. In
the field of social policy, for example, the poor are given new responsibilities to manage
the implementation of social assistance. The creation of these new types of opportunities
for participating within the institutions of the state has responded, in turn, to some
demands made by marginalized groups to the state. Amongst those who are marginalized
as a result of pro-market economic reforms in Latin America, sociologist Maristella
Svampa includes the poor, the unemployed, and peasants. In short, neoliberalism does not
only produce social exclusion via poverty and mass unemployment, it also creates
mechanisms for citizen inclusion (Hindess 2002). Following the earlier example, social
policies focalized on the poor promote the self-organization of communities so they can
manage (ostensibly more effectively than the state) social assistance programs.
The conditions under which new spaces for citizen participation are created and the ways
in which these spaces are used by states and citizens must be considered if one wants to
have a more nuanced understanding of indigenous activism under neoliberal forms of
state and citizenship. I find Verónica Schild’s (2000; 2007) concept of “market
citizenship” useful in thinking about what the consolidation of these new spaces within
the neoliberal state means in practice for social activism. Schild focuses on the effects of
neoliberal citizenship for the organization of poor women. However, some of the lessons
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she draws are relevant to the study of present-day indigenous activism in Latin America.
Anthropologist Charles Hale has recognized the influence of Schild’s “fascinating and
cogent analysis” of the neoliberal state for his understanding of indigenous politics and
neoliberal multiculturalism (2002, 498). Market citizenship, according to Schild,
empowers state subjects as individuals who are “viewed as capable of enhancing their
lives through judicious, responsible choices as consumers of services or other goods”
(2000, 4). In this context, neoliberal, or market, citizens are defined in the following
terms:
“These citizens are ‘enterprising’ agents, consumers and producers,
whose aim is to maximize their quality of life as individuals within small
communities, for example, neighbourhoods, schools, or health clinics. The
thrust of the shift in emphasis, in conceptions of citizenship, from clients of
public goods to empowered clients is ostensibly to make citizens
responsible –through their own individual choices for themselves” (2000,
4).
This approach to neoliberal citizenship is compatible with the notion of neoliberal
multiculturalism proposed by Hale (2002; 2006). Hale (2002) contests what he calls the
“conventional wisdom” that views neoliberalism as a formidable threat to indigenous
peoples and focuses primarily on the negative effects of neoliberal policies. The author
argues instead that neoliberal modernisation and the recognition of indigenous cultural
rights are compatible. Faced with demands for indigenous rights (based on cultural
difference), neoliberal multiculturalism responds by opening new political spaces and
offering some accommodation for indigenous participation. In practice, cultural rights
may include bilingual education, guarantees for indigenous self-representation and
indigenous legal practices. However, there are limits to this recognition because cultural
rights may also serve the purposes of fending off “more far-reaching demands” as well as
of shaping the boundaries of future claims (Hale 2002, 488). As Hale points out, some
rights may be acceptable (i.e., legitimate) while others may not. Furthermore, indigenous
identities are also scrutinized as either legitimate or not, depending on the context in
which they are formed.
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2.5 The central roles of collective identities and ethnicity in
social activism

When it comes to indigenous politics, studying the formation of collective identities
matters because, as Melucci reminds us, it helps us understand the “symbolic challenge”
such identities present to systems of political regulation and social control (Melucci
1996). In the present context, it is through the formation of new collective identities and
the contestation of existing ones, that indigenous activists have been able to engage with
the neoliberal state in novel and interesting ways. Claims for territorial autonomy are an
important case in point. My study of Mapuche activism in Northern Patagonia shows that
the formation and articulation of territorial claims are good indications of how indigenous
activists engage with the state, negotiating and contesting dominant forms of citizenship.
By focusing on the formation of collective identities, I am able to take a more dynamic
view of neoliberal multiculturalism than Hale’s. While Hale’s notion of neoliberal
multiculturalism is attractive, it runs the risk of approaching the phenomenon in ways that
do not allow us to see how, in practice, the boundaries of neoliberal multiculturalism are
vigorously challenged. A more flexible take on neoliberal multiculturalism allows me to
pay closer attention to the ways in which, in practice, indigenous activism pushes beyond
the limits of neoliberal citizenship (Postero 2007). According to this view, activists take
advantage of the new opportunities for participation offered by states. In this sense, they
conform to the expectations of the neoliberal state and its form of citizenship. However,
as anthropologist Nancy Postero points out, indigenous citizens also use those spaces “to
pose important challenges to the workings of global capitalism” and the state practices
that sponsor them (2007, 17). In this sense, the framework of neoliberal multiculturalism
is open to the influence of indigenous activism in ways that Hale does not always take
into account. In my study of Mapuche activism I show how this framework informs, but
does not determine, indigenous politics. In short, indigenous politics has to be understood
as a dynamic interaction with neoliberal multiculturalism. My analysis suggests that
claims for territorial autonomy, for example, are a result of this interaction between
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neoliberal multiculturalism and new forms of Mapuche activism and collective identities.
In other words, indigenous peoples engage with neoliberal multiculturalism in complex
ways. Thus, although a historically subordinated group, indigenous peoples in Argentina
continue, nevertheless, to be protagonists of history (Joseph and Nugent 1994).

2.5.1

Collective identities
“The cultural forms may not say what they know, nor know what they say,
but they mean what they do – at least in the logic of their praxis” (Paul
Willis, quoted by Scott 1990, 183).

Borrowing from Melucci (1989; 1996), I emphasize the point that cultural processes of
collective identity formation play a central role in our understanding of collective action
and ethnic mobilization. Furthermore, the focus on the formation of collective identities
allows us to see an important dimension of indigenous activism that would otherwise
remain hidden in studies that only privilege mass-mobilization, direct action, and open
confrontation with state forces. My study insists that local activism and low intensity
negotiation and engagement with the state matter, and that a study of the formation of
collective identities as central for indigenous political activism is crucial. I see social
movements as “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities,
in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities” (Tarrow 1998, 4).
Moreover, rather than taking the formation of these “common purposes and social
solidarities” for granted, I focus on the ways in which they are created (Melucci 1989). I
also emphasize in my definition of social movements those less visible forms of
collective action at the local level, such as the interaction between urban indigenous
activists and members of rural communities, or meetings to discuss concrete strategies
affecting one community. These typically local activities, neglected by Tarrow for
instance, contribute to a more nuanced understanding of social mobilization. As Hansen
and Stepputat put it, local actions deemed “mundane, unexceptional, and maybe deeply
ambivalent” may contain important elements of an ongoing process of confrontation and
adaptation to the state and political circumstances in general (2001, 33).
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The view of the local as a privileged scale for the study of indigenous activism, especially
in contexts where indigenous peoples are minorities, also echoes James C. Scott’s (1990)
notion of infrapolitics. Infrapolitics, according to Scott, is the realm of political struggles
that are waged daily by subordinate groups, and the fact that they usually remain
“invisible” obeys to strategic choices “born of a prudent awareness of the balance of
power” (1990, 183). The importance of this type of politics is that it provides “much of
the cultural and structural underpinning of the more visible political action on which our
attention has generally been focused” (1990, 184). I consider Scott’s take on infrapolitics
and “more visible forms of political action” as mutually sustaining to be central for
studying indigenous activism at the local level. As Scott reminds us, any “small
advantages” subordinate groups may see in their interaction with dominant groups count.
In Scott’s words:
“Each realm of open resistance to domination is shadowed by an
infrapolitical twin sister who aims at the same strategic goals but whose
low profile is better adapted to resisting an opponent who could probably
win any open confrontation” (1990, 184).
Amongst the available literature on collective action, the tradition consolidated by the
“new social movements” (NSM) approach offers useful insights for incorporating the
study of cultural processes into the field of social mobilization. Within this tradition, I
single out Alberto Melucci’s (1989; 1996) work to understand the challenges the
formation of collective identities poses to dominant forms of rule. It is important to place
Melucci’s contributions in the context of the rich ongoing debates on collective action.
Broadly speaking, the NSM approach of the 1980s can be seen a response to what many
saw as the reductionist tendencies of previous Marxist studies that focused too narrowly
on class analysis to explain collective action. In addition, more recent versions of NSM
reflect its engagement with other approaches on social movements that have been central
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in sociology and political studies: resource mobilization theory (RMT) and political
process theories (PPT).

13

Resource mobilization theory (RMT) has been useful in demonstrating how different
elements at the disposal of social movements, such as leadership, organizational
structures, and clear strategies, help to explain the emergence and persistence in time of
social mobilization (McCarthy and Zald 1977).In this sense, RMT has helped us to
understand some of the “strategic dilemmas” social movements face in practice, among
them societal support, available resources and linkages to other groups, dependence on
support, and relationships between movements and governments. Furthermore, the vast
literature on RMT has contributed to our understanding that structural factors, motives
alone, or shared grievances and deprivations are not enough to understand how social
movements emerge. A key limitation of this approach, however, is that RMT over
emphasizes the role of movements’ strategies, and minimizes or overlooks the power
relationships in which social actors are embedded. Political Process Theories (PPT) have
addressed these limitations and demonstrated how movements are more than
organizational mechanisms that work for the sole objective of satisfying the preferences
of their constituencies. By emphasizing the wider context of political opportunities in
which social movements operate, including their relationship with states, PPT gives
prominence to existing institutional settings (McAdam 1982; Tilly 1984; Tarrow 1998).
In more recent interpretations of collective action which follow this tradition, some
authors have studied how processes of meaning and interpretation play a central role in
social mobilization (Snow and 2001; Meyer, Whittier, and Robnett 2002). Nancy
Whittier, for example, connected direct political action by social movements with a
process of collective identity formation in the following terms:
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Resource Mobilization and Political Process Theories are considered to be a response to the earlier
collective behaviour paradigm which explained collective action as a result of social deviance, disruption,
or social breakdown (Blumer 1951; Kornhauser 1959; Smelser 1962; Gurr 1970). One version of the
collective behaviour paradigm was symbolic interactionism, which many recognized had some merit in
focusing on the ways in which social actors construct meaning through social interaction (Blumer 1951).
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“The paths movements take are shaped by both internal identities,
discourses, traditions, and organizations infrastructure, as well as
external political opportunities and dominant cultural possibilities and
constraints. In short, the interpretative process by which groups construct
collective identities and other oppositional meanings are inextricable from
public confrontations with authorities” (2002, 291).
It is clear that by taking this “cultural turn” in the study of social movements, the PPT
tradition has acknowledged the contribution of authors working within the tradition of
“new social movements” (Offe 1985; Touraine 1985; Melucci 1989).

14

In particular, they

have engaged with Melucci’s constructivist theory of collective identity. According to
Melucci, the construction of collective identities poses symbolic challenges to established
social and political systems of regulation and control (1989, 19). He argues that this
construction takes place using the social networks that exist in everyday life and that it
consists in the formation of new ways of knowing, the creation of new social networks,
and also an investment of emotions. The discursive practices in which groups in these
networks engage explain, according to Melucci, the construction of new political
subjects. These discursive practices create new spaces for political participation and new
opportunities for challenging dominant systems of rule. I adopt Melucci’s analysis of the
constitution of collective identities because it helps to understand how political activism,
in this case indigenous activism, depends in large part on a broader process of collective
self-identification.
In adopting Melucci’s view on the constitutive role of collective identities for studying
indigenous activism, I do not lose sight of the importance of broader political processes.

14

Challenging existing literature on collective action, the study of “new” social movements aimed to
understand novel forms of collective action that have been taking place mostly in Western Europe and
North America since the late 1960s after a perceived decline of working-class politics. According to
Touraine (1985), social movements refer to conflicts “around the social control of the main cultural
patterns” of society rather than material aspects of life. For this author, social movements are marked by a
central conflict that is no longer marked by “labour and economic problems” but by the “production of
symbolic goods”, that is, by culture itself. In post-industrial societies, Touraine adds, the actor is a key
subject of social action that tends to change the terms in which a “way of life” is experienced (1985, 749750).
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Indeed, I study the construction of Mapuche collective identities as part of a process of
engagement with the neoliberal state, and see the political and cultural aspects of
indigenous activism as mutually constitutive. Thus, I disagree with Melucci’s claim that
“new social movements” do not contest political power. Finally, I do not share Melucci’s
optimism that new identities per se result in the democratization of everyday life. Studies
of indigenous activism in contexts characterized by stark social inequalities, for example,
suggest that new identities may emerge but that these do not necessarily democratize
everyday life.

2.5.2

Ethnic mobilization

Indigenous politics has also been studied by following the ongoing theoretical debates on
the factors explaining ethnic mobilization. A central feature of ethnic mobilization, some
scholars propose, is that claims are made based upon certain identities and boundaries
that are defined by racial or ethnic markers (Olzak 2004, 667). The existence of ethnic
mobilization often creates tensions with nation-states given the ways in which it
challenges dominant ideas of social homogeneity that states seek to maintain. Ethnic
social movements and nation-states, these scholars have suggested, “depend on each
other in a delicate balance of self-definition, political claims making, and contests over
power, authority, and legitimacy” (Olzak 2004, 668). The emergence, growth, and impact
of ethnic-based movements have been studied by several theoretical traditions (Briones
1998; Olzak 2004; Yashar 2005).
Primordialism approaches the study of ethnic identities as the main cause of indigenous
political mobilization (Geertz 1973; Horowitz 1992). According to this view, the
emergence of indigenous movements is a “natural expression” of ethnic identities
(Yashar 2005, 9). Geertz (1973), for example, understands the emergence of ethnic
conflict as a result of the politicization of what he calls primordial linkages (e.g., those
based on race, language, customs, religion, regional identities) that are constructed as a
given by a social group. These primordial linkages, however, do not emerge as a
consequence of personal affection, practical necessity, common interest, or pre-assumed
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obligations; they emerge as a result of the emphasis attributed to the linkages themselves
(Briones 1998, 57). Primordial arguments assume that ethnic identities are fixed and
immutable and, therefore not susceptible to the influence of the state (Yashar 2005, 9;
Briones 2005, 58). As Geertz has suggested, however, “dormant” ethnic loyalties can reemerge as politically salient as states try to “domesticate” them (Briones 2005, 60).
According to this approach, once the many elements that constitute an ethnic identity are
taken as a given by a specific group, collective and individual subjectivities can be set in
motion and activated for political purposes. This approach is problematic because it does
not address why certain identities are formed on the basis of some “primordial elements,”
but not others, nor does it address how these other identities are politicized. Critics have
questioned the primordialist assumption that ethnic ties, as opposed to other forms of
social relations, are naturally depoliticised. For them, this inevitably reduces ethnic
conflict to events divorced from their historical context (Briones 1998; 2005). Finally,
primordialism has also been criticized for its inability to address the changing nature of
ethnic identities and the role of these changed identities in the emergence of indigenous
mobilization (Yashar 1998).
Formalism, or competition theories, has paid more attention to the historical context in
which ethnic mobilization takes place (Barth 1969). According to this approach, groups
experiencing a decline in economic disadvantage are more likely to mobilize to express
ethnic claims. In other words, declining inequality promotes ethnic conflict (Olzak 2004).
Barth (1969), for example, has suggested that declining inequality and intergroup contact
lead to competitive exclusion and conflict. Challenging primordialism, Barth has argued
that ethnic groups should not be seen as social units separated by distinctive cultural
marks assumed to be essential for the collective identity of such groups (Roosens 1989).
On the contrary, ethnic difference is to be understood as the result of the interaction
between groups adopting different identities. Furthermore, this approach has focused on
explaining how competition over similar political, economic, and social resources creates
ethnic conflict. For example, by offering new political advantages and access to some of
those resources, democracy can provide incentives for ethnic groups to mobilize.
Formalist approaches, such as Barth’s, have been challenged on three grounds. First, they
emphasize contact among different ethnic groups in society without taking into
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consideration the different degrees of power that different groups have. In other words,
they tend to ignore how an “us” versus “them” has been defined in the first place.
Second, the assumption that ethnic identity is preferred over others ignores that by
themselves such identities cannot explain the emergence of ethnic conflict. In short,
ethnicity is always embedded in specific historical contexts. Finally, formalist approaches
give too much credit to subjective factors of ethnic belonging without addressing the
connection between ethnic identities and the material conditions under which they
reproduce (Briones 1998, 72).
Scholars using instrumentalist or rational choice approaches see ethnicity as an
instrument for social competition (Hechter 1987; Roosens 1989; Fearon and Laitin 1996).
In this view, ethnicity is a purely contingent, circumstantial factor in social mobilization
(Briones 1998, 79). Thus, economic and political goals are central to understand why
collective action takes place. In this context, ethnic groups are considered interest groups
with their own set of fixed preferences, goals, intentions and utility-maximizing
behaviours (Briones 1998, 80; Yashar 2005, 11). Moreover, ethnic conflict is the result of
a calculated effort to maximize goals for a given group. Rather than questioning how the
boundaries between ethnic groups are formed, a question raised by formalists for
example, instrumentalists are interested in knowing when and why individuals decide to
activate political demands along ethnic lines, focusing on the costs and benefits attached
to ethnic mobilization (Yashar 2005, 12). Authors working within this paradigm tend to
agree that ethnic mobilization often occurs when the costs for mobilizing decrease in
relation to the perceived rewards. Instrumentalist approaches, however, are not able to
account for the reasons why some groups use ethnicity as a form of group competition
while others decide not to compete as “ethnic subjects” but do so as “individuals”, or why
ethnicity takes precedence over other forms of identity. Critics have suggested that this
approach de-contextualizes the role of ethnicity in indigenous movements thus ignoring
how ethnic relations have been formed historically and how they change over time
(Briones 1998, 85; Yashar 2005, 12). Furthermore, critics have pointed to the limitations
of an approach that conceives of ethnicity mainly as an effect produced by states or ruling
elites that are seen as the exclusive “managers” of the ethnic question. The question to
ask, according to these critics, is whether such processes of cultural production are
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exclusively dependent on state policies or whether they respond to broader processes of
collective identity formation in an ongoing process of negotiation, accommodation, and
conflict between ethnic movements and other institutions that have the potential to
reproduce questions of otherness and social difference (Briones 1998, 96).
A fourth approach to ethnic mobilization privileges structural conditions of poverty and
inequality. Given indigenous peoples’ experiences of marginalization, racial
discrimination, poverty and economic exploitation, the focus on material conditions to
understand indigenous activism is important. Poverty amongst indigenous peoples has
been a persistent reality since colonialism, particularly in the case of Latin America
(Eversole, McNeish, and Cimadamore 2005). These material conditions of poverty,
scholars insist, have historically affected indigenous peoples and they inform indigenous
activism and conflict (Yashar 2005, 14). Some studies, for example, have shown that the
combination of social inequality along racial lines and high levels of ethnic solidarity are
a major cause of ethnic conflict (Hechter 1975, cited by Olzak 2004). Other studies have
stressed the correlation between indigenous mobilization and/or ethnic fragmentation
within nation-states and the insertion of that society into world capitalism (Young 1986,
cited by Olzak). In short, poverty and inequality are indeed important aspects in the
everyday life of many indigenous peoples today. However, these material conditions
alone cannot explain the characteristics of indigenous activism or even its emergence
(Yashar 2005).
Each one of the four approaches discussed above offers a lens into indigenous collective
action. Each one privileges some aspects of ethnic mobilization based on certain
assumptions about identity-formation, individual political behaviour, or society in
general. By themselves, these approaches are limited in their ability to explain why
contemporary indigenous activism takes specific forms and how new collective identities
are formed. As Yashar has argued, such views on indigenous identity and political
organization “are too static and, as such, have a difficult time explaining change over
time and variation within and among cases” (2005, 18). Melucci’s emphasis on collective
identity formation has served to rescue a dimension of social activism that has been
otherwise ignored in the study of politics. My insistence on seeing collective identities as
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the product of ongoing processes of negotiation, accommodation, and resistance between
indigenous activists and states offers a more dynamic approach to indigenous politics.

2.6 Conclusion

My understanding of neoliberal multiculturalism as a form of governing indigenous
peoples and political subjectivities provides a framework for understanding indigenous
activism at the local level in contexts where the indigenous are a minority. To study the
prospects of such minority groups materializing their aspirations for a better life in the
face of neoliberal citizenship regimes, we need a critical, interdisciplinary framework that
renders state formation, citizenship, and collective action open to transformation when, as
Rancière (1990) puts it, those who are “part” of society but have been given “no part” in
it rise up and speak. For Rancière, that is the moment when politics happens.
This chapter opened with a brief historical overview of the ways in which Latin
American states have regulated indigenous peoples through specific forms of citizenship
regimes. Today, it argued, indigenous peoples are regulated through a neoliberal
citizenship regime. The main objective of this chapter was to propose an
interdisciplinary approach that emphasizes the constitutive role of culture and that
privileges the local as a site of dynamic indigenous politics. This approach allows us to
connect localized forms of collective actions to broader processes of state formation and
citizenship regimes, and to explore how indigenous identities and states, for example,
depend on each other in what Susan Olzak calls, “a delicate balance of selfdetermination, political claims making, and contests over power, authority, and
legitimacy” (2004, 667).
In the following chapters I turn to the case of the Mapuche of Neuquen to privilege an
instance of indigenous politics that has remained understudied. I show that although
Mapuche activism around territorial autonomy is an instance of localized collective
action by an indigenous minority, it is nevertheless part of a more generalized struggle to
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re-define the boundaries of citizenship under neoliberal multiculturalism (Assies, van der
Haar and Hoekema 2000; Garcia 2005; Yashar 2005; Pallares 2007). Chapter 3 sets the
context by turning specifically to a historical overview of the relation of indigenous
peoples and the Argentinean state.
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Chapter 3

3

Of Hopes and Shadows. Indigenous peoples and the
State in Argentina (1810-2012)

“There are also groups committed to glorifying our process of national
consolidation, who raise fine monuments to The Indian, forgetting that
real Indians actually exist, not in the pages of a history book but in grim
reality. To say that the natives are the real owners of the land seems to be
a platitude that no one disputes, but no one seems to notice that this
statement is true, and the aborigines’ territories are in fact regarded as
zones freely available for colonization” (Bartolomé 1972, 249).

Modern state formation in Argentina cannot be understood without acknowledging the
construction of its Others as those abject subjects that stand in the shadows of preconceived ideas of nationhood and its material progress. This construction, I argue, is
possible with the articulation of specific forms of citizenship. The construction of
national subjectivities often entails that, while dominant groups enjoy the benefits of
modern citizenship such as civil, political and social rights, those who are marginalized
often must struggle to assert their political spaces and make their collective voices heard.
As a result, claiming their existence as political beings, generally through collective
action, these Others resist conditions of marginality. In order to understand why current
Mapuche communities organize and mobilize around demands for self-representation,
autonomy, and territory it is essential to understand the forms in which indigenous
alterities were often represented in the past, particularly in the discourses of the educated
elites as well as in the legal mechanisms in which the modern state frames indigenous
peoples. Moreover, these historical representations of indigenous peoples have framed
their possibilities for political activism in the past and current indigenous mobilization
emerges as a response to them. This chapter highlights the ways in which the
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Argentinean state expands and transforms indigenous communities into state subjects.
Starting with dominant discourses on indigenous peoples articulated in the early
nineteenth century, the chapter traces the expansion of state presence in formerly
recognized indigenous territories and the subsequent legal frameworks established to deal
with Argentina’s indigenous population.

15

The political organization and mobilization of contemporary Mapuche communities
around territorial autonomy are part of long and often contradictory histories of the
making of nation, state, and citizens in Argentina. The so-called Indian Question in
Argentina does not seem to have the historical centrality it has in debates over nationality
and modernity in other corners of Latin America. However, the cultural, economic and
political legacies of colonialism in the region as well as the presence of indigenous
communities throughout the territories of today’s Argentina cannot be ignored. It is often
assumed that by the end of the nineteenth century, the Indian Question in was solved in
that country. As the rest of this chapter shows, by the mid-twentieth century, the few
remaining concerns related to the Indian Question were considered solved.
The so-called Indian Question in Argentina rarely presents itself as such. In the early
1930s, Antonio Gramsci commenting on Argentina argued that it was “the most
European and Latin country in America” (Gramsci 1975, 12). This observation made by
Gramsci but dominant in society at large in Argentina served to justify and shape the
notion of invisibility of indigenous peoples. When questions related to an indigenous
group emerged, they were addressed as a set of social or political problems that
demanded the implementation of state policies to solve them. The ways in which these
policies emerged however, depended on specific historical circumstances, hegemonic
forms of conceiving the role of the state, and the relationship between the state and its
citizens. For these reasons, the ways in which states approach these socio-political

15

A detailed historical account of the ways in which indigenous communities have responded to the
expansion of state control over their territories exceeds the objectives of this chapter as well as the space
available to do justice to this topic. Moreover, such type of historical studies that privilege local accounts of
indigenous resistance in modern Argentina, are scant. Notable exceptions are the works by CurruhuincaRoux (1993) and Walter Delrio (2005).

64

problems related to indigenous communities necessarily rely on broader economic, sociopolitical and cultural contexts. Arguably, the characteristics of a state form are given, in
great part, by its policies and not necessarily by the group of institutions that represent it.
However, state policies are not necessarily the result of autonomous institutions or the
direct result of the decision-making process of its agents. As suggested by many,
including Gramsci, state policies crystallize processes of political and cultural hegemony
of a certain historical period and in a given society. The prevailing attitudes held by
economic and political elites towards indigenous populations in Argentina periodically
crystallized as a set of legal norms or as the creation of organizations in order to “deal”
with the Indian Question. Thus, the language, objectives and the overall effectiveness of
such state policies depended on such prevailing attitudes as well as on hegemonic
ideologies of nationhood and citizenship.
The characteristics these various periods assumed are not contained by the temporal
framework within which we try to encapsulate them. It may well be that certain elements
of one historical period permeate other historical moments as political and socioeconomic changes can produce interests in promoting some elements over others.
However, in order to understand the relationship between indigenous peoples and the
state in Argentina one needs to look at the long history of state formation as well as at the
making of citizenship and nationhood. In contrast to other countries of the region,
Argentina did not openly confront the “Indian problem” as a key component of its
consolidation as a modern state. Far from assuming that this “problem” did not exist,
however, the power elites articulated different “solutions” to an issue that was hardly
recognized as central to the formation of Argentinean citizenship. The small number of
indigenous groups self-identifying as such was taken as a sign that the “Indian problem”
was either solved in the late nineteenth century with the military campaigns of
extermination and occupation of indigenous territory or that the remaining indigenous
population would, sooner or later, become part of the Argentinean nation, thus “losing”
any distinctive cultural (and political) elements that would keep them on the margins of
this historical process.
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The Indian Question in Argentina is directly related to the project of modern state
formation in the second half of the nineteenth century. This project defined external
borders, a strong central bureaucracy, an uncontested national identity and, above all, the
monopoly of coercive control in the hands of state institutions over a defined territory and
its peoples. As a result, by the end of the nineteenth century the Indian Question was
increasingly defined as a matter of internal security and since the remaining autonomous
indigenous communities inhabited areas near the borders with neighbouring countries,
the matter started to assume geopolitical connotations that led to the military conquest of
these territories. Furthermore, this loss of autonomy at the hands of the Argentinean army
meant for the indigenous survivors of the military expeditions their forced incorporation
in the state as “subordinated ethnic minorities” (Varela and Biset 1993, 66). Immediately
after the military expeditions, the indigenous subaltern became increasingly a matter
subjected to administration by the central state.
The tragic outcome for indigenous communities living in Northern Patagonia after the
military campaigns of 1879-1885 was, however, the result of previous debates that had
started to take place earlier in the nineteenth century during the decades marked by the
struggles for independence and civil war. Consequently, conflicting views on how to
control those spaces under immediate control of indigenous groups at the time of
independence from Spain gained prominence as the consolidation of the central state
became a priority for the governing elites.

3.1 Roots of the Indian Question, 1810-1880
Before the military campaigns exterminated or decimated the autonomous indigenous
communities of Northern Patagonia between 1879 and 1885, these communities were in
permanent contact with settler populations in frontier areas and they enjoyed a state of
relative autonomy vis-à-vis political authorities. This particularity for indigenous
communities in the regions of the Pampas, Patagonia, Great Chaco, and Northwest of
what eventually became the new country of Argentina makes it possible to refer to them,
following Martínez Sarasola (2005), as “free cultures” that colonial statesmen,
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revolutionary leaders and new authorities in government often recognized, explicitly or
implicitly.
When the colonial encounter between the natives of Northern Patagonia and the Spanish
took place in the sixteenth century, there were three main ethno-linguistic groups:
Tehuelches, Poyas, Pehuenches and the Mapuche. The presence of the latter group on the
east side of the Andes is still a matter of controversy as some historians have argued that
the Mapuche only inhabited in the western areas, in what is today Chilean territory, until
the late nineteenth century. However, for the most part historical evidence suggests that
their presence on the eastern side of the Andes dates from before the mass movement of
Mapuche groups in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Varela and Biset 1993, 69).
The adoption of the horse, cow and sheep drastically changed the human topography of
the Patagonian landscape, affecting amongst other things, the ways in which natives were
incorporated into the colonial systems of economic exchange and more complex forms of
organization (Leacock 1982). This new economic context, for example, transformed the
socio-political organization of indigenous communities. With time, the livelihood of
many of these communities relied less on hunting and gathering and more on commercial
exchanges amongst the communities themselves and between some communities and
settlers (Gray 1987; Varela and Biset 1993). Thus, a society of hunter-gatherers was
transformed into what Varela and Biset (1993) referred to as “horse-riding peasants,
cattle owners and merchants” connected more clearly with the economic interests of the
new settler societies. These new patterns of commercial exchange alongside the changing
relations between indigenous communities and settler societies also resulted, in the case
of Patagonia, in mass migration across the Andes. The mass movement of Mapuche
groups or “partialities,” as the Mapuche name the different groups inhabiting Patagonia,
from the west (present-day Chile) to the east (present-day Argentina) of the Andes during
the eighteenth century also meant, on the one hand the initial emergence of a culturally
mixed indigenous population but, on the other, a process of homogenization which led to
the adoption of Mapudungun as lingua franca (Varela and Biset 1993). The early
nineteenth century witnessed as a result of these changes the emergence of partialities
with strong leaders with control over independent territories not subordinated to colonial
authorities.
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Besides the regular contact that occurred between colonial societies and indigenous
partialities in the frontier areas, the rest of the territory was defended against any attempts
at Spanish intrusion – Crown officials or missionaries -, a situation that persisted for
many decades after independence. Needless to say, the influence of European settlements
and their economies deeply affected native communities as well as the interaction
between the two groups. The resistance of native partialities on both sides of the Andes
forced the Spanish crown to hold Parleys with indigenous leaders in which treaties were
signed and promises on both sides were made. While the Crown generally recognized the
independence of Mapuche territory, as the parliament of Quilín did in 1641, these treaties
were usually violated by both sides but a de facto recognition of native autonomy on one
side and resistance to missionaries and other Crown officials on the other persisted.
Despite these shortcomings, the celebration of Parleys between natives and colonial
administrators provided a stable framework of negotiations under which commercial
interests could continue operating in those regions of Patagonia.
As mentioned earlier, the new economic reality of the eighteenth century transformed
important aspects of the socio-political organization of native communities. Community
leaders attained more prestige and power and started to control larger territories,
commerce routes and thousands of cattle, and this led to the emergence of new
hierarchies within indigenous communities that had not been very common before
(Varela and Biset 1993, 86). Thus, the nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of
cacicatos (chiefdoms) as a new form of Mapuche political organization. This
reinforcement of indigenous leadership was the result of internal as well as external
factors. An example of the latter was the insistence of Europeans on reinforcing the
authority of leaders by providing them with gifts which led to a more centralized form of
government authority that was preferred by colonial administrations over decentralized
ones which would be more difficult to dominate (Varela and Biset 1993). Internally,
these transformations in leadership responded to the need to centralize decision-making
in light of the new commercial exchanges that were taking place.
The debates on the place of indigenous communities in what later would become
Argentina started to take place as a result of the participation of indigenous leaders in the
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revolutionary process. The collaboration between these indigenous and revolutionary
leaders was acknowledged when the first criollo (American-born) government junta of
1810 granted indigenous military officials the formal recognition by incorporating them
into the ranks of the emerging revolutionary armies.

16

In a context of revolution and

internal war, republican ideas became dominant and started to be adopted by a new
generation of the political elite to organize a crumbling society, although the idea of an
17

emerging Argentinean nation did not yet exist.

Furthermore, the goal of the emerging

revolutionary governments to incorporate indigenous communities into the revolutionary
process was directed exclusively at those groups that were already incorporated or
subjugated. This excluded, for example, the remaining indigenous communities in the
Chaco region, the southern Pampas, and Patagonia. Given the degree of autonomy these
regions had enjoyed under the colonial administration, they were considered a menace
(Martinez Sarasola 2005). However, during the decades of independence and civil war
the frontier with the Indians was considered real, as it was often assumed and accepted
that indigenous communities in those areas free of colonial control were the owners of
the territories they inhabited. Indeed, this was even the view of independence leader José
de San Martín (Martinez Sarasola 2005).

16

The decades following the instauration of the first criollo junta in 1810 saw attempts to shake off the
political links with the Spanish crown, resulting in a period of great instability. The year of 1810 also
inaugurated the attempt by Buenos Aires, and its commercial elites, to expand their influence across the
territories that once formed part of the Rio de la Plata Viceroyalty since 1776. The resistance encountered
in the interior of this territory came not only from local elites – who had good economic reasons to
maintain the formal relations with the Spanish Empire and the current commercial routes established during
the Viceroyalty years throughout the region - but also from native communities. In practice, a “frontier”
between colonial settlers and indigenous populations existed.
17

Many historians agree that the idea of an Argentinean nation was a result of the events that followed the
criollo revolution which did not consolidate until the late nineteenth century (Chiaramonte 2005; Myers
2005). Despite the impact that May 25 of 1810 has in Argentina’s history as an inaugural moment of
nationhood, the events that led to the criollo revolution were unanticipated and linked with the Napoleonic
invasions of Spain. These circumstances explain to a certain degree why the intentions for independence
from the Spanish crown were not among the most considered options at the time. In fact, the United
Provinces of the Rio de la Plata did not declare formal independence until 1816. For an insightful debate on
the relevance of the events of May as well as the different meaning of “nation” in the political debates
during and on that period, see Nun (2005).
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Intense fighting between royalists and criollos followed the establishment of the
government junta of 1810. On July 9th 1816, representatives of the former Viceroyalty
declared the country’s formal independence while Crown armies remained a threat until
the mid 1820s. Internal divisions amongst the provinces of what later became Argentina
and bloody battles persisted on a large scale until 1862. This violent context and the
continuing political disunity between those favouring a strong central government
controlled by Buenos Aires and those supporting a confederation of provinces is the
scenario in which debates over the political place of indigenous populations took place.
During the decades of civil war (1820s-1850s), there were some attempts by the
governments of the provinces, particularly Buenos Aires, and by indigenous chiefs to
establish the terms under which the territory of each could be kept from being invaded by
the other. Nevertheless, the mutual mistrust and constant attempts by the provincial
armies to penetrate native territories and the retaliation of indigenous armies convinced
the government authorities and indigenous leaders that any attempt to negotiate was set to
fail from the start. Moreover, when negotiation attempts failed, the position supporting a
policy of extermination” started to gain momentum amongst the elites. Ownership by
indigenous communities of the territories they inhabited was not questioned, however, as
evidenced by the practice of signing treaties between government authorities and
indigenous chiefs. Having said this, the effectiveness of these documents to end the
ongoing occupation of indigenous territories was extremely limited. In practice, the
existence of treaties between the authorities of an emergent state and indigenous leaders
coexisted with a “complex and infinite network of relationships between indigenous
communities and the emerging state via multiple institutional expressions of the latter:
frontier state officials, governors, special envoys, translators, and commissioners”
(Martinez Sarasola 2005, 198). Furthermore, fighting factions of the civil war constantly
used indigenous groups for their own political purposes. During this process, however,
indigenous peoples attempted to maintain ownership of their land as well as preserve
their economic activities and their ways of life. In sum, this period is often characterized
by a reigning pragmatism in the face of quickly changing circumstances, where
contending factions defended different interests and forged different alliances.
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As a result, the ongoing civil conflict affected indigenous communities directly. In this
context, native groups were forced to take sides in the wars of independence.
Furthermore, changes in the international economic context also had an impact, as
farmers in the Pampas regions were pushed to expand their lands in order to allow more
space for their cattle. In this sense, the insertion of the economic activities of Buenos
Aires into the capitalist world system gave a real impetus for the ongoing process of land
grabs. In a few decades, this new reality helps to understand why the Indian Question
became a political issue for which solutions in the form of more or less draconian policies
followed. For indigenous peoples, these pressures made the defence of their lands more
urgent. As cattle farmers expanded their land grabs towards the south, natives of
Northern Patagonia reacted organizing malones (raids) of estancias (large estates),
located near the frontier. In this context, the first decades of the nineteenth century
witnessed the migration of Mapuche groups from the west to the east mentioned above in
search of new lands, a process that was accompanied by the establishment of strong
leadership with increasing capacity to control vast territories and commercial circuits.
This resulted, in turn, in more stable patterns of settlement for Mapuche communities,
now strategically located according to the new emerging trading circuits postindependence. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the military occupation of
Northern Patagonia and the emerging conflict over international boundaries between the
central governments of Argentina and Chile put a stop to the ongoing political and
territorial concentration of indigenous leaders and their communities in the region.
1833 was the year in which the Pampas region was conquered by military expeditions
sent by the central authorities and commanded by Juan Manuel de Rosas (1793-1877).
Rosas became governor of Buenos Aires in charge of the federal government in 1829.
The military campaign of 1833 was the first event of magnitude that marks the beginning
of the “extermination” approach towards indigenous communities in Argentina. Other
historical events added to the complexity of this period in regards to indigenous
communities: the determination of Buenos Aires to weaken indigenous groups in order to
control their territories; the influence of civil war on intra-indigenous affairs; the
expansion of white settlements into indigenous territories; and finally, the inter-ethnic
“mixing” and rivalry taking place within indigenous communities (Martínez Sarasola
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2005). By the mid-1830s, the “Indian question” was at the forefront of Rosas’s policy of
territorial expansion to the south of the province of Buenos Aires. Amid Rosas’
expansionary goals, his government was able nonetheless to maintain a policy of
alliances with some indigenous leaders, resulting in relatively calm relations between
indigenous communities and the authorities of the emerging state (Martinez Sarasola
2005, 213). Despite the modest territorial gains of Rosas’ expedition, this military
incursion of 1833 anticipated how the central government would approach the Indian
Question during this period.
The fall of Rosas in 1852 inaugurated another short period of civil war that culminated
with the instauration of a federal Constitution in 1853. However, the outcome of the civil
war was not definitive as the wealthiest and most influential province of the newly
formed Argentina, Buenos Aires, would remain outside of the federation for another ten
years until it was formally –and as a result of an armed conflict- incorporated into the
federation in 1862. 1852-1862 was a decade of open and fruitful debates on the question
on how to organize the modern state in Argentina. It was not until the end of the century,
however, that the Indian Question became central to these debates.
The fall of Rosas also created an opportunity for a group of intellectuals to participate in
the debates over projects of state building.
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The achievements of a certain degree of

social discipline and insipient institutionalization during the Rosas government proved to
be the platform from which many of these projects departed. Moreover, the proximity of
these voices to the economic and political elites facilitated the transition between ideas
and their implementation. Indeed, during this period many projects for constructing a
“new nation” emerged, which shared the conviction that certain socio-cultural elements,
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This group of intellectuals, self-proclaimed as the “New Generation” in 1837, included historical figures
such as Esteban Echeverría, Juan Bautista Alberdi, Bartolomé Mitre, Vicente Fidel López and Marco
Avellaneda, among others. Inspired by European Romanticism, this “New Generation” thought possible the
conformation of a new alternative project of state and nation construction via a debate that could only take
place within an illustrated elite. They argued, for example, for restricted suffrage over the principle of
universality, denoting an underlying assumption of limited political citizenship in the emerging nation. For
a more detailed discussion on the “New Generation”, see the work of historian Halperín Donghi (2005, 3541).
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like “barbarism,” had to be eliminated from the nation in order to make way for the
global forces of progress. European immigrants and foreign capital were seen as the
vehicles for these forces of progress, and “barbarism” was regarded as the exact opposite
of “civilization” and progress. The content of what barbarism entailed depended on the
author presenting the idea but it was generally associated with local and provincial
interests that opposed the centralization of state power in Buenos Aires and the
establishment of a modern market linked to European interests (Lewis 2002). Barbarism
was also associated to ideas of anarchy and disorder (Halperín Donghi 2005, 123).
It was all too evident even back then that the profound belief of educated elites in what
the future held for the emerging nation was limited by a complex reality in relation to
which even their good intentions would prove futile. Thus, the assumptions on which the
belief in a modern, civilized Argentina were built proved to be more “problematic” than
initially thought. Modernization efforts were also supported by the necessity of an
expansion of areas apt for agriculture and by the consolidation of an export-led model of
economic growth. The presence of the “Indian frontier” was a perceived as an obstacle to
these ends. The export-based model of development based on agricultural production
was, in other words, a set of structural conditions and pressures that affected the plans for
modernization. From this perspective, the emphasis on civilizing Argentinean society and
addressing its “backwardness” is the ideological justification of an incessant demand for
agricultural lands by economic elites.
The Constitution of 1853 merits attention because it framed the relationship between
indigenous peoples and the modern state in clear ways. The Constitution gave Congress
the power to secure borders (where many indigenous peoples lived), to keep peaceful
relations with Indians, and to promote their conversion to Catholicism. Armed with this
Constitution in the context of the securitization of its international borders, the state
assumed a rather paternalistic approach towards indigenous communities. At the same
time, however, the state implicitly acknowledged the de facto existence of internal
borders. This de facto recognition of internal borders would later legitimize the state’s
use of violence for dealing with “rebel” communities, particularly those inhabiting areas
near the border. Furthermore, state-sponsored Catholicism was given prominence over
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the existing spiritual practices of indigenous communities. With this constitutional
mandate, Christian missions were deployed to convert indigenous peoples to Catholicism.
In this context, only some sectors of the liberal elites trusted the inclusion of Indians as
Argentinean citizens, and proposed that public education and labour training programs
should eventually “civilize” indigenous populations (Halperín Donghi 2005).
The three decades between the fall of Rosas and the inauguration of Julio A. Roca’s first
presidency (1880-1886) witnessed the consolidation and modernization of state
institutions. In this sense, following Benedict Anderson (1991), the “imagined reality” of
the modern Argentinean state became a blueprint for political action during the
presidencies of Bartolomé Mitre (1862-1868), Domingo Faustino Sarmiento (1868-1874)
and Nicolás Avellaneda (1874-1880).
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Until then, the ideas articulated in the work of

liberal intellectuals were impossible to realize between 1853 and 1862 given the
separation of Buenos Aires under the Confederation president mostly by Justo Jose de
Urquiza (1854-1860).
Echoing class and racial prejudices from colonial times, the dichotomy between
“civilization” and “barbarism” soon gave way to the idea that those areas under the
autonomous control of indigenous peoples constituted a desert, a harsh and hostile
territory that had to be conquered. Consequently, the fate of the inhabitants from these
territories, whose very existence was denied by the notion of the desert, was annihilation.
The so-called “Conquest of the Desert” was paramount to this idea and the recently
institutionalized national army was given the coercive power to attain the goals of the
emerging political order. A combination of small-scale military incursions targeting the
more combative indigenous groups and a policy of treaties, which did not take into
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The presidencies of Mitre, Sarmiento and Avellaneda, in fact, marked the beginning of the attempts to
consolidate state institutions based on the principles of modernization and liberalism, which the educated
elites strongly embraced since the second half of the nineteenth century. For decades, however, the role of
the state was still in dispute: Mitre thought to transform it as “an agent of a (political) faction”; Sarmiento
thought of the state as “independent from these factions;” and Avellaneda, saw the state as an arbiter
between factions (Halperín Donghi 2005, 115). Despite these disagreements, the new political context since
1862 guaranteed some of the conditions for the institutionalization of state power, particularly after the
consolidation of Buenos Aires and its elites over those of the rest of the provinces when Rosas’s
government fell.
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consideration indigenous traditions, characterized the presidencies of Mitre and
Sarmiento.
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The strategy of treaties, however, was considered a temporary and

necessary concession and it was only implemented when internal conflict, for example,
shifted the militarized pressure of the central government (Martinez Sarasola 2005, 243).
Both Mitre and Sarmiento, for example, faced armed opposition to their governments as
well as the war against Paraguay in the north. At the same time, however, it was clear to
them that the threat perceived by the landed elites coming from indigenous peoples had to
come to an end. The six military campaigns by the central government between 1855 and
1872 against Rankulche communities and Kalfucurá’s forces were indeed signs of the
commitment by central governments to the interests of such elites.
A more encompassing albeit radical approach took place in 1876. During Avellaneda’s
presidency (1874-1880), his Minister of War, Adolfo Alsina, projected a new policy of
slow advancement towards indigenous-controlled territory. The plan consisted of a ditch
along the frontier, three and a half yards wide by two yards deep, and a series of outposts
and forts placed along 500 miles. Alsina’s plan assumed that these indigenous
communities also aspired to advancing civilization and for that reason the plan intended
to negotiate with indigenous leaders during the construction of the ditch. Such
negotiations did not take place, but Alsina remained convinced that his plan was “against
the desert to populate it, [and] not against the Indians to destroy them” (quoted by
Curruhuinca-Roux 1993, 106). The plan, however, was short-lived and plans of this sort
that started with a timid support for assimilating indigenous peoples to the dominating
culture soon gave way to the draconian approach that supported extermination. The death
of Alsina in December 1877, and his replacement by General Julio Roca embodied the
21

transition from a mostly defensive strategy to a final solution.

In the project he sent to
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As part of Sarmiento’s program of modernization, for example, the national army acquired Remington
riffles, adding precision and reach which were to be crucial in the defeat of indigenous communities in the
Pampas and Northern Patagonia a few years later (Curruhuinca-Roux 1993, 104).
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In the two decades before the military expeditions to the Pampas and Northern Patagonia, a similar
process of military incursions into indigenous territory took place in Northern areas of Argentina, notably
the Chaco region in which the coerced incorporation of indigenous population as labour force into the sugar
plantations was seen as an instrument of order and pacification (Martinez Sarasola 2005, 272).
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Congress seeking approval for his approach to the Indian question, General Roca
articulated his position in these terms:
“Even our own decorum as a virile nation forces us to conquer as soon as
possible, by reason or force, a bunch of savages that destroy our wealth
and prevent us from definitely occupying, in the name of the law of
progress and of our own security, the richest and most fertile territories of
our Republic” (Julio A. Roca, Message to the National Congress of
August 14, 1878; quoted by Curruhuinca-Roux 1992, 123).

3.2 A Final Solution for the Desert (1880-1916)
The initial military offensive of 1879 did not last more than three months amid the
attempts to resist by indigenous communities living in territories that previous
governments had recognized as their own.
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There was a second period of military

campaigns from 1881 to 1885 in which the remaining communities of Patagonia that had
previously resisted ended up surrendering to the authorities of the central government.
The forced displacement of Mapuche communities took place immediately after the years
of the military conquest and ownership of the land was transferred, as latifundio (large
estates), to a wide range of recipients: members of the military involved in the military
campaign; private holders of public bonds who supported the military expedition
financially; pioneers who obtained land as the result of auctions of more than five million
hectares, kicking off a cycle of speculation in the land market; and immigrants, priests
and others with commercial interests. Some remaining parcels of land of very low soil
quality were transferred to indigenous communities without a secure regime of land
tenure. Since then, claims for land redistribution have become an important part of
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Between April and May of 1879, the greatest military expedition under the command of General Roca
was predisposed to wipeout the “desert” of North Patagonia and its inhabitants and to that end an army of
6,000 men entered the territories under indigenous control.
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Mapuche resistance after the loss of their autonomy (Martinez Sarasola 2005, 331). By
1883 an army commander referred to the conquest in a self-congratulatory mode:
“In the territories located in between the Neuquén and Limay rivers, the
Andes mountains, and the Nahuel Huapi Lake there is not a single Indian:
they have all been pushed westwards […] South of the Limay river […]
the only thing left of the savages is their Chief Sayhueque, running away,
poor, miserable and without any reputation. Only today can it be said that
the Nation has its territories wiped out of Indians. Soon enough, the
Nation will receive, in its fertile lands, millions of those who want to
extract its richness.” (Walther, quoted by Martinez Sarasola 2005, 262)
The military conquest of territories under indigenous control ended, on a large scale, by
1885 after the intensive military campaigns of the national army and the rendition of the
Mapuche leaders such as Sayhueque. Thus, the colonial and post-independence periods in
23

which indigenous peoples were viewed as the “Indian menace” came to an end.

The

last military campaign, of course, did not result in the disappearance of indigenous
peoples in Argentina but rather it entrenched the view in the dominant political and sociocultural imagination that “Indians” had become a “thing of the past.” The invisibility of
indigenous peoples in public policies and discourses thus began with the consolidation of
the modern state, and it can be argued that the mass killing of indigenous peoples by the
national army “constituted” the modern state in Argentina (Maybury-Lewis 2001).
This period also consolidated the officially held view that the Indian question was
increasingly a matter of national security. For the governing elite, in the context of
institutional modernisation, the question of international borders became a priority.
Furthermore, the territories under indigenous control were often located in areas
considered parts of the frontiers with neighbouring countries, a situation that made the
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The military conquest of Northern Patagonia left hundreds of indigenous peoples dead. In addition to the
massacre, the National Army took many indigenous survivors as prisoners. According to official sources,
the period of 1878-1879 alone left near 13,000 Indian prisoners in the hands of the central government
(Mases 2002, 50). That number increased after the final military incursions of 1885.
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governing elites connect their need to consolidate international borders with the Indian
question. The finalization of military campaigns and the extermination of most
indigenous communities created conditions for the successive central governments to
think about what to do with the “remaining” indigenous populations. A number of
colonization policies, for instance, emerged with the goal of moving some indigenous
communities to government-owned lands. In turn, these “reductions of Indians” were
seen as a vehicle to bring them to “civilized life.” This could be attained, governments
argued, if indigenous communities were kept in areas near international borders, in close
proximity to military settlements to eventually overcome indigenous ways of living
(Martinez Sarasola 2005, 348). In practice, this meant that indigenous communities were
re-located to areas far from their previous location, generally on land of poor quality for
the continuation of subsistence practices. With time, these relocations also meant the end
of indigenous peoples as owners of their own land and their transformation into a waged
labour force. Moreover, in this context the military campaigns to Northern Patagonia are
endlessly justified in geopolitical terms by public officials, the military and mainstream
historians, and to this day it is not uncommon for many in Argentina to regard Roca as
the president who “secured” the territories of Patagonia against the expansionist
ambitions of Chile.
The geopolitical thinking of a consolidated national army that regarded itself as the moral
expression of modern Argentina and the insertion of the country into the world capitalist
system via an agro-exporting model, contextualized the mass-killings of indigenous
peoples in the late nineteenth century. No one is more appropriate than General Roca
himself to articulate the army’s goal:
“[This military campaign] arms itself for something greater and
righteous; to combat for the security and enlargement of the Fatherland,
for the life and fortune of millions of Argentineans and even for the
redemption of those savages who for many years acting under their own
instincts have represented a burden to the richness and welfare of the
Republic.” (Walther, cited by Martinez Sarasola 2005, 474)
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As Halpering Donghi (2005) suggests, by the late nineteenth century, Argentina had a
powerful central state that started to become a crucial actor in the political life of the
country. This State, or at least the idea of it, that began in Buenos Aires was increasingly
capable of reaching almost every corner of the country through its transportation
infrastructure (e.g., train system), its market (e.g., foreign capital), its mechanisms of
social engineering (e.g., public schools), as well as other institutions and their officials.
Still following Halperin Donghi, this “exceptional” condition of the modern state in
Argentina meant that that what started as a project on paper of educated elites translated
into a reality, as the “body of the nation” that took the form of a centralized State.
General Roca, under whose command the mass killing of indigenous peoples had taken
place, became president of Argentina in 1880. At this point the state was in possession of
a considerable amount of land for settlement plans and for the expansion of the
agricultural frontier. The “arrival” of the national state to its recently conquered territory
was further consolidated with the expansion of a railway network which connected
remote areas of the country to Buenos Aires, from where raw products were sent to
European markets (Lewis 2002). As a result of the territorial conquest and appropriation
of lands from indigenous peoples, the modern state faced the task of bringing such
territories under its administration and control. Administratively, these territories were
divided into new provinces or national territories depending on the level of political
autonomy granted to them. In 1884, a federal law created the following National
Territories under the direct jurisdiction of the central government: La Pampa; Neuquén;
Río Negro; Chubut; Santa Cruz; and Tierra del Fuego in the South; and Misiones,
Formosa, and Chaco in the North. One commonality is that, for the most part, indigenous
communities inhabited these territories until the National Army removed their effective
control over those areas. Economically, these territories were now part of the ongoing
transformation of economic activities taking place in the late nineteenth century,
including the proletarianization of labour and the transformation of regional economies
along the lines of the economic model dictated by Buenos Aires and favoured by regional
elites. Finally, the social landscape of these areas was transformed with the arrival of
settlers who, for the most part, showed the same disregard towards the remaining
indigenous populations than those who came before them had.
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By 1885, the central government implemented the first public auction of land. Many
reasons explain the speed with which the government decided to put these lands on the
market, among them the need to cover the cost of the military expedition. However, the
dominant vision in government circles remained committed to the expansion of the
agricultural frontier, the consolidation of the central government and the promotion of
European immigration. New public auctions took place in the early twentieth century
(1904-1905) although most of the auctioned land – nearly ninety-five percent – was never
effectively occupied. The need for currency seemed to be so high that the government
even considered selling some of the land in Europe. The case of the Neuquén territory is
paradigmatic, considering that this is where the last resistance to Roca’s military
campaigns had taken place. The extension of the railway system into Neuquén’s territory
in 1902 facilitated the process of colonization, promoted immediately after the military
campaigns were over. Since the end of the nineteenth century, at least seventy-five
percent of this territory has remained “available” to the government as public land.
However, despite provisions to give some remaining indigenous families ownership of
parts of the land they inhabited before the military campaigns, these lands were only
given in very small quantities to selected chiefs with precarious titles of possession. This
situation led some communities to rebel against the government forces, giving the army
new reasons to eliminate the “Indian threat” by the use of force (Curruhuinca-Roux
1993).
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The fate of indigenous communities in the Northern region of Chaco was no different. After seven
military expeditions between 1870 and 1883, the resisting communities were finally pushed towards the
Northern part of Chaco region (today’s province of Formosa). By 1884, however, the region was
subdivided into the National Territories of Chaco and Formosa that later become provinces. Indigenous
labour was forced into the sugar plantations as the land they inhabited was distributed among new settlers.
The final military expedition in the region took place in 1899, ending the relative autonomy of the Qom and
Mocovi communities. In Southern Patagonia, it took settlers almost twenty years to exterminate Ona and
Yamana communities (Martinez Sarasola 2005, 287). In Northern parts of Argentina, such as the Puna
region, a process of mestizaje had taken place for centuries. However, the remaining communities that
struggled to keep the ownership of their land at the end of the 19th century saw their efforts coming to an
end when provincial governments sent military expeditions to suppress them. In areas where former
Catholic Jesuit missions were located, Guarani communities witnessed the arrival of settlers that in the
process of land acquisition pushed their members to become cheap labour in plantations and even soldiers
in the army (Martinez Sarasola 2005).
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The military conquest of Northern Patagonia meant that a vast amount of land was now
available for the expansion of the farming interests of cattle ranchers who desperately
sought a way to increase their production of beef and wool for European markets. With
the institutional support of the state, principally through its coercive forces, commercial
interests were able to find in these lands the conditions for expansion. This process led to
a model of “territorial expansion without settlement” in the region of Patagonia and its
characteristic latifundios (large estates with extensive farming) (Barbieri 1993, 130). As
mentioned before, the immediate transfer from public control to private hands, however,
took place according to mechanisms established before the military campaigns. First, the
central government transferred lands to those who financed the military expeditions as
well as those members of the military – according to their rank – who participated in
them. Second, parts of the territories were sold, usually through public auctions, in order
to cover the emerging costs necessary for the administration of these territories and
military defence. And finally, the government kept parts of the territory in order to
establish towns either directly or through third parties (Barbieri 1993). Amid these
government approaches to the newly conquered territories, the lack of clear settlement
and urbanization policies and official mechanisms used to assimilate indigenous
survivors of the military conquest left indigenous communities of Northern Patagonia to
their own devices with few possibilities for sustaining a decent livelihood.
The central authorities in Buenos Aires also needed to establish the political and
administrative control over the territories newly conquered. To that end, the government
established in Northern Patagonia the legal figure of National Territories which lasted
until the mid-1950s when they became provinces with their own political autonomy and
political rights for their inhabitants (Barbieri 1993; Briones and Delrio 2009). One of the
first challenges assumed by the political authorities of the Territories – generally
belonging to the members of the military - related to the assimilation of the population
under their control and the integration of the territory into the national economy. For
example, by 1895 62 percent of the population of the national territory of Neuquén was
foreign-born – the majority were from Chile and only 1% were Europeans (Barbieri
1993b). In this context, land ownership was seen as the main instrument to make the
scant, highly mobile and dispersed population more stable. Such high mobility of the
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population persisted for much of the period until the territory became a province in 1955.
Even by the 1970s, for instance, at least 50% of the land in Neuquén was publicly owned
(Favaro and Morinelli 1993).
Military control over territories such as Neuquén did not alter by much the socioeconomic organization of the population inhabiting these areas. For example, it would not
be until the 1940s that the commercial dependency on Chile would come to an end when
structural changes in the economy were implemented on both sides of the border
facilitating the complete integration of Neuquén into the national market. These changes
affected the area so profoundly that their social ramifications persist today in the relative
peripheral location of the local economies. Small-scale producers were the most affected
as their marginal participation in the local economy as well as their dependency on other
commercial interests attests (Barbieri 1993b).
The expansion of state control over the conquered territories was accomplished
administratively, economically, and socially. As mentioned above, military incursions
into indigenous territories in Northern Patagonia also produced survivors. Thus, from that
moment, there was a systematic attempt by state institutions to deal with the remaining
indigenous groups. The efforts included further military campaigns to curtail all
resistance, prison terms, especially for those involved in the combat as an instrument of
negotiation, confinement in agricultural “colonies” where Indians would “learn” to work
productively. In addition, they forced the transfer of children, pushed women and the
elderly to end up as domestic servants in Buenos Aires, and forced people into “new
ways of life”, including the national navy or sugar plantations in the North. These
deliberate efforts to break indigenous communities apart led to the disintegration of
families and further exposure to epidemics (Martinez Sarasola 2005, 267; CurruhuincaRoux 1993, 161). The brutality of these practices was such that it was even denounced by
members of the elite in the local newspaper:
“This was the spectacle: once a carriage arrived in that human market [in
Buenos Aires] all those who cried about their captivity shivered in fright
[…] All Indians would crowd trying to defend each other. Some covered
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their faces, others looked resigned to the ground, a mother strongly held
her baby against her chest, a father stepped up to defend his family from
the advances of civilization, and all, terrorised by that refined cruelty, that
themselves did not conceive in their savage spirit, ceased finally to ask for
mercy from those who were not even moved and started asking their god
for the salvation of their children” (“El Nacional”, Buenos Aires, March
20th 1885, quoted by Curruhuinca-Roux 1995, 188).

3.3 The “Indian Question” as “Social Question” (1916 –
1983)

Roca’s strategy of war opened up lands and nearly annihilated the indigenous population
in those areas where considerable indigenous autonomy existed. Once the military
campaigns finished, this strategy was replaced with new programmes aimed at
demarcating public lands, the encouragement of European immigration and the design of
25

new forms of control over remaining indigenous communities and the rural poor.

Agrarian and military “colonies”, for example, were part of the government’s attempts to
exercise its tutelage over populations deemed as needing this form of control and who
were perceived as needing a transformation of their systems of production and

25

The creation of a Patronato Nacional de Indios (National Indian Trust) was proposed in 1904, during
General Roca’s second presidency (1898-1904). The paternalist language of this project , justified as being
in “defence” of Indians, was mixed with provisions for a gradual “incorporation” of indigenous
communities into the nation (Martinez Sarasola 2005). Other provisions included: the creation of an
elementary school for both men and women in which the latter would learn “trabajos manuales” (manual
labour) as well as “canto escolar” (school singing); the imposition of Catholicism by “Argentinean priests”
who would also convince Indians to go to school and learn the “national language”; and the delimitation of
land plots given to settlers that would teach Indians, in a “practical and exemplary” fashion, to operate
farming machinery and tools and the “appropriate crops” for the colonies. The project also included the
possibility of transferring some land to indigenous communities in order to form a “colonia de indígenas”
(an indigenous colony) that would be named after its geographical location when possible – otherwise the
name of the colony was to follow a “national historical event” of “some national hero” (Bialet-Massé,
quoted by Martinez Sarasola 2005, 352). Although this project was never implemented, it became a future
point of reference for the further development of policies of the assimilation of indigenous peoples into
mainstream society (Martinez Sarasola 2005, 352).
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subsistence. By the end of the century, the idea of a homogenous Argentina nation was
consolidated. In order to facilitate this consolidation, the state – although not without
resistance – put into practice institutional mechanisms, including public education,
26

mandatory military conscription and the obligation to vote (Sábato 2005, 165).

In terms of the “Indian Question”, the central government made only timid attempts to
address it for most of the twentieth century. Furthermore, the state often assumed a
somewhat paternalistic role considering it to be its duty to restore some land to remaining
indigenous communities identified by the state as such. From a vision that considered the
Indian as “lazy” or “unproductive”, the early decades of the century witnessed positions
that consecrated indigenous peoples as workers, considering them “apt, docile and
affordable” (Mases 2002, 182). The aim of incorporating indigenous communities into
Argentinean society within a general framework of national society marks the
institutional development of the relationship between state and indigenous peoples in the
early decades of the twentieth century. In the words of Martínez Sarasola, “reduction,
protection and instruction are part of the euphemistic trilogy on which the ideological
framework of the policies implemented in this epoch seem to rest. Reduction meant, in
practice confinement, separation, and segregation. Protection implied that indigenous
peoples did not posses the conditions to act by themselves. Instruction meant isolation,
taking away ancestral cultural practices” (2005, 353). It was not until the rise of Peronism
in the 1940s, however, that the status of indigenous peoples as rural workers acquired
some degree of centrality in the discourse on nationhood although Peronism was
characterized by a lack of clear policies aimed at indigenous peoples.
Years after the violent extermination of indigenous communities, the Indian Question
was reframed, increasingly becoming part of the “social question” that marked national
policies during the first decades of the twentieth century. In 1904, under the second
administration of president Roca, the Ministry of Interior mandated Juan Bialet Massé, a
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It is important to emphasize, as Hilda Sábato does, that this process was charged with permanent
contradictions, internal debates among elite groups and constant confrontation from social groups which
suggest that the process of creating a nation cannot be understood monolithically and as one imposed from
the top down without contestation.
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recognized jurist at the time, to prepare a report on the state of the working classes in the
rural areas of the country. Bialet Massé published his report three months later. In it, the
author offered a deeply concerned view of the social conditions workers faced and of the
abuses committed towards rural workers by those running regional industries, including
sugar plantations, mining and timber activities (Bialet Massé 1904). In describing the
social conditions of workers in the Chaco region, for example, Bialet Massé prepared a
chapter on the indigenous communities living there. This document did not only
denounce the poor social conditions and exploitation of Indians but it also contained
some of the liberal ideas often found among the ruling elites of the time. Essentially, for
Bialet Massé, the solution to those conditions was to be found in the incorporation of
indigenous communities into the “civilized life” presumably enjoyed by the rest of the
nation. Furthermore, the author saw in public education and the learning of Spanish the
main vehicles for change, assuming that indigenous communities needed to be
incorporated into the Argentinean nation through means similar to those applied to new
immigrants.
Bialet Massé´s report also had the merit of bringing to the attention of the Buenos Aires
elites the harsh conditions of labour in the rest of the country. It also made evident the
exploitation and violent treatment of Indians because of their racial condition, cultural
practices and religious beliefs. Most importantly, the report voiced the demands of
indigenous leaders for their own land. The conclusion of the report highlighted the fact
that the ongoing exploitation of rural populations was in large part due to the lack of
“instruction” of Indians. Thus, the assumption that at the root of the dire condition of
Indians were elements missing from indigenous cultures was reinforced. This view also
ignored the fact that the exploitation of Indians and cheap labour were not isolated cases
of abuse but rather, they were part of a systemic attempt to build regional economies at
their expense in response to the main economic direction taken by the central
government.
It is difficult to estimate the impact that Bialet Masse’s report had on the central
government. The conquest of new territories previously under indigenous control and the
continuing presence of indigenous populations, however, ushered in a new historical
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period in the relationship between the state and indigenous peoples in Argentina. While
there were sporadic attempts by indigenous communities to recover what once belonged
to them, the balance of forces had shifted enormously and the state was able to establish
the framework of reference for most matters related to indigenous populations. The first
decades of the century witnessed attempts to implement policies aimed at assimilating
indigenous populations but those were largely ineffective to address indigenous claims.
The words of President Figueroa Alcorta, in 1908, illustrate the main approach towards
the “Indian Question” that characterized the relationship between state and indigenous
peoples for decades:

“[This government’s approach is to] establish a relationship with the
Indians, to try to attract them and offer them the protection of the national
government in order to facilitate their welfare through their labour. This
plan has showed some results; more than 500 Indians have surrendered,
and we should expect that the remaining majority will follow their
example once civil authorities can start protecting them against any
possible exploitation and provide them with land and tools for farming
[…]
We can expect that if this is done with justice the problem of Chaco will be
solved because it is well known that the majority of Indians lack the
willingness to work.
As far as those communities resisting assimilation, they will have to be
conquered by force because the Republic needs to eliminate these vestiges
of barbarianism that make the two richest territories of the Nation [Chaco
and Patagonia], dangerous and impossible to inhabit” (Scunio, quoted by
Martinez Sarasola 2005, 304-305).

President Yrigoyen (1916-1922), for example, proposed a “cultural reparation” for
indigenous peoples and legislation aimed at protecting their working rights, especially of
those in the North of the country where news of their denigrating treatment was
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becoming more frequent (Martinez Sarasola 2005, 360). This emphasis on the working
conditions and welfare of previously marginalized populations anticipated the political
discourse of Peronism (1946-1955). However, the official defense of indigenous
communities was timid and it took place within a framework of effective segregation
from mainstream society and increasing surveillance of indigenous communities by the
police and the army. In 1939, for instance, a project proposed the creation of a National
Commission for the Protection of Indians and Colonies. Some of the most relevant
dispositions of this project were: the establishment of a census that included indigenous
populations; the establishment of a museum to showcase the “art and culture” of Indians
that “lived or live in our country;” the distribution of land among indigenous families that
“decide to be incorporated into our civilization;” the protection and defense of Indians in
general; the supervision of working conditions given that their “incomprehension” made
them targets for abuse; and the “stimulation of working habits” through the school system
and workshops for “regional adaptation” (Consejo Agrario Nacional, quoted by Martinez
Sarasola 2005, 363).

3.3.1

Assimilating Citizens: the impact of Peronismo

Under the presidency of Juan D. Perón (1945-1955), the Argentinean state assumed a
more active role in the configuration of the worker, generally in the formal sector of the
economy, as a main subject of social rights (Grassi 2003, 26). Furthermore, the
interventions of the Peronist state were directed towards the national incorporation of the
interior, represented by peones (rural workers) either working in large estates or
migrating to urban spaces to become part of the ascending industrial labour force. The
creation of the Consejo Agrario Nacional (National Agrarian Council) consolidated the
transition from a politics of indigenous segregation towards one of assimilation under
Peronism, while the creation of this council established land redistribution for
“Argentinean Indians” as an objective, existing forms of paternalism prevailed. By 1943,
the government still insisted that indigenous peoples could be incorporated into the
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“civilized life of the nation” via elementary education and Catholicism (Martinez
Sarasola 2005, 372). Moreover, the incorporation of the council under the umbrella of the
Secretary of Labour in 1945 consolidated the “Indian Question” as the “Social Question”
under Perón’s populism. Thus the ascension of Perón to the presidency of Argentina in
1946 meant not only the irruption of working-class culture into the political system of the
country but it entailed the first attempts to consolidate a corporatist version of the welfare
state that was being consolidatd in core capitalist countries in the post-war period. In
terms of nationhood, the official discourse made visible, for the first time in Argentina’s
history, the indigenous roots of the population: the irruption of the “cabecitas negras”
(literally, “little black heads”) as an expression of the people marked the symbolic
beginning of the commitment to the social justice goals of populist politics.

27

Indigenous

politics under Perón took place under two conditions that informed the boundaries of
social change. First, corporativism was seen as the main vehicle for social change. And,
second, the prevalence of a strong nationalist rhetoric made it difficult to eliminate the
prevailing paternalism, particularly towards indigenous peoples. The combination of
corporatism and a strong nationalist discourse proved to be an effective formula to secure
social order.
Two main legal frameworks sustained the efforts of the Peronist state to create a space in
which both the organized working class and other subaltern sectors, such as indigenous
peoples, could be integrated into the notion of nationhood. First, the short-lived
Constitution of 1949 eliminated all reference to “indigenous peoples” in an attempt to
eliminate any mention of racial distinctions among a population that was seen, in the
nationalist discourse of Peronism, as simply “Argentinean.” References to the conversion
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In other areas of the continent, the first half of the twentieth century also witnesses populist regimes
giving central importance to the discourse and ideology of mestizaje, according to which the mixing of
indigenous and European peoples was sought to have created a new American “race.” In Mexico and Peru,
the mestizo race was seen as an expression of modernity. Indians, on the other hand, represented the past
and became a symbol of underdevelopment. In practice, however, mestizaje was often used as a way to
glorify the Indian element of the population as something of the past and populist regimes marginalized
contemporary Indian claims. Argentina, however, is one of the exceptions because the notion of mestizaje
was never significant in the discourse of modern nationhood. The implicit recognition of a mixed or
indigenous race or population was contained in the idea of cabecitas negras but Peronism did not go further
in challenging the powerful ideology that viewed Argentina as a nation of (European) immigrants.
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of Indians to Catholicism included in the 1853 Constitution were also eliminated
(Martinez Sarasola 2005, 374). Furthermore, in 1949 the National Congress passed a law
regulating indigenous labour, effectively framing the “Indian Question” in terms of
labour rights and consolidating the expansion of social rights as citizenship rights.
Second, the Dirección de Protección al Aborigen (Department of Aboriginal Protection)
was created in 1943 under the military government (1943-1946) of which Perón was part
as Secretary of Labour and Social Welfare. The Department of Aboriginal Protection was
placed under his jurisdiction. Furthermore, the existing Comisión Honoraria de
Reducciones de Indios (Honorary Commission of Indian Reservations) created in 1916
was replaced by the Department of Aboriginal Protection and also placed under Perón´s
leadership. As President, Perón further centralized, under the National Department of
Migrations, other agencies in charge of indigenous as well as migration issues. In 1953,
for example, Perón created the Comisión de Rehabilitación (Restitution Commission)
with the stated goal of offering some form of land redistribution to the benefit of
indigenous communities in the northern province of Jujuy (Martinez Sarasola 2005, 378).
However, other studies suggest that these types of government decisions that aimed at
some form of land redistribution for specific indigenous communities were far from
addressing the need of most indigenous communities to access productive lands (Lenton
2010).
The limited recognition of indigenous demands by the Peronist state has led some
authors, like historian Martínez Sarasola (2005) to conclude that Peronism was
particularly concerned with the demands of indigenous communities. Others, however,
disagree and use the paradigmatic case of the so-called Malón de la Paz (Raid of Peace)
to insist that Peronism really lacked a clear approach towards indigenous peoples. What
became known as Malón de la Paz, an indigenous march from the Northern provinces to
the country’s capital, started to take shape in mid-1946 only months after the
inauguration of Peron’s presidency (1946-1955). Hundreds of indigenous peoples
departed from northern provinces in May and were welcomed along the way by local
government officials. They arrived in Buenos Aires on August 3rd. Their demands
included land restitution in accordance with historical demands and within the new
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political context under Perón’s presidency indigenous leaders saw the political situation
as positive for this form of massive, public mobilization along 1,700 kilometers. At the
end, however, indigenous activists overestimated the willingness of the government to
deal with their demands in a supportive way. After a reception at the National Congress
and the Presidential palace, most indigenous activists were sent back to their home
provinces by train against their will and without a formal explanation. In a peculiar twist
of history, some indigenous leaders were sent to the Hotel de Inmigrantes (Hotel for
Immigrants) and kept there until they were escorted by the federal police and violently
forced to board the train that returned them to their province of origin. Indigenous
activists resisted but the state repressive apparatus prevailed. This hotel had been built to
encourage European immigration as part of the modernization effort and so was the rail
system. These “vehicles of progress” were used to push back the “barbarism” from the
interior. Thus, Peronism replicated the elitist view on indigenous peoples although this
28

time it was within the discursive framework of populism.

To be sure, the extension of

social rights to previously marginalized groups affected indigenous peoples by granting
them some access to welfare provisions. However, as Diana Lenton (2010) explains,
despite its “prominent place in the collective memory of indigenous communities” today,
Peronism did not effectively address their specific needs and demands.
Clearly, the government’s response to the Malón de la Paz helps highlights the
limitations of populism in addressing indigenous demands.
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First, despite initial support,

this particular type of public indigenous mobilization was severely repressed. In fact, the
politicization of indigenous demands was deemed too inconvenient for the nationalist
discourses prevailing within Peronism. Nevertheless, Lenton (2010) refers to Peronism’s
general approach to indigenous peoples as “protected incorporation.” In other words,
indigenous communities were seen as poor working-class Argentineans and in need of
state protection. A pro-Peronist newspaper put it in the following terms:
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In its approach to indigenous issues, Peronism was close to the indigenist policies practised other parts
of Latin America, most notably in Mexico under President Lázaro Cárdenas (Lenton 2010).
29

For a historical analysis of the Malón de la Paz, see Domínguez (2001).
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“[…] They are Indians and they represent the noble inhabitant of this
American land, with virtues, with industrious spirit, love for the sciences
and arts, and with soul. They are Argentineans and the founding Fathers
of the nation have put into our hands […] the obligation to care for them,
to protect them from their poverty, to instruct them, to educate them to live
in today’s hard world, so different from the one of their ancestors” (El
Laborista, July 22, 1946, quoted in Sala 2005, 134).
Second, some indigenous communities were granted, for the first time, easier access to
welfare measures and social protection. By making indigenous peoples supporters of
Peronism, the state’s aim of assimilation into mainstream society was addressed. Public
education under Peron was the preferred vehicle to accomplish this objective.
The support offered to indigenous demands was often seen by the state as a necessary
step towards their assimilation into mainstream society. During Peronism, the state’s aim
of assimilation translated into the recognition of social rights, with an emphasis on the
role of public education. A Peronist deputy expressed this assimilationist perspective in
the following terms in 1946:
“[…] Even with our Constitution and democracy, we continue witnessing
domination [over indigenous peoples]. We protest against rights given by
colonial conquest, but we forget that in our own country we are
conquerors. It is very grave and very difficult to deal with the problem of
assimilation of Indians but I consider that the best form of inclusion is not
only by inspiring trust […] but, once and for all, by providing them with
an education and by facilitating the mixing of races. It is then imperative
and urgent to saturate the American continent with people from Europe
and the Near East, people with no racial prejudices: Italians and
Spaniards, and also Syrians and Lebanese, because the latter ones have
an assimilating aptitude that it is almost incomprehensible.” (Federal
Deputy Alberto Candiotti 1946, quoted in Salas 2005, 178)
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The emergence of new channels, not necessarily institutional, for the articulation of
popular demands under Peronism meant that social movements placed outside the scope
of discursive and/or political spaces designated by the government or ruling parties could
face political exclusion or repression and the persecution of their members. This is a
practice that largely prevails to this day. In the case of indigenous peoples, Peronist
advocacy for the excluded was part of a nationalist project that identified the values of
Peronism with those of the nation. Indeed, the nationalist discourse of Peronism and its
assimilationist tendencies brushed aside ethnic tensions. However, Peronism was able to
articulate a discourse that, attacking the centrality of class or ethnic divisions, introduced
reforms that improved the material conditions of thousands of industrial and rural
workers. And while some indigenous communities received some limited social benefits,
Peronism did not respond to indigenous claims for land reform.
The project of national incorporation of indigenous peoples ended in 1955 when a
military coup ousted Perón. The end of Peronism marked a change in the overall
direction of social policy in general, and in policy aimed at indigenous peoples in
particular. The military government abolished the Dirección de Protección del Aborigen
in 1956. It also introduced further limitations on the use of lands by indigenous
communities. In practice, the military government abandoned the role of the state as the
main coordinator of indigenous policy, leading to what Gordillo and Hirsh (2003) refer to
as an “erratic indigenist policy.”
The return of constitutional rule and election of Arturo Frondizi in 1958 inaugurated
developmentalism as a strategy of state-led economic and social policy, with an emphasis
on industrialism and the urbanization of the capital city (Carrasco and Briones 1996;
Gordillo and Hirsh 2003). Under developmentalist guidelines, the state resumed its role
as coordinator of indigenous policy. While the overall goal of assimilation did not
disappear, new state agencies promoted a more active participation of indigenous
communities, particularly through development planning and labour training (Carrasco
and Briones 1996; Gordillo and Hirsch 2003). Furthermore, the general approach to
indigenous policy-making was to “adapt” indigenous communities to mainstream society.
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Typically, questions of collective land titling were excluded (Gordillo and Hirsh 2003;
Martinez Sarasola 2005, 381).
The first national census of indigenous populations was conducted between 1966 and
1968, under the presidency of Arturo Illia with the goal of gathering, for the first time in
the country’s history, data on the demographic composition of indigenous communities.
Once again paternalism and progressive social reform characterized the approach taken
by the federal government vis-à-vis indigenous peoples. The presidential decree calling
for the census incorporated an innovation in its approach to indigenous peoples: it
considered indigenous peoples not only as a population with “basic anthropological
characteristics” of a determined group but it also left room for self-identification. The
partial results of the census estimated an indigenous population of 165,381,
30

corresponding to less than 1% of the total population of 22,800,000.

The largest groups

of indigenous peoples effectively counted were the Mapuche (28,000), Toba-Quom
(17,000), Chiriguanos (13,000) and Mataco (10,000). Despite the difficulties of this first
census – data remained incomplete and final results were never entirely processed – it
marked the first attempt in Argentina to think about concrete ways to measure the
indigenous population. This new approach by the state was, however, short-lived
(Gordillo and Hirsh 2003).
The military coup of 1966, under Juan Carlos Onganía (1966-1970) replaced the Illia
government and, amongst other policy measures, cancelled the ongoing census
permanently. The military dictatorships that ruled Argentina between 1966 and 1973
established a series of “integrated programs of aboriginal community development”
under the umbrella of the State Secretary of Social Assistance. Beyond stated objectives
of community development these policies were increasingly considered, once again, to be
under the domain of national security. Indigenous mobilizations in regions near
international borders, for example, were treated in the context of doctrines of national
security, which emphasized the objectives of “internal security” over any other
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The number of effectively counted people reached to a little more than 75,000. The rest is based on an
estimation of communities that were not effectively censed.
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consideration (Martinez Sarasola 2005, 394). This period also witnessed the
radicalization of leftist groups mobilization against the military dictatorship. This context
of radicalization, in turn, had an impact on indigenous activism as many students and
workers with an indigenous background began to create new indigenous organizations in
the cities to pursue ethnic-based or political-economic demands on the state. The Catholic
Church played an important role in working at the grassroots levels with indigenous
communities to protect them, for example, from political persecution by the dictatorship
(Gordillo and Hirsch 2003).
The return of Peronism in 1973 marked a new short-lived attempt to return to policies
aimed at incorporating indigenous communities under the rhetoric and action of the
Peronist party and, in this logic, into the nation in general. Under Isabel Perón’s
presidency (1974-1976), for example, the government tried to suppress Indian
organizations that did not follow the desires of the Peronist party. Peronism’s attempts to
hold on to institutional power came to an end, when the regime was ousted by the most
violent and repressive military dictatorship to date in Argentina (1976-1983). The
military regime set the bases, amid a climate of political violence, for neoliberal
economic policies that aimed to erase the legacies of the welfare state and Peronism and
re-structure the economic development strategy of the country.

3.4 From the confines of terror (1976-1983) to the end of
invisibility and recognition (1983 to present)

The successive military administrations of the period between 1976-1983 implemented
neoliberal policies that affected negatively those of Argentinean society whose power to
influence the direction of national politics had increased in the previous decades, notably
Peronist labour unions. They also had detrimental effects on the living conditions of
already marginalized aboriginal communities. In general, the 1976-1983 period under
military dictatorship was marked by an official negation of the existence of indigenous
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peoples in the territory of Argentina and by the deliberate repression of indigenous
organizations. In its goal to “eliminate politics” generally, the military regime suppressed
indigenous organizations which were seen as “too political.” In many ways, the discourse
of the governing elites resembled the euphoric voices heard during the extermination of
indigenous communities carried out by Roca in the late 19th century.
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When military rule came to an end and in 1983 Ricardo Alfonsín was elected, new
possibilities for the implementation of policies towards indigenous peoples living in
Argentina opened up, as did new opportunities for indigenous communities themselves to
demand the implementation of rights and principles that were, by then, being recognized
at the international level. Furthermore, this time, the opening of the political system
coincided with the pressure indigenous peoples were beginning to exercise through their
struggle to end their representation by non-indigenous “experts” and to self-represent
within a political context in which their existence and subsequent rights were finally
recognized by law.
With the return to democratic rule in 1983, indigenous organizations that had been
created in the late 1960s and 1970s began to experience new challenges. Political parties,
for example, were now free again to support candidates and run for elections. In this
context, indigenous communities became subject to attempted co-optation and
manipulation. This greater dependence upon, and influence by, political parties partially
explains the absence of indigenous parties in Argentina and the fractured nature of
contemporary indigenous movements (Van Cott 2005). As a result, no major indigenous
organization at the national level has emerged.
However, the co-optation attempts by political parties are not the only element that
characterizes the relationship between state and indigenous peoples in Argentina during

31

Gordillo and Hirsh explain the sense of continuity between the military dictatorship of the period 19761983 with Roca’s military campaign in the following terms: “In 1979, the military rulers organized largescale celebrations of the centennial of the campaigns to Pampa-Patagonia and sanctified the civilizing
struggle against the malón. In official discourses, ‘the Indian’ emerged once again as a savage force that
had temporarily precluded the birth of the nation” (2003, 18).
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this period. After years of bloody dictatorship and political violence, the newly elected
government of Alfonsín (1983 – 1989) made, in its early years, a strong commitment to
address the human rights abuses perpetrated by the military dictatorship. The
convergence of a new class of young indigenous leaders that emerged in the early 1970s
and the government’s human rights agenda provided the background for the process of
legal recognition of indigenous rights in this period.
The most significant recognition of indigenous rights in Argentina in the 1983-1989
period was the Ley de Protección y Apoyo a las Comunidades Indígenas no. 23302 (Law
for the Protection and Support of Indigenous Communities). This law, passed by
Congress in 1985 and implemented in 1989, constituted a fundamental step in the path
towards official recognition of indigenous rights until such rights were recognized almost
a decade later in the constitutional reform of 1994. This law created the Instituto
Nacional de Asuntos Indigenas (National Institute of Indigenous Affairs, INAI) a new
institution to deal with indigenous issues. As one of its goals, INAI aimed to encourage
active participation and decision-making by indigenous representatives. The law also
established some criteria to define who is indigenous and it legally defined “indigenous
communities” as civic associations regulated by public law. INAI also maintains, at the
federal level, an official registry of indigenous communities, the Registro Nacional de
32

Comunidades Indígenas.

The law established some guidelines for the collective

ownership of land for those indigenous communities that were “properly registered” by
the state. The state was also in charge of determining whether such lands were “apt and
sufficient” for any certain economic activities, such as agriculture, forestry, mining,
industrial development, or crafts, depending on the needs of each community. Finally, the
law established that, under collective ownership, these lands could not be transferred for
at least twenty years (Carrasco and Briones 1996).
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This registry has been the source of ongoing conflicts between indigenous communities, provincial
governments, and the federal government as some communities have been able to register federally but
have seen their attempts to register at the provincial level severely limited. Thus, some provinces like
Neuquén, have refused to accept the federal registry as “proof” that a community is indeed an indigenous
community.
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Law 23302 was also significant because it consolidated pre-existing provincial legal
reforms on indigenous rights, specifically laws from those provinces with a considerable
indigenous population. This legal reform illustrates the centrality of provinces in the
process of mediating local and national dimensions of indigenous politics. The 1980s
witnessed legal changes recognizing indigenous rights in Formosa (1984), Salta (1986),
Jujuy (1986), Chaco (1987), Misiones (1987), Río Negro (1988), Chubut (1991), and
Santa Fe (1993) (Carrasco and Briones 1996, 25).
It is clear from the discussion above that, since the return of electoral rule, a policy of
official recognition of indigenous rights has replaced and reversed the invisibility of
indigenous issues and their relationship to discourses of nationhood. These new policies
recognized the multiethnic composition of the country’s population, embracing new
rights based on cultural differences and echoing multicultural policies in other corners of
Latin America. In 1992, Argentina had adopted Convention 169 of the International
Labour Organization. Its significance resides in the fact that Convention 169 was the first
international document that recognized indigenous populations as “peoples” (Carrasco
and Briones 1996). The Convention, however, was not ratified until 2001. In Argentina,
the main legal instruments for this recognition derived from the constitutional reform of
33

1994.

In regulating the powers of Congress, its article 75, section 17, stated as one of its

main functions:
“To recognize the ethnic and cultural pre-existence of the Argentinean
(sic) indigenous peoples. To guarantee respect for their identity and the
right to a bilingual and intercultural education; to recognize the legal
character of their communities, and the community possession and
ownership of the lands they traditionally occupy; and to regulate the
granting of other lands adequate and sufficient for human development;
none of them shall be sold, transmitted or subject to encumbrances and
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In December of 1993, Argentina’s Congress passed the law that declares the necessity for a partial
constitutional reform. In such law, Congress gave the power to a constitutional convention to redraft the
constitutional text in order to guarantee “the ethnic and cultural identity of indigenous peoples” (Carrasco
and Briones 1996, 26).
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seizures. To assure their participation in issues related to their natural
resources and in other interests affecting them. The provinces may jointly
exercise these powers” (Political Database of the Americas July 16,
2008).

34

This wave of recognition, however, took place in the context of the implementation of
new market-based development strategies (i.e., neoliberal economic policies) and the
consolidation of new forms of citizenship. In addition, the period saw an increasing
indigenous mobilization, especially in those provinces where indigenous populations
were considerable (e.g., the Northeast and Northern Patagonia). The history of
neoliberalism in Argentina began in the 1970s, when the first set of policies inspired by
the monetarism of the “Chicago School” was implemented. In the context of repression
and forced disappearances, the military dictatorship applied the first policy measures that
opened the country’s economy to the influx of international financial capital. Moreover,
the return of an elected government in 1983 did not fundamentally alter some of the
economic policies previously adopted by the military Junta. Although Alfonsín tried a
more heterodox approach for managing the economy, his government ended in
hyperinflantion and social chaos.
It was not until 1989 with the election of Carlos Menem (1989-1999) that the neoliberal
project was consolidated as a state form. Against a background of hyperinflation,
president Menem assembled a team of orthodox economists that applied monetary (i.e.,
anti-inflationary) policy solutions. The Menem administration managed to stabilize prices
eventually, but did so at the expense of increasing public spending deficits, alarming
unemployment rates, larger income gaps, and trade deficits. The Menem period was
characterized by massive social dislocation. It also ushered in a redefinition of the
relationship between state and society, as part of the consolidation of the neoliberal
project. In fact, the relationship between state and society came to be mediated by the
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In 2003, the Supreme Court of Justice determined that the provisions included in this article are
applicable and that the rights included in this article are valid even in the absence of specific provincial or
federal legislation. This was an important decision as Congress has been painfully slow to adopt new
legislation on indigenous issues since the passing of the constitutional reform in 1994.
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logic of market relations and this affected state policies and the possibilities for the terms
35

of social mobilization and protest actions.

The consolidation of neoliberal policies came to an end after Menem’s successor,
president Fernando De la Rúa (1999-2001), failed to address the social and political crisis
that years of “austerity” policies created. Even though the economic policies associated
with neoliberalism have been questioned, the cultural-political logic of the neoliberal
state (and its rationalities) has been entrenched through the policies and legal reforms
implemented by successive governments. In the midst of such crisis, De la Rúa’s
resignation in December 2001 opened a new period characterized as a post-Washington
consensus in which previous policies became increasingly contested. Before leaving
office, however, De la Rúa’s government saw the International Labour Organization’s
Convention 169 come into effect as well as other measures of relative importance to
36

indigenous politics.

Under the transitional government of Eduardo Duhalde (2002-2003), the social landscape
of Argentina was characterized by the intensive social mobilization and public
demonstrations of organizations of the unemployed and the middle class. Indigenous
mobilization during this period needs to be understood in this context as the government
shifted towards, what Lenton and Lorenzetti (2005) call a “neo-welfarist” state (estado
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The consolidation of the neoliberal project did not go unchallenged. Public sector workers and the
unemployed were at the centre of an increased social mobilization that also included indigenous
communities (Svampa and Pereyra 2003; Silva 2009). Indigenous demands and mobilization during this
period received scant attention. Svampa (2005, 79), for example, suggests that this can be explained by a
predominant view that the “popular” sector in Argentina comprised wage workers, their challenges facing
unemployment, their political influence (given the historical alliance between the union leaders of major
labour organizations and Peronism), and their mobilization strategies. The recent literature on social
movements in Argentina almost exclusively addresses the experiences of the unemployed and the poor.
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De la Rúa’s government was involved in a number of initiatives related to participation in the UN
Human Rights Committee in Geneva to address the country’s weak implementation of indigenous policies
and participation in the World Conference Against Racism, Racial discrimination, Xenophobia and Other
forms of intolerance celebrated in Durban, South Africa in September 2001. During this period, chief
Panghitruz Guor’s body was returned. The National Institute for Indigenous Affairs (INAI) was open, for
the first time since its creation, to the participation of indigenous leaders even though such possibility failed
as a result of the ongoing economic crisis and lack of government commitment. Finally, the Census
conducted in 2001 considered, for the first time, the possibility of indigenous self-identification (Lenton
and Lorenzetti 2005, 297).
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neoasistencialista) or what many others see as an intensification of neoliberal forms of
governing the poor (Schild 2000, Ilcan and Lacey 2011).

37

This approach towards social

policy endorses certain limited types of self-management and the participation of those
who are targeted by such policies. The ultimate goal is to govern well-defined segments
of the population (e.g., the poor, indigenous peoples). It does so, however, in ways that
do not fundamentally challenge neoliberalism or alter state power but that increase
mechanisms of policing and controlling target populations. Thus, “the poor” become
responsible for managing their own way out of poverty using the mechanisms available
through social programs. It is in this context that the “Indian Question” became, once
again, part of the Social Question in the 2000s. In fact, during Duhalde’s government the
emphasis was less on the implementation of recognized indigenous rights, or on
addressing political conflicts between indigenous communities and provincial or local
governments, than on reaching indigenous peoples through social assistance programs
(Lenton and Lorenzetti 2005).
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Under the presidencies of Nestor Kirchner (2003-2006) and Cristina Fernandez de
Kircher (2006-Present), the state has consolidated this neoliberal-based “neo-welfarist”
logic. Under it, the state retains a transformative role over indigenous mobilization with
the goal of facilitating control over indigenous issues. In this context, the state has
supported new forms of “inclusion” and participation for indigenous peoples within the
institutional structures of the state. By taking these initiatives, the Kirchner
administrations have further entrenched the neoliberal regime through legal reforms and
the creation of spaces for indigenous participation. These reforms have, since their
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According to Lenton and Lorenzetti (2005), the approach is “neo-welfarist” because it provides welfare
services or payments under the conditions of a “payback” in the form of participation and self-management
of welfare clients. See Schild (2000, 2007).
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The Plan Jefas y Jefes, as it was known, was implemented in mid-2002. The plan was informed by the
principles of decentralization, client participation, and civil society involvement. Although it was
considered as a temporary mechanism to address the social crisis and was meant to expire by December
2002, the government decided to extend the program throughout 2003. The World Bank provided funding
to cover half of its cost.
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implementation, shaped the “indio permitido” (permitted Indian), to use Hale’s
expression.
Arguably, it is too soon to gain a historical perspective on the impact of the
macroeconomic policies of the Kirchner administrations on indigenous peoples.
However, the “Indian Question” has gained some visibility during the last decade that is
pertinent to briefly describe. In November of 2011, Argentina had, for the first time, an
official visit by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, James Amaya. The United Nation’s Report (Naciones Unidas 2012) highlights
the gap that exists today between the legal framework that recognizes indigenous rights
and its implementation in practice. Furthermore, the report emphasizes that the existence
of such gap is related to the expansion of extractive industries, the criminalization of
social protest and lack of access to the court system, and the socio-economic deterioration
of indigenous communities, characterized by the lack of quality in education, health, and
development in general.
The Kirchner administrations have also seen the implementation of new spaces of
indigenous participation within state institutions. In 2004, for instance, the National
Institute for Indigenous Affairs (INAI) created the Consejo de Participatción Indígena
(Indigenous Participation Council) as a mechanism for indigenous collaboration in the
implementation of its programs and policies, including the assessment of land ownershp
and social welfare needs. In 2006, in the context of increasing conflicts over land
ownership fuelled in part by the expansion of the soy frontier, Congress passed Law
26160 to suspend all evictions of indigenous peoples for a four-year period. The law also
gave the INAI the mandate to conduct a study on the lands occupied by indigenous
communities. Furthermore, the new law of National Education (no. 26206), also passed
in 2006, included Educación Intercultural Bilingüe (bilingual intercultural education) in
support of the constitutional right to such education for indigenous peoples. In 2007,
Argentina voted in favour of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, and in 2009, Law 26554 extended the no-eviction period for four more years,
until 2013. Finally, a controversial media law (no. 26522) recognized the right to a
“comunicación con identidad” (communication with identity) for indigenous peoples by
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granting indigenous communities access to media outlets (Naciones Unidas 2012, 6).
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These policy measures entrenched new categories of belonging for indigenous peoples.
For many indigenous groups, for instance, the state provides ambiguous signals. On the
one hand, the state has created new spaces of recognition and some support for
indigenous claims. On the other, the administrations of the last ten years have promoted
economic development strategies that rely on the expansion of extractive industries,
40

which are increasingly encroaching on indigenous lands.

3.5 Conclusion
Indigenous communities in Argentina have been experiencing the social impacts of
neoliberal policies since they were consolidated in the 1990s. These effects, together with
new forms of activism and spaces for participation within the state inform the ways in
which indigenous mobilization has taken place in recent years. The most recent decades
have witnessed the emergence of new types of indigenous mobilization that challenge
centuries of official invisibility. In a country that was seen as having “no Indians,” this
mobilization caused some initial astonishment. This chapter has shown that throughout its
post-colonial history, the Argentinean state has attempted to deal with the “Indian
Question” in ways that cannot be disconnected from broader questions of social power,
political institutions, and, fundamentally, the insertion of the country into broader
processes of modernization and global capitalism. For the last thirty years, successive
administrations have tried to insert Argentina in the global economy under new terms,
and while the strategies between the Menem and the Kirchner administration vary, they
have relied on economic activities that have increasingly taken place on indigenous
territories.
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The media law has been controversial as many opposition leaders and journalists accused the
government of using such a law to silence those media outlets that are critical of the Kirchner
administration, particularly the Clarín media conglomerate, a former supporter of Néstor Kirchner
presidency.
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This point is elaborated in more detail in the following chapters.
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The centrality of territorial claims has a long history that goes back to colonial and early
republican times. By the mid-19th century, the “Indian Question” was bound with the
territorial aspirations and expansion project of the modern state. Once those indigenous
groups who remained autonomous until the late nineteenth century were militarily
subdued, the state changed its approach from one of military conquest over indigenous
lands to attempts to assimilate indigenous peoples as Argentinean citizens. Reserves
(reducciones), labour colonies, and religious missions were put into place by the state
41

with the purpose of “eliminating the Indian within.”

In the 1940s, Peronism addressed

the problem significantly differently. Informed by indigenista discourses, the state
emphasized the socio-cultural incorporation of indigenous peoples into Argentinean
nationhood. Perón’s populist rhetoric, clientelism, and the provision of concrete material
social benefits secured the electoral support of many indigenous peoples. The Peronist
political strategy of social and political integration was part of the larger strategy of
inward-oriented development through industrialization. The support of “workers” was
central to this strategy. Two decades later, the emphasis was placed on the economic
“development” of indigenous communities and the identification of a need for
technocratic intervention. The Census of 1966 illustrates this effort to identify, count, and
assess indigenous “needs.”
Contemporary indigenous mobilization has its most immediate roots in the early 1970s,
during the brief period of political openness between two military dictatorships but also
in the context of the formation of new political identities, social mobilization, and the
internationalization of indigenous rights.
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However, these incipient forms of indigenous

mobilization in Argentina were suspended for almost a decade as a result of the military
dictatorship (1976-1983) and the context of political violence that characterized it. The
aftermath of the dictatorship’s violence carried with it the social and political pressure to
address past human rights violations. In this context, the increased recognition of
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I borrow the expression “to eliminate the Indian within” from the Canadian context of Indian residential
schools.
42

There are, however, previous experiences of indigenous mobilization and resistance that date back to the
19th century and expand throughout the 20th century, such as the Malon de la Paz under Peronism in 1946.
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indigenous rights in the 1980s can be seen as a confluence between social mobilization
and the result of such pressures to address human rights violations. Finally, the profound
transformation of the state in the 1990s, with the consolidation of neoliberal forms of
citizenship and the constitutional reform of 1994 recognizing new indigenous rights,
created the conditions of the ongoing tensions that exist today between formal
recognition of rights and their implementation. In the present period, the dynamic core of
the economy includes state support for extractive industries that increasingly rely on the
exploitation of indigenous territories. Territorial autonomy has, thus, come to occupy a
central place in indigenous activism. It is the critical focus of negotiations,
accommodations and contestations that characterize the relations between the Mapuche
and the local neoliberal state, through which new collective identities are being shaped.
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Chapter 4

4

Pewmagen: Towards a new Mapuche political
subjectivity in Neuquén43

“What is the basis of bonding in collective action – past or future, memory
or project? While communal symbolism may be important, collective
symbolism and discourse merging a heterogeneous collectivity in a
common project may be more important […] Generally, emancipations
may be thought of in the plural, as a project or ensemble of projects that
in itself is diverse, heterogeneous, multivocal.” (Nederveen Pieterse 2009,
80)
Mapuche activism today involves and active process of negotiating with, accommodating
to, and contesting the neoliberal state. This activism begins with challenging established
identities. The emergence of new collective voices in the political landscape of
Argentina’s social movements is not new. In addition, collective voices that may seem
“new” are not simply the result of the return to democratic rule in 1983 or specific
institutional changes. Instead, these collective identities, including indigenous ones, need
to be understood in relation to dominant orders that have been established in the past
(Shapiro 2004). Indeed, the emergence of new indigenous identities in Argentina since
the late 1970s often reflects “historical processes of subalternity” as well as possible
ways “to forward struggles” that have originated in the past (Escobar 2008).
Furthermore, the formation of collective subjectivities, as Negri (1989) reminds us, takes
place first and foremost as the result of a relationship between subjects in a context of
power inequalities. In time, these relationships tend to manifest themselves in a more
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Pewmagen translates from Mapuzugun as “let our dreams conduct our actions.”
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explicit manner as a relationship with the state, on the one hand, and subjects and
citizens, on the other.

44

Thus collective subjectivities, Negri continues, do not obey to

what he calls “immutable moments” as they “do not require foundations which go
beyond experience.” On the contrary, they are always socially produced and typically in
antagonistic ways (1989, 127). Escaping what he calls a structuralist notion that
conceives a “process without a subject,” Negri further argues that, “the ontological
aspects of subjectivity are established (or rather, produced) through the formulation of
points of view, the interlacement of orientations of struggle and the revelation of
intentions and desires” (1989, 128).
After introducing the particularities of Mapuche communities in Patagonia and the recent
process of political mobilization in the region, this chapter provides an overview of the
particularities of Neuquén and the focus of my ethnographic research: the Confederación
Mapuche de Neuquén (Neuquén’s Mapuche Confederation, CMN). The chapter then
focuses on the three elements that Negri (1989) identifies as constitutive of collective
identities which serve to analytically examine the production of a new Mapuche political
subjectivity through the establishment of the Confederación Mapuche de Neuquén
(CMN). First, the “formulation of points of view” is explained by looking at the
Confederación’s politics of self-representation. Second, while the “orientations of
struggle” of the Confederación can be analysed from many different perspectives, I
choose to focus on the politics of interculturalidad (interculturality) as an attempt to
change the terms in which the political relationship between Mapuche activist and the
state is established. Finally, I examine the ways in which Mapuche activists talk about the
legacy of their ancestors, new forms of knowledge production, and the importance of a
collective memory as an illustration of Negri’s notion of a “revelation of intentions and
desires.” These three elements shape contemporary Mapuche demands for territorial
autonomy, a process discussed in the following two chapters.
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In addition to the state, one can also include other forms of institutionalized power such as international
financial institutions, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, or pan-regional
organizations that become targets of social mobilization and demands. As some research included in the
introduction to this dissertation shows, the process of transnationalisation is one of the most salient
characteristics of contemporary indigenous mobilization around the world and Latin America in particular.
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4.1 Mapuche Communities in contemporary Patagonia

Of the three indigenous peoples that inhabit Patagonia today, the Mapuche are the largest
group and the most politically active. According to an official survey published in 200405 out of a total of nearly 650,000 people who self-identified as indigenous in Argentina,
104,988 (16%) self-identified as Mapuche.

45

According to the latest 2010 Census, the

Mapuche and Toba peoples represent the two largest indigenous groups living in the
country, totalling 21.5% (205,009) and 13.3% (126,967) of the indigenous total
population, respectively. The results of the 2010 Census provide additional information
on the indigenous population (INDEC 2010): 368,893 households (3,03%) and recognize
at least one of its members as an indigenous person. In relation to the previous census of
2001, there has been an increase of 0.04% of such households. In Patagonia, however, the
increase has been over 1%. If one looks at population numbers, independently from
household estimations, the 2010 Census ended with a total of 955,032 people who selfidentified as indigenous, representing 2.4% of the population. In the provinces of
Neuquén and Río Negro in Northern Patagonia, 8% and 7.2% of their population selfidentified as indigenous respectively. Chubut, with 8.7%, is the province with the highest
proportion of indigenous population in the country. Neuquén, however, remains the
province with the highest Mapuche population in the country.
In addition, the latest census shows that, currently, the Mapuche live primarily in
Patagonia (Neuquén, Río Negro, Chubut, and Santa Cruz) and in the provinces of La
Pampa and Buenos Aires. While a significant percentage live in rural areas, most
Mapuche live in cities. The largest Mapuche population, however, lives on the other side
of the Andes, in Chile. In both countries, Mapuche communities have been able to adopt

45

The 2004-05 survey was conducted to provide additional data on the indigenous population to the 2001
Census. The 104,988 people who self-identified as Mapuche are distributed as follows: 76,606 in the
provinces of Chubut, Neuquén, Río Negro, Santa Cruz, and Tierra del Fuego; 19,689 in La Pampa, and rest
of Buenos Aires province; and 8,693 in Buenos Aires city and 24 counties of the Greater Buenos Aires.
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very different organizational structures and political stances as a result of the
particularities of state formation on both sides of the mountains. In Argentina, for
example, the federal political system has granted provinces opportunities to retain, gain,
or be given a considerable amount of power to deal with indigenous issues (Briones
2005). While the focus of this study is the case of the Mapuche in Neuquén, it is
important to provide an overview of the ways in which Mapuche societies have organized
in other parts of Patagonia.

46

While Neuquén recognized the presence of indigenous peoples in its territory in the 1958
provincial Constitution and in the mid 1960s through specific policies, other provinces in
Patagonia failed to do so until more recently. Río Negro, for example, started to
recognize the presence of indigenous societies living within its boundaries in the 1980s.
Chubut, the province with today’s largest proportion of indigenous peoples, did not start
this process of official recognition until the 1990s. This, in part, helps to explain the
different trajectories of contemporary Mapuche organizations in those provinces. The
particularities of contemporary Mapuche activism in Neuquén, for example, can be better
explained if one begins by providing an overview of such activism in the other two
Patagonian provinces where such activism has been taking place.
The province of Río Negro is located, together with Neuquén, at the northern edge of
Patagonia.

47

In contrast to Neuquén, however, the province has not witnessed the

influence of one hegemonic political party in charge of creating a strong sense of
provincial identity.

48

The absence of this type of hegemonic political party explains, in

part, the lack of initiative by the provincial state in addressing indigenous demands until
recently. In 1984, when the demands for indigenous recognition were stronger, the
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For the political organization of Mapuche communities in Chile, see Richards (2004, 2010), Haughney
(2006).
47
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The National Territory of Río Negro became a province in 1957.

Since it became a province, Río Negro was governed by the Unión Cívica Radical (Radical Civic Union,
UCR – a moderate, centre party) and by the military, except for the 1973-1976 period under which it was
under a Peronist administration. Thus, no significant provincial party emerged as in the case of Neuquén.
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provincial government created the Consejo Asesor Indígena (Indigenous Advisoy
Council, CAI).

49

In 1987, the province recognized for the first time the presence of its

indigenous population, which currently forms approximately 125 communities with
different legal standings (Cañuqueo 2005, 133).

50

At that time, the CAI brought together

indigenous representatives from the communities across the province as well as nonindigenous peasants and small producers.
Thus “Mapuche” demands in Río Negro are established in relation to the demands of
other non-indigenous sectors with a stronger emphasis on class-based interests. Since its
inception, the CAI also worked closely with the office of Viedma’s bishop and with
provincial authorities.

51

In the meantime, urban Mapuche Centres were formed

throughout the province emphasizing demands based on cultural difference as opposed to
the CAI’s weight on socio-economic (i.e., class-based) concerns (Kropff 2005). In 1988,
the government of Río Negro finally passed legislation facilitating a more autonomous
decision-making processes in matters that affected indigenous communities, thereby
granting the CAI a considerable level of autonomy and legitimacy as a representative of
Mapuche communities.

52

Since the mid-1990s, a new organization, the Coordinadora del

Parlamento Mapuche de Río Negro represents the interests of rural communities, urban
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The original purpose for the CAI was to provide council to provincial legislators on indigenous affairs
but the organization quickly became the “political arm” of the Mapuche communities once the government
lost control over the appointment of its representatives (Gutiérrez 2001).
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The provincial constitution of 1988 consolidated such recognition. The process of provincial recognition
can be seen as echoing the national law of 1985 (no. 23302) described in the previous chapter.
51

Viedma’s bishop, Miguel Hesayne, publicly condemned the military junta’s human rights violations
during the military junta (1976-1983). In 1984, a severe winter storm left many rural small producers in
dire economic conditions and the event served to put into the public eye the conditions of poverty and
marginality of such populations that included indigenous peoples (Gutiérrez 2001, 290). The bishop
facilitated not only the visibility of such conditions but it also started a public campaign to address the
needs of these rural communities by acquiring sheep to replace those who have died as the result of the
harsh weather conditions. In doing so, it included newly formed urban Mapuche organizations for the
implementation of the assistance plan that slowly led to the establishment of a rural cooperatives movement
(Gutiérrez 2001; Cañuqueo 2005, 134). Viedma is the capital of Río Negro.
52

The CAI’s autonomy was facilitated with the establishment of the Consejo de Desarrollo de las
Comunidades Indígenas (Council for Development of Indigenous Communities, CODECI), which included
representatives of both the CAI and the provincial government (Kropff 2005, 111).
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Mapuche Centres, and the CAI.

53

Since their formation, the Coordinadora and the CAI

claim the political representation of Mapuche interests in the province.

54

Since the

emergence of these organizations, Mapuche activism has centred not so much on
establishing a radically different relationship with the state – as in Neuquén -, but in
making sure that the legal framework that guarantees indigenous participation is applied
(Kropff 2005, 115). In this context, the CAI, for example, has been accelerating the
process by reoccupying lands since it made the decision to adopt such a strategy in 1997.
Chubut, the province located south of Río Negro, presents a different scenario in terms of
its relationship with indigenous peoples than Río Negro and Neuquén. Chubut did not
55

pass any legislation on indigenous affairs until 1991.

For example, the provincial

government did not create spaces for indigenous participation, such as the Confederación
Mapuche in Neuquén or the Coordinadora in Río Negro, giving later indigenous
organizations a much higher degree of initial autonomy (Kropff 2005, 112; Ramos and
Delrio 2005). Furthermore, the province that currently claims the highest proportion of
indigenous peoples (8% of its population) did not have a public history of visible
Mapuche organizations until recently (Ramos and Delrio 2005). By the early 1990s, and
in the context of the counter-celebration of the 500th anniversary of Spanish arrival in the
American continent, however, some indigenous activists began to organize their demands
publicly. They did so, not as Mapuche but as Mapuche-Tehuelche communities and with

53

The Coordinadora is divided in regional “zones”: Andean, South, Atlantic, and Valley. In doing so, the
Coordinadora adopts the official conception of space conceived by the provincial governments (Cañuqueo
et al 2005). The establishment of regional sub-organizations echoes the recent modification of the
representative structure of the Confederación Mapuche de Neuquén.
54

In 2001, the CAI ended its relationship with the CODECI due to political differences. Since then, the
CAI has increased its public opposition to the provincial state and the CODECI. Thus, unlike Neuquén, Río
Negro is characterized by the fragmentation of Mapuche activism. Some argue this fragmentation has led to
the lack of concrete results to solve territorial disputes in the province between the state, private interests,
and Mapuche communities (Kropff 2005).
55

Provincial Law no. 3657 declared the need to improve the living conditions in the province’s “aboriginal
communities” and created the Instituto de Comunidades Indígena (Institute of Indigenous Communities).
The provincial constitution of 1994 officially recognized the presence of an indigenous population in the
province. Such recognition, however, only includes indigenous rural populations (Ramos and Delrio 2005,
87).
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a tendency to work in alliance with other social movements in the province opposed to
political authorities (Kropff 2005, 115).

56

The institutional name given to the first attempt

to create a representative framework for indigenous communities is the Organización de
Comunidades Mapuche-Tehuelche 11 de Octubre (The October 11th Organization of
Mapuche-Tehuelche Communities, OCMT). Since its creation in 1992, the OCMT has
gained public notoriety after being involved in struggles against the provincial state,
terratenientes (large landowners), and multinational corporations (Kropff 2005, 113). In
Chubut, the main political strategy adopted by the urban OCMT and the communities has
been to reoccupy ancestral lands, seen as lugares de origen (places of origin) and as a
sign of Mapucheness. According to one of the Mapuche communities involved in this
type of activism, “the right to self-determination and to a territory is not to be begged; it
is to be exercised” (Pillan Mahuiza, quoted in Ramos and Delrio 2005, 97).

4.2 The local state: Neuquén

As the previous chapter has shown, the region of Neuquén was incorporated into
Argentina as a national territory in 1884 by the end of the military campaigns conducted
against Mapuche societies established in the region at least since the seventeenth century.
For many decades, Neuquén remained a National Territory under federal jurisdiction
until it became a province in 1955. During the period between the end of the military
conquest and the provincialization of Neuquén, Mapuche families came together in the
form of lof (communities) and negotiated land-related issues with the federal authorities
in Buenos Aires.

56
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These negotiations, in turn, took place in a context in which national

In Chubut, there are approximately 65 indigenous communities.

A lof is usually the term used by the Mapuche to name a community. A lof traditionally consists of a
group of families living in the same area. These families have been traditionally interrelated by marriage
along patrilineal lines (women often left their own communities after marriage). The conformation of lof
along these lines, however, is more the exception than the rule in contemporary Patagonia.

111

integration and the delineation of borders were the two key goals of the authorities of the
National Territory (Falaschi et al 2005, 180).

58

Thus, the first half of the twentieth

century witnessed attempts by Neuquén to assimilate its population, including Mapuche
communities, to the Argentinean nation, granting them some support to establish
agricultural colonies of the type described in the previous chapter. Public education, with
strong nationalist and religious components, supplemented this mission.
Significant changes in the relationship between indigenous societies and Neuquén took
place with the emergence of a new provincial political party shortly after the province
adopted its constitution in 1957. With very few exceptions, since its inception in 1962,
the Movimiento Popular Neuquino (Popular Movement of Neuquén, MPN) has been the
hegemonic political party in charge of the provincial government. Adopting a populist
rhetoric, the MPN has since its beginnings taken a stance against the federal state to
preserve its provincial autonomy. For example, it supported a provincial sense of
belonging highlighting a particular identity that, interestingly enough, included aspects of
Mapuche culture. This inclusion, in turn, can be explained considering the wider context
in which the provincial state (and its hegemonic political party, the MPN) and Mapuche
communities have been establishing relationships with each other.
Historically, Neuquén’s successive governments have maintained a strong relationship
with Mapuche rural communities. They have done so by implementing development
strategies that affect the territories where Mapuche communities are located, such as
foresting projects and support to handicrafts for the tourism industry, as well as the
provision of food, clothing, and other basic necessities. Such relationship, however, has
been built on patron-client networks and cooptation of community leaders. In this context
and depending on their location, many rural communities still make a living by raising
livestock, providing labour for larger estates, or by providing goods and services in the
tourism industry (e.g., handicrafts, tourist guides).
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The importance of these goals was the result of a perceived threat to national security coming from
Chile.
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This relationship between the state of Neuquén and Mapuche communities began in 1964
when the provincial government under the MPN assigned “reserved” lands to 18
indigenous agrupaciones (groupings). Since then, the provincial government has created
different governmental agencies to deal with the social needs and “development” needs
of indigenous communities.

59

In practice, however, the reach of the provincial state into

the internal affairs of Mapuche communities resulted in the consolidation of political
patronage and cooptation of its leaders (Falaschi et al 2005). In the early 1970s, other
“communities”, the term now preferred by state discourse, were recognized, totalling 37.
Since registration of indigenous communities is also possible within the National Institute
of Indigenous Affairs (under federal jurisdiction), some of Neuquén’s communities have
been registered at the federal level when the province did not grant such recognition.

60

Thus, the legal status of approximately 15 Mapuche communities in Neuquén is under
dispute as they are only recognized by the INAI.

61

Moreover, the official understanding

of “communities” as “localised settlements recognized by the state” excludes from the
definition both dispersed rural families and Mapuche peoples living in cities (Kradolfer
2011, 46).
In all cases, however, it is the legal ownership of the assigned land that is a matter of
legal as well as political controversy. This is often the case as Argentina’s Civil Code, the
legal instrument that regulates private property in all provinces, only recognizes
individual private property and not collective ownership over lands. As a result, there is a
tension between the Constitutional reform of 1994 that recognizes collective ownership
of the territories indigenous peoples “traditionally inhabit” and the Civil Code, which
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These agencies changed their names frequently but they were often under the umbrella of the Ministry or
Secretary of Social Services or Welfare. Echoing the emergence of a new Mapuche activism in the 1980s,
official documents replaced the terminology of “indigenous” or “aboriginal” with “Mapuche.”
60

The INAI runs the Registro Nacional de Comunidades Indígenas (National Register of Indigenous
Communities, RENACI) independently from each provincial registration system for indigenous
communities. Thus, despite the weak role of INAI for dealing with indigenous affairs in the provinces, the
institute can still influence certain legal boundaries for registering indigenous communities, sometimes in
open defiance to the provinces.
61

Some of these new communities are located in urban areas (Kradolfer 2011, 49).

113

regulates the procedures on private ownership. In addition, since 2012 the Kirchner
administration has been trying to address the reform of the Civil Code but it has
encountered the active resistance of many indigenous organizations due to the lack of
consultation and the lack of clarity on the matter of indigenous collective ownership.
Most Mapuche peoples today, however, live in cities. It is difficult to assess the living
conditions of Mapuche urban dwellers but some studies suggest that for the most part the
only available sources of income are in the informal sector or government welfare. In the
past, many young Mapuche moved to urban centres to find jobs in some of the new
industries related to the energy sector, such as the steel industry, before they entered into
a period of crisis in the 1990s. While these precarious labour conditions have forced
many Mapuche to live in poor neighbourhoods, it is from these locations that many
contemporary organizations have begun their activism. The Confederación Mapuche de
Neuquén is one of those organizations that began in the city in order to become
autonomous from the state’s patronage system of control.

4.3 The Confederación Mapuce de Neuquén62

Built in 2002, the community centre located in a poor suburb of Neuquén city is the
visible “headquarters” of the Confederación Mapuche de Neuquén. This ruka (house,
building), which has been broken into at night, where computers have been stolen, and
when the challenges of not being able to pay for its upkeep and utilities have brought
considerable levels of stress and desperation for activists, has also become a meeting
place for a new generation of Mapuche activists and other organizations. La ruka, as it is
known in Neuquén city, is where most of the everyday work of the Confederación takes
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The spelling of the term Mapuce follows the Ragileo graphemic system. For the terms in Mapuzugun, I
try to follow this system as close as possible as this is the system that has been approved by the
Confederación. Thus, documents, words, and phrases written by members of the CMN often follow the
Ragileo system. When not citing CMN documents, I use the commonly accepted term Mapuche.
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place. It is here where official documents are often drafted, workshops are thought out,
and community building is maintained. It is also the place where a new generation of
young Mapuche in their early 20s imagine new forms of activism: from multimedia
activism to Mapu Punk concerts and mass demonstrations. In Neuquén, however, new
forms of Mapuche identity and politics are constructed and maintained in a process that
involves ongoing negotiations with the state as well as with the rural communities. Using
the case of the Confederación Mapuche de Neuquén, the rest of this chapter aims at
illustrating how the process of identity construction and political negotiation takes place.
One of the methodological dilemmas that occur while studying collective forms of
political action is that, on the one hand, collective experiences are always dynamic and
they depend on generational, gender, origin, and political outlooks amongst others. On
the other, such experiences take place within a context of conflict between subjects and
as such these tensions often become a defining feature of collective political action. This
is particularly the case in post-colonial contexts such as that of the Mapuche. As Briones
(2008) argues, the disagreements on how to organize politically within Mapuche
communities are often the result of many years of mobilization that tend to foster diverse
positions that are key to understanding the diversity of their political identities in the
long-term. In Northern Patagonia, for example, a new Mapuche leadership that began its
activism in the early 1970s consolidated a vision of collective action framing the struggle
within the confines of such logic of antagonism.
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In this context it is possible to speak of

a new political identity, not only to avoid an essentialist view of an immutable Mapuche
identity, but also to emphasize that this identity is the product of clear efforts by activists
as well as the result of a broader relationship to a dominant order, including the state. As
such, the meaning of being Mapuche today is expected to change with time and this is a
tension that does not escape most indigenous organizations.
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The meaning of being “indigenous” or Mapuche, in this case, refers to the construction of aboriginality
itself (Beckett 1988): a process that goes beyond discursive practices to include the encounter between
“natives” and the institutional settings of political and economic power.
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In contemporary Argentina, the logic of antagonism mentioned earlier is placed in the
context of the neoliberalization of the state and the relationship of the state with
indigenous peoples. Thus, Mapuche organizations such as the Confederación Mapuche
de Neuquén (CMN) often try to oppose what Shapiro (2004) calls the “hegemonizing
practices” of the modern state which usually take the form of a “neoliberal, formal, and
juridically-oriented approach to equality” (2004, 22). In order to challenge the dominant
order, Mapuche organizations have provided an “instance of subjectivation” for the
emergence of indigenous subjects as such, that is, activists that claim specific rights – and
some times a radical social transformation – based on cultural differences (Shapiro 2004,
22). However, as Marisol de la Cadena and Orin Starn warn, “becoming indigenous is
always a possibility negotiated within political fields of culture and history” (2007, 13).
In other words, indigenous collective identities are socially constructed and politically
64

negotiated, not discovered.

As explained earlier, the emergence of indigenous collective

identities in Argentina, for example, must be framed within the institutional instances of
provincial states as well as the predominant social orders that one encounters in them.
Historically, as Briones has reminded us, contemporary Mapuche organizations need to
be studied in relation to specific provincial formations of alterity, which in turn have
translated into “regional geographies of inclusion and exclusion” (2007, 101).
The Confederación Mapuche de Neuquén (Mapuche Confederation of Neuquén, CMN)
has its origins in the creation of the Confederación Indígena Neuquina (Indigenous
65

Confederation of Neuquén, CIN) by the provincial government in 1971.

Until it

changed its name to Confederación Mapuche in 1990 under a new leadership of young
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For an in-depth analysis of Mapuche “formations of self” and their politicization in the provinces of Río
Negro and Chubut, see Briones (2008).
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According to Kradolfer (2011), the creation of the CIN was made during a meeting organized by
Neuquen’s governor and the Catholic bishop in 1970 in order to create a structure that would group all the
communities to facilitate the emergence of representative leaders vis-à-vis the state. Thus, the CIN was to
be headed by one chief, a deputy chief, a treasurer, a secretary, and other members. Kradolfer describes the
main objective of the CIN in the following terms: “The principal task of the CIN was to arbitrate problems
inside and between communities, as well as to be an intermediate between the Mapuche and the provincial
State, for example, in the process of measurement and setting of landmarks in public lands allocated to the
communities by the State” (2011, 46).
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activists, the CIN served as an the institutional instance in which all rural communities
were represented by only one headman in negotiating with state officials (Kradolfer
2011). Furthermore, the structure of the CIN reflects the organization structures imposed
on each community by the provincial government, namely, one headman or chief, a vicechief, a treasurer, a secretary, and other members at large. Each community was to elect
these authorities for a period of two years during a fvta trawun (Parley).
Indeed fvta trawun (Parleys) have historically provided Mapuche communities with
opportunities to discuss collective issues. Thus, Parleys are until today an instance that
facilitates the creation of a common sense of belonging despite the differences that exist
amongst and within communities (Briones 2008). As stated earlier, established by the
provincial state as asociaciones (groupings) or reserves in 1964 – and later identified
officially as “communities” – Mapuche societies have always found ways to deal with
domestic problems and present them to the provincial authorities. Thus, the creation of
the Confederación Indígena Neuquina in 1971 as a civil association consolidated a form
of politics that relied on strong assistentialist practices and patronage networks of
Neuquén’s hegemonic political party, the Movimiento Popular Neuquino (Neuquén’s
Popular Movement, MPN).
While the stated objectives of the Confederación Indígena (CIN) were to serve as the
intermediary between the communities and the province as well as to solve conflicts
within the communities (particularly in relation to the measurement of public lands), by
the 1980s a number or urban Mapuche activists began to question the assimilationist and
hegemonic tendencies of the Confederación Indígena as well as the approach of the
provincial state vis-à-vis the communities. Given the hegemony of the Movimiento
Popular Neuquino and its influence in the functioning of the Confederación Indígena, a
new generation of urban activists created its own organizations in the mid-1980s, which
Briones (2003) refers to as “organizations with Mapuche philosophy and leadership” as
they tried to legitimise their actions from a different political standpoint. This process that
began in the 1980s and continues today can be understood, following Briones’s work, as
a transition from an imposed status of indigenous peoples as “ethnic minorities” to a selfdefined identity as a pueblo-nación originario (roughly translated as first nation). A
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detailed account of this process exceeds the space available here but the major tension
between the authorities of the Confederación Indígena and this new generation of
activists during those years was based on different ways to articulate not only a Mapuche
identity but also its relation to the political context of the time. While some groups
privileged alliances with the state or the Movimiento Popular Neuquino via the CIN in
order to secure social welfare programs to address conditions of material deprivation
within the communities, the new generation of activists emphasized a relationship “of
equals”, from nation-to-nation, with the state. The latter view finally prevailed in 1990,
when the CIN became the Confederación Mapuche de Neuquén (CMN) under a new
leadership.
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This perspective, in turn, placed a strong emphasis on gaining autonomy

from state institutions rather than on trying to work “from within.” The CMN has thus
managed to reframe what it means to be Mapuche today (Briones 2003). The following
section focuses on the Statute of Autonomy to illustrate how such a reframing takes
place.
The end of military rule and the return to democratic rule certainly provided the context
under which political mobilization could take place.
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The ongoing mobilization around

human rights issues was prevalent by the time the dictatorship ended. Soon, indigenous
issues gained public prominence within the broader struggles of social organizations to
bring those responsible for torture and other atrocities to justice. In Neuquén, human
rights organizations and the Catholic Church – under the leadership of bishop Jaime de
Nevares – became important allies for emerging autonomous Mapuche organizations as
they provided some protection from military and police harassment as well as some
logistical, technical, and financial support during the years under military rule (Kradolfer
2011). One of the most important of these new organizations was Newen Mapu, an urban
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While these two perspectives have been prevalent in Neuquén, they do not cover all the choices that
Mapuche organizations faced in other provinces. As described earlier, initially the Consejo Asesor Indígena
in Río Negro, for example, adopted a more class-based and socially broad perspective than the
Confederación Mapuche de Neuquén.
67

During the period of military rule (1976-1993), political and indigenous leaders were persecuted. In this
period, the CIN, for example, was only able to insist on cultural claims and they did so only in two Parleys
(Briones 2003).
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organization of young Mapuche, some of them with previous experience in labour
mobilization, which assumed the political goals of “revitalizing Mapuche culture.”
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With time, Newen Mapu consolidated its leadership within the Confederación Indígena
(CIN), starting the process that has led to its autonomy from the Movimiento Popular
Neuquino, the Catholic church, and of other human rights organizations. As a result of
this process, the organization changed its name from Confederación Indígena de
Neuquén to Confederación Mapuche de Neuquén in November 1990. The particularity of
urban organizations such as Newen Mapu is that they have chosen, since their beginnings,
to work closely with the rural communities.
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They have done so by emphasizing a

discourse of cultural authenticity for Mapuche claims with roots in the ways of life of
rural communities. As Kradolfer argues, “when the young urban leaders speak, they are
doing it in the name of their brothers and sisters from the communities. To challenge the
State and to answer it in the same words, they retake the image of the community as
being the ‘only and true’ lifestyle of the Mapuche” (2011, 47). While I agree that to a
certain extent this strategy can be seen as a form of essentialisation of cultural difference
(Kradolfer 2011), I do not think that such approach informs all aspects of contemporary
Mapuche struggles in Neuquén. Tensions continually emerge, for example, between
community and urban leaders during land reoccupations or when broader alliances with
other sectors are established to force political change, as was the case in the mobilization
for constitutional reform in Neuquén in 2007. The following two chapters that elaborate
on new opportunities for indigenous participation within the state, and the strategies of
land reoccupations and criminalization of indigenous mobilization, need to be read with
this general strategy of Mapuche political organization in Neuquén in mind as well as
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In my fieldwork, I interviewed some of Newen Mapu’s first leaders. This group was created in 1983 and
worked closely to the Catholic Church, the sponsor of the “First Indigenous Encounter of Neuquén” that
invited these young urban Mapuche (in their early twenties). Newen Mapu means “the force of the land.”
Another important urban organization in Neuquén that emerged in the 1980s was the Centro Mapuche de
Junin de los Andes also formed under the sponsorship of the Salesian Order of the Catholic Church.
69

Mapuche activists today still recall how the formal authorities within the CIN at that time used to reject
their views as being non-Mapuche because they did not live in a rural community.
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with the awareness that tensions exist between representative organizations such as the
Confederación and the communities.
As stated earlier, in November 1990 young activists were able to challenge the traditional
role of the Confederación, arguing that it was working too closely with the interests of
the Movimiento Popular Neuquino and the state, and leaders were serving their personal
interests instead of the Mapuche people.
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As these young activists were elected into

leadership positions within the communities, they were able to participate in the
Confederación even if their urban organizations were not included formally in the
71

Confederación.

A crucial moment in the political organization of Mapuche

communities in Neuquén took place in 1992 in the context of the counter-celebrations of
the 500th anniversary of the arrival of the Spanish in the Americas. At the time, the main
purpose for the meeting of diverse regional Mapuche organizations was to articulate
claims based on cultural difference as indigenous peoples, including demands around
regaining, or securing, control over ancestral territories, plus the right of selfrepresentation and autonomy.
The institutional expression of this new phase of Mapuche activism in Neuquén was the
creation, in 1992, of the Coordinadora de Organizaciones Mapuche (Coordination of
Mapuche Organizations, COM), an umbrella organization that included the
Confederacion Mapuche, in representation of the rural communities, and urban
72

organizations, such as Newen Mapu.

Thus, the COM became the institutional

expression of the activists’ goals to blend the interests of urban Mapuche and the
“traditional authorities” of the rural communities (Briones 2003, 107). Today, in practice,
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This was evident in the CMN’s XII fvta trawun (Big Parley) of that year.
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The condition for eligibility for a leadership position in the Confederación was to be an elected leader of
one of the rural communities recognized by the provincial state. Thus, the new generation of activists
started to be integrated into newly elected committees of the Mapuche communities that were their place of
birth. Each community was, in turn, in control of electing its own authorities, within the framework given
to them by the province.
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The name of the organization in Mapuzugun was Taíñ Kiñe Getuam (TKG) and it means “to be one
again.”
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Mapuche leaders in Neuquén recognize the Confederación Mapuche de Neuquén as the
only legitimate political representative of the confederated communities in the
province.
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Since then, the Confederación has presented its demands and built its

political identity based on three principles: Mapuche identity as a pueblo-nación
originario (aboriginal peoples-as-nation); territory under Mapuche control and
administration; and autonomy (self-representation) in order to define its own modes of
organization. It is the confluence of these three goals that informs what I call the quest for
Mapuche territorial autonomy in this study. The following sections of this chapter
elaborate on these principles. Chapter 6 expands on the notion of Mapuche territory.

4.4 Tayiñ Mapuce Normogeal. Formulating the quest for
self-representation as a pueblo nación originario

Borrowing from Negri’s work, one of the major challenges for the Confederación
Mapuhe de Neuquén (CMN) under its new leadership has been to formulate a “point of
view” that can serve as a political statement of a pueblo nación originario, according to
its own ways of knowing (kimvn).
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Following Pierre Clastres (1987), one could see the

recent attempts of a new generation of Mapuche activists to reclaim a model of
organization in which institutional authorities, of the Confederación, for example, serve
their communities according to the needs of those who inhabit them and not according to
an authority whose source is located outside of the community, such as government
agencies or hegemonic political parties such as the Movimiento Popular Neuquino. In
sum, from the perspective of a pueblo nación originario, new Mapuche activists have
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The Confederación, for example, has been instrumental in granting federal registration within the INAI
as “indigenous communities” to Mapuche rural settlements that were not recognized by the province. Thus,
when provincial authorities denied official recognition to a community, the CMN would act to ensure that
federal registration takes place, even if provincial state authorities ignore such recognition.
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For an interesting take on the challenges of formulating these “points of view,” see the Jean-Luc
Nancy’s work (2000).
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been demanding a new relation vis-à-vis the state (at the provincial or federal level),
namely, from nation to nation. As the next two chapters demonstrate, such approach
carries its own contradictions as contemporary Mapuche activism in Neuquén, for
example, places itself as “against” the state but at the same time demands the
implementation of sanctioned legal frameworks – in the form of rights – that have their
bases in the juridical apparatus of the state. The rest of this chapter, however, analyses
what this new perspective on Mapuche politics means for the new generation of activists
within the CMN and understanding how, as Clastres puts it, “the history of people
without history” becomes, suddenly, a struggle against the state and the hegemonic
notions of it (1987, 218).
Like other documents prepared by the activists within the Confederación, the Tayiñ
Mapuce Normogeal or Estatuto Autonómico Mapuce (Mapuche Statute for Autonomy),
sanctioned in 2008, illustrates one of the most recent attempts to express a political
programme of collective action based on cultural difference - that is, the expression of a
set of principles informed by the ways in which Mapuche activists think about their own
culture, institutions, and political practices (Kradolfer 2011, 49).
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One of the main goals

of the statute is to replace existing statutes created and used in Neuquén to frame the
relationship between the provincial state and Mapuche communities. Furthermore, the
statute is important because it establishes the bases for self-representation and territorial
autonomy, principles that activists must transmit to the communities and, perhaps more
importantly, to the state (CMN 2008).
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After a preamble and a “Historical overview”,

the Estatuto is divided into eleven títulos (parts):
I. Denomination, Members, Address, Assets, Objectives
II. Obligations

75
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The preparation team for the Estatuto was designated by the 18th fvta trawvn (Great Parley) in 2006.

All translations from Spanish to English are mine. For the terms in Mapuzugun, I use the term in
Spanish provided by the document to translate into English.
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III. Prohibitions (zewmanoal)
IV. Sanctions
V. Institutional Mechanisms of Mapuche Government (kvme feleal)
VI. Administration of Justice (nor feleal)
VII.

Mapuche Civil Registrar (meli folil kvpan)

VIII.

Territorial Organization (azkunual or azmapun)

IX. Territorial Councils (kiñe azmpu)
X. Election of CMN Authorities
XI. Other Arrangements
The text begins by placing the pueblo Mapuce (Mapuche peoples) as a nation and as a
pueblo originario, with the constitutional powers to determine the terms of its own
autonomy:
“The Mapuche peoples have the constitutional power (es primer
constituyente) to design and approve a new autonomous statute. We have
this right based on our own laws or AZ MAPU, because we are original
peoples (pueblo originario) of these lands and territories, according to our
values and principles, AZ ka NOR MOGEN, that have guided us for
thousands of years. We accomplish our role as peoples, CE, to protect and
defend different lives (ixofij mogen) and to develop with identity alongside
the protecting spirits of the mountains (gen mawiza), the protecting spirits
of the waters (gen ko), the protecting spirits of animals (gen kvrvf), the
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protecting spirits of air, the atmosphere, and all other GEN with whom we
inhabit the universe” (CMN 2008, 2).
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The relevance of the statute also rests in the ways in which it establishes the bases for
self-representation, independent from the direct influence of the state to determine and
78

authorize the content of this type of statute (CMN 2008).

As stated earlier, the

emergence of a new generation of urban Mapuche activists in the 1980s and their
engagement in working with the rural communities has served to articulate a critical
vision towards the paternalistic ties and patron-client networks that existed between the
local state (and its hegemonic political party, the Movimiento Mapuche Neuquino) and
the Confederación Indígena since its creation. The recent drafting of the Estatuto can be
read as a continuation of such efforts to articulate a new political project for the Mapuche
peoples living in Neuquén.
According to its authors, there are three broad themes running through the rest of the
statute’s preamble that give the Confederación the legitimacy to dictate the Estatuto
Autónomo. First, the statute recalls historical circumstances under which the Mapuche
peoples have lost their autonomy. This section discusses the broken alliance between the
pro-independence movement of the early 1800s and Mapuche ancestors (“nuestros
abuelos”). The end of that alliance took place when the newly independent state applied
a system of “usurpation, annihilation, and colonialism” towards its indigenous
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The original preamble reads as follows: “El Pueblo Mapuce, es primer constituyente en la decision de
diseñar y aprobar un nuevo Estatuto de carácter Autónomo. Hacemos uso de este Derecho fundamentado
en nuestra propia Ley o AZ MAPU, por ser un Pueblo Originario de estas tierras y territorios, según
nuestros valores y principios. AZ ka NOR MOGEN que nos han regido por miles de años.

Cumpliendo nuestro rol como Ce para proteger, defender las diversas vidas / Ixofij Mogen y para
desarrollarnos con Identidad junto a Gen Mawiza / Espíritus Protectores de las montañas, Gen Ko /
Espíritus Protectores de las aguas, Gen Kujiñ / Espíritus protectors de los animals, Gen Kvrvf / Espíritus
protectors del Aire, la atmósfera y todos los demás Gen con los que cohabitamos el universo.”
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In order to register, either with the provincial government or with the federal government, each
community must have a statute that, in turns, needs the approval of the state. This Estatuto Autonomo is
clearly a defiance of the state’s paternalistic attitude vis-à-vis Mapuche peoples.
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populations. The section also recalls state efforts to eliminate Mapuche institutions of
government, their territories, and the assimilationist attempts of the state as well as the
Catholic Church. Finally, the section highlights that the constitutional recognition of
indigenous rights (at both the federal and provincial levels) is a result of Mapuche
mobilization and activism.
Second, the statute considers that the obligation of the Confederación is to protect the
welfare (“velar por el bienestar”) of Mapuche peoples and to ensure the respect of
Mapuche rights. Such authority is given by the fvta gvbamtuwvn (Big Parley). According
to the statute, this authority also comes from a very special set of knowledge and wisdom.
In the terms of the statute,
“The Mapuche peoples and other aboriginal peoples in the world have
developed knowledges and wisdoms to guarantee our own existence and
endurance, in harmony and balance with nature and its spirits. We are
guardians of that legacy so we can transfer it to new generations. That is
a cultural prerequisite demanded of us by the cycles of life. It is also an
obligation given to us by the AZ MAPU, the natural cosmic law” (CMN
2008, 3).
Third, the preamble considers the impact of globalization in the everyday life of Mapuche
communities in very specific and illustrative terms,
“1. Transnational corporations, specifically those related to the
pharmaceutical and food industries that rely on the use of genetic
engineering and the support of the World Trade Organization, are
converting the natural reserves of indigenous peoples into genetic banks
in situ and ex situ. 2. Globalization is resulting in the plundering of
cultural diversity […] 3. The plundering and expropriation of the wealth
of our mountains, lakes, rivers, forests, minerals, and knowledges, is
oriented towards gaining control over Mapuche territory – the space and
its peoples. It aims at eliminating our authority, autonomy, and selfdetermination. And it threatens our millenarian cultures. 4. The imposed
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concepts […] such as “biological corridors,” “protected areas,”
“sustainable development,” “debt-for-nature swaps,” “environmental
services,” “productive chains,” amongst others, hide the interests that
hide behind the discourse on conservation. Such discourse entails the
commodification of nature, subsumed under the logic of capital. It does so
to bring about a legal and material transformation with the aim of
installing life as private property.” (CMN 2008, 4)
Thus, on the one hand, Mapuche activists adopt a discourse of “nation-to-nation” (e.g.,
Mapuche peoples, pueblo nación originario) that is based on cultural difference. In the
preamble, this is most evident in the second principle: Mapuche knowledges and wisdom.
On the other hand, the political identity of the Mapuche peoples, expressed in the
Confederación´s statute, emerges in new forms that are unique to the historical time in
which they take place: globalization as well as a consolidated state that grants “Mapuche
rights” (or, more technically, collective rights that apply to indigenous peoples based on
their cultural difference).
In short, the statute gives the Confederación the political and legal representation of
Neuquén’s lofce (Mapuche communities), which in turn have the power to designate their
79

local authorities. It also establishes the wenu foye (Mapuche flag) as its symbol.

The

statute also introduces an important caveat concerning the notion of autonomy, that the
autonomy that Mapuche authorities refer to is to be exercised within the jurisdictions of
Neuquén and Argentina. Thus, this autonomy is understood in relation to the indigenous
rights granted in the federal and provincial Constitutions as well as the condition of the
Mapuche as a pueblo nación originario. In other words, the position of a “nation-tonation” relationship between the Mapuche and the state does not include the claim to
juridically break away from the existing state.

79

The decision to approve the flag that is currently in use by Mapuche communities in Chile and Neuquén
is the result of the Primer Reencuentro de la Nación Mapuche (First Reencounter of the Mapuche Nation)
held in May 1992, in Neuquén. Not all Mapuche organizations in Argentina, however, have adopted the
same flag.
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Another important section of the statute lists the four main components of the
government for the Mapuche peoples represented by the Confederación. First, the highest
authority is established as the gvbamtuwvn (Parley), composed by the traditional
authorities (“autoridades originarias”) from the communities that recognize the authority
of the Confederación.
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Second, the kvme feleal (Council of Traditional Authorities), is

composed of the following roles:
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1. The ñizol logko, who can be woman or man, is the highest political authority of
each community and also for the Confederación. The authorities designated by the
Territorial Entities elect the logko of the Confederación.
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2. Inan logko is the authority that accompanies the ñizol logko and is in charge of
communications with other communities as well as state institutions.
3. Werken can be a woman or a man and must be “preferably young” (CMN 2008, 8).
They have the ability to represent and transmit the zugu (word) and rakizuam
(thinking) to the interior of Mapuche institutions and to the Territorial Entities.
They are messengers and representatives of the Mapuche peoples when they
interact with state institutions.
4.

The pijañ kuse is the authority with knowledge of Mapuche traditions, spirituality,
biodiversity, and medicine.

5. The xapvm kujiñfe plays the role of treasurer.
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In Neuquén, some communities have not recognized the authority or legitimacy of the Confederación.
Some communities, for instance, remain allied to the provincial government and the Movimiento Popular
Neuquino (MPN). Other communities have aligned themselves with the federal government. These
Mapuche communities and other indigenous groups are part of the Organización Nacional de Pueblos
Indígenas de la Argentina (National Organization of Indigenous Peoples of Argentina, ONPIA).
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These authorities are generally found in all Mapuche communities in the province, except those who
have not recognized the legitimacy of the Confederación.
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The statute recognizes five “Territorial Entities” which represent five different geographical zones. Each
Territorial Entity can designate two representatives to the Confederación. The five entities are based in San
Martin de los Andes (Sur), El Huecu (Norte), Aluminé (Aluminé), Zapala (Centro), and Neuquén
(Confluencia) and they represent the communities located in each one of these regions (CMN 2008, 10).
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6. The pu kona are the young Mapuche whose responsibility is to keep the
Confederation connected with each community).
Third, the nor feleal (justice council) is composed of the inan logko, werken, and two
members who are elected depending on the nature of the problem to solve. The main goal
of the nor feleal is to administer justice and solve disputes within each community.
Finally, the statute recognizes the meli folil kvpan (civil registry), which registers births
respecting the graphemes and phonemes of Mapuche names in Mapuzugun (language of
the land). The registry also has the power to “rectify” names and last names given in
Spanish and to register those children or adults who have “reclaimed” Mapuche names
after exercising their right to their own identity. It is also responsible for promoting the
inclusion of the indigenous group to which a person belongs in national identity
documents. The statute sees this as a way to “visualize” people’s belonging to the
Mapuche Nation.
This structure of traditional authorities has been one of the most important changes that
the Mapuche activists have been able to re-establish within many of the communities that
were under the influence of the provincial state before the Confederación became
autonomous from government influence. While Neuquén created a structure for the
communities that followed the model of civic associations (e.g., a president, a vicepresident, a secretary, a treasurer), Mapuche activists have claimed that the government
structure of each community must respect Mapuche knowledges and traditions.
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Today,

each community has its own mechanisms for electing traditional authorities. Some
communities, for example, follow more traditional ceremonies while others are less
structured. This makes it difficult to generalize on how gvbamtuwvn (Parleys) are
conducted but this approach to selecting authorities has certainly increased awareness and
perhaps encouraged a more positive look into Mapucheness among those community
members who were too afraid, too embarrassed, or too threatened by the prospects of
becoming (once again) Mapuche.

83

The Mapuche often refer to knowledge in its plural form.
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In addition to the recognition of traditional authorities and the principles of representation
assigned to them, the statute also includes provisions for the defence of the environment,
its ixofij mogen (biodiversity), and the principle of collective sustenance. The inclusion of
the protection of biodiversity is appropriate for activists because it secures their “cultural
projection” as Mapuche peoples in an autonomous territory (CMN 2008). Simply put,
Mapuche activists maintain that their existence as a pueblo nación originario is
dependent upon their access to a territory. The statute, in fact, lists the four main
objectives of the Mapuche peoples represented by the Confederación:
“1. To secure the ownership, protection, conservation, and sustainable
use of our territory, with all its biodiversity (ixofij mogen), waters, air,
minerals, and everything else the territory contains. 2. To consolidate the
strengthening of its political, normative, and philosophical Mapuche
institutions. 3. To guarantee the “cultural projection” of the Mapuche
peoples, protecting and developing all their knowledges and collective
wisdom. 4. To develop their intellectual or industrial property rights on
any element of our territory and our culture. These are collective
knowledges, practices, and innovations from our ancestors and they are
not to be appropriated.” (CMN 2008, 6)
Accordingly, one of the main concerns emerging from the statute is the level of
exploitation of the environment. From a Mapuche perspective, the statute points out,
exploitation of these lands should first and foremost ensure that it supplies all
requirements to sustain the life cycle as well as the identity of the Mapuche, according to
definite planes de vida (life projects) that each community elaborates according to
specific needs. In some cases, these requirements include the production of healthy foods
for self-consumption in order to achieve higher levels of nutrition, health and well-being.
The statute warns that food self-sufficiency should not be replaced with “commercial and
industrial crops,” especially in the form of transgenic seeds (CMN 2008, 6). Open-pit
mining and oil extraction in indigenous territories should also be excluded along the same
principles. Finally, and in order to preserve the communal property of indigenous
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territories, the statute prohibits the sale, donation, transfer or lease by communities of any
portion of their territories to private interests.
While it is clear for activists within the Confederación Mapuche de Neuquén that the
statute should establish the guidelines for the political representation of the communities
in Neuquén, the preparation and reception of the document has faced some considerable
challenges. The first obstacle towards Mapuche self-representation, as understood by the
CMN and the statute, is the conflictive relationship with the provincial state. In Neuquén,
Mapuche authorities in some communities often respond to the whims of the Movimiento
Popular Neuquino and to its clientelistic incentives in the form of social assistance and
handouts, particularly before elections. Despite the understanding by activists that these
practices reflect paternalistic assimilationist policies of the past, they are willing not to
intervene when families decide to accept the party’s assistance because they consider that
they would be victimizing the communities twice. Rather, Mapuche activists often try to
reach those members of the communities who believe in the political principles of the
Confederación. By building new alliances with members of communities they do not
currently represent, Mapuche activists hope to influence the change of authorities in those
communities in the future.
A second obstacle relates to the legal framework within which the CMN has to operate.
Each community has to be registered in Neuquén as a non-for-profit civic association in
order to be recognized by the province. Despite the constitutional recognition of
“indigenous peoples” as the subject of new rights, the legal notion of “community”
imposed by the provincial government in the 1970s is still prevalent. Thus, in practice,
“community” comes to entail a traditional group of families or neighbours registered by
state officials following constitutional rights granted to all citizens, namely that of free
association. Instead, Mapuche activists claim that their constitutional rights grant them
the freedom to establish their mechanisms of self-representation as a pueblo nación
84

originario.
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The provincial decree no. 1184 of 2002 illustrates the historical approach of the local state vis-à-vis the
registration of Mapuche communities. According to international conventions (e.g., ILO no. 169) and the
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Finally, the quest for political representation of Mapuche communities adds additional
challenges for Mapuche activists and the Confederación. One of these challenges is how
to relate to those communities and activists who have recognized neither the legitimacy
of the new generation of Mapuche activists,nor the new objectives of the Confederación.
To date, this is an open challenge for activists as alliances and the political context
change. While the tensions between the “old” generations of Mapuche leaders who
maintained close ties to the provincial state and its hegemonic party (i.e., Movimiento
Popular Neuquino) and the “new” generation that took control over the Confederacion in
1990 persist, there are also newer sources of conflict. One of them stems from the
relation between the Confederación, that maintains a critical stance vis-à-vis the
Argentinean state, and former members of the “new generation” who have decided to
channel their political demands by working within the institutional framework of the
state. These members have done so by accepting low-level positions in the federal
bureaucracy and by working closely with the Kirchner administration.
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In conclusion, since 1990 the Confederación Mapuche de Neuquén has become a strong
political voice for the Mapuche communities located in the province. The new generation
of urban activists that eventually took control over the Confederación has been able to
articulate a political project for the Mapuche. The Estatuto Autónomo is an illustration of
those efforts. The political project consists primarily in presenting the Mapuche as a
pueblo nación originario with the power to relate to the state on a nation-to-nation basis.
However, this approach based on cultural differences also makes claims on the state for
the implementation of the rights that have been recognized. While there is a tension
between both principles, Mapuche activists can now project themselves from a new
political position that is based on their autonomy, which in turn depends on controlling

Constitution, indigenous communities should be approached as a matter of public law (similar to the legal
principles regulating municipalities, for example). However, the provincial decree continues framing the
question of registration of Mapuche communities as a matter of private law (Falaschi et al 2005, 204).
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Most of these activists now working with the federal government remain critical of the provincial
government and the Movimiento Popular Neuquino.
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their ancestral territories. This new position of the Confederación has shifted the
discussion on “indigenous politics” in Argentina, a country that until recently
concentrated its efforts on invisibilizing its indigenous past and present. While there are
many ways in which this new type of Mapuche politics translates into specific demands, I
focus here on the demands for interculturalidad (interculturality) to illustrate the ways in
which Mapuche struggles can be re-oriented and made compatible with the perspective of
a pueblo nación originario.

4.5 Interculturalidad. Orienting Mapuche Struggles

In the previous chapters, I have referred to a series of recent reforms by governments that
have recognized the multi-ethnic makeup of Argentinean society as well as set out new
collective rights for indigenous peoples. Such reforms have been referred to as
“multiculturalism.” As such, multiculturalism usually makes reference to the ways in
which (liberal) states adapt ethnic differences in society (Kymlicka and Norman 1994).
Some authors have focused on a particular dimension of such efforts and have
concentrated on the process of constitutional recognition (Van Cott 2000).
Multiculturalism, in sum, implies a recognition and tolerance on the part of the state
towards cultural difference. This study adopts the term “neoliberal multiculturalism” to
address both the fact that multiculturalism is a state project and that, as such, this set of
reforms must be understood in relation to neoliberal forms of government and citizenship
(García 2005; Postero 2007). As a result of the most recent waves of indigenous
mobilization in Latin America, Mapuche activists have adopted an alternative discourse
that challenges multiculturalism; numerous organizations now speak of interculturalidad
(interculturality). Despite it being a contested term (García 2005), activists generally
understand interculturalidad as a more horizontal form to relate to non-indigenous
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peoples and the state.

86

Rather than relying on a vertical (i.e., top-down) recognition of

cultural differences by the state, activists use interculturalidad to address social change
with the goal of transforming society through very specific projects, such as education
reform which in turn may include bilingual or bicultural education from the bottom up.
According to Walter Mignolo (2005), indigenous intellectuals and activists introduced
interculturalidad in projects of bilingual education of the Confederación de
Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of
Ecuador, CONAIE). Mignolo sees interculturalidad and bilingual education as attempts
made by indigenous peoples to “decolonize knowledge” and as philosophical
mechanisms that put into collaboration “two different logics (indigenous and nonindigenous) for the good of all” (2005, 118). In contrast to the hegemonic tendencies of
multiculturalism which reduce knowledge, education, political economy and morality to
forms of state control, interculturalidad means, according to Mignolo, “that there are two
distinct cosmologies at work, Western and Indigenous” thus representing a “radical
claim” of indigenous “epistemic rights, which are different from cultural rights (2005,
119). While the former challenge our ways of knowing the world, the latter simply
addresses tolerance of ethnic difference. The author concludes explaining
interculturalidad in the following terms:
“Through interculturalidad […], the claim is made for the right of
Indigenous people to co-participate in the making of the state and in
education. It is not a claim for simple recognition […] that begs for
acceptance into a nation in which they […] do not have a place because
their position on the margins, precisely, defines the limits of the modern
nation. Instead, interculturalidad would lead to a pluri-cultural state with
more than one valid cosmology” (Mignolo 2005, 120).
Studying interculturalidad in Peru, María Elena García defines the term as “the practice
of a multiculturalism in which citizens reach across cultural and linguistic differences to
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According to some indigenous activists, “respectful relationships between and among different cultural
groups in the country” (quoted in García 2005, 3).
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imagine a democratic community. In that vein, bilingual intercultural education is the
mechanism par excellence used to foster intercultural unity out of multicultural
difference” (2005, 3).
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One activist of the Confederación Mapuche de Neuquén (CMN)

has explained the concept of interculturalidad as follows:
“To begin with, the proposal for an intercultural education that we as
Mapuche peoples recommend has to do with the recognition that there are
different rights (“derechos diferentes”). We cannot speak of intercultural
education if we do not admit first that indigenous peoples have rights that
have to be respected, recognized, and applied. There are three
fundamental rights that provide the basis of interculturalismo: our right as
peoples (“el derecho a ser un pueblo”), the right to have a territory, and
the right to exercise autonomy within that territory” (quoted in Moyano
2007, 3).
Besides helping to clarify what Mapuche activists understand by interculturalismo, this
quote serves to show how the concept is also related to the Confederación’s focus to
present Mapuche demands as a pueblo nación originario. Furthermore, activists
transform such a political approach to cultural difference in more specific ways. One of
such ways is engaging with non-Mapuche society and the state. For this, they adopt the
language of interculturalismo and a focus on bilingual education. Finally, the
understanding of Mapuche demands in this context comes full circle when activists link
both their position as a pueblo nación originario and interculturalidad to their quest for
territorial autonomy: as peoples, the Mapuche argue they need to control the territories
they inhabit according to their own cultural principles. In the next few paragraphs I
outline these three ways in which interculturalidad relates to contemporary Mapuche
activism in Neuquén.
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For a treatment of interculturality as a site of conflict and contestation in Argentina, see Tamagno
(2009).
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For Mapuche activists, language has always been a central component of their culture.
Indeed, Mapuzugun (literally, the language of the land) has been identified as crucial for
the survival of Mapuche as a people and the strongest cultural marker of Mapucheness. It
also serves to consolidate the nation-to-nation treatment that Mapuche activists envision
in their negotiation and interaction with non-Mapuche society as well as the state. In
contemporary Neuquén, the area in which the struggles over the use of Mapuzugun took
place has been public education. Thus, while both the state and Mapuche activists have
embraced bilingual education, each one of them sees such approach in very different
ways to accomplish very different aims.
The province of Neuquén has been implementing the Mapuche Language and Culture
Teaching Program since 2001 in elementary schools with the goal of preserving the
“language and culture” of Mapuche communities. The Program, in turn, recognizes that
language is the “vehicle for cultural expression” and that the state must assume the
“responsibility to preserve indigenous culture” (Mapuche Language and Culture
Teaching Program, quoted in Falaschi et al 2005, 211). In the context in which this
Program emerged, it can also be seen as the state response to the increasing demands of
interculturalidad by Mapuche activists within the Confederación in 2000 (Falaschi 2005,
211). Since its inception, the Program has received the criticism of Mapuche activists for
ignoring the demands of interculturalism as well as subverting any attempts by Mapuche
leaders to participate in the design and implementation of education reform that have
Mapuche communities as their main targets. According to activists, the Program has
ignored interculturalism altogether and has only included Mapuzugun as one more
subject with one or two-hours of weekly instruction (Falaschi 2005, 213).
Mapuche organizations have implemented interculturalism in educational initiatives
outside the school system. The Centro de Educación Mapuche Norgvlamtuleayiñ (Centre
of Mapuche Education), established by the Confederación, for example, focuses on
teaching Mapuzugun as part of a broader political strategy in order to “rescue” the
language to secure Mapuche self-determination (Falaschi et al 2005, 214). By
implementing these strategies, activists counter the hegemonic tendencies of the local
state to incorporate Mapuche issues in a “subordinated manner”, ignoring current
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conflicts between the state and Mapuche peoples and placing Mapuche culture and
identity in a distant past, linked to rural areas and embedded in tradition (Falaschi et al
88

2005, 215; Szulc 2009).

Finally, by demanding a new framework of negotiation between Mapuche peoples and
the state, interculturalidad also orients current struggles over territorial autonomy. Thus,
activists do not separate their goal of interculturalidad from demands of territorial
autonomy and self-representation. They claim, for instance, that autonomy can be
exercised only under conditions of indigenous control over the territories they inhabit so
it is only after such control is guaranteed by the state that they can fully achieve an
intercultural society in which co-existence and mutual respect overcome simple tolerance
of cultural difference, as is the case under state-sponsored multiculturalism. As one
activist puts it, “to be able to speak our language, we need a territory; Mapuzugun means
the ‘language of the land’ after all” (quoted in Arias and Granieri 2007, 8).
In conclusion, interculturalidad is one way in which Mapuche activists translate the new
approach to negotiating their demands for territorial autonomy with the state, that is, a
nation-to-nation approach that is based on the cultural differences between Argentinean
society and a pueblo nación originario. While interculturalidad may often adopt
“utopian” overtones in the discourses of indigenous intellectuals and activists, in practice
interculturalidad serves to orient struggles towards territorial autonomy. In other words,
interculturalidad has the potential to “prepare” non-Mapuche society to accept that coexistence involves the recognition of Mapuche territories under their own control. In the
past few years, Mapuche activists have taken interculturalidad outside of the “classic”
milieu of public education. Indeed they have started to think about new ways to adopt an
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A key activist of interculturalidad within the Confederación Mapuche de Neuquén explains the tensions
between state-sponsored bilingual education programs and Mapuche conceptions of an intercultural
education: “Our children enter the classroom speaking Spanish. Thus, the conditions for the consolidation
of an autonomous education and the transformation of the education system must take place if we want to
accomplish an intercultural education. As a result, we need to elaborate a new approach to education than
the one implemented today by the provincial government. They use the help of Mapuche brothers but they
are not changing the structure of the education system. Thus, [the school programs] simply use our
language to reinforce the process of colonization in the school system, emphasizing only the folkloric
aspects of Mapuche peoples” (quoted in Arias and Granieri 2007, 7).
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intercultural approach to new projects, such as the plans to create the first Mapuche
Intercultural University or barrios interculturales (intercultural neighbourhoods). While
both projects initiated by Mapuche activists within the Confederación and local leaders
from the communities have not been able to “take off” due to lack of state support and
lack of funding, they are meant to transform the relationship between Mapuche and nonMapuche societies from one of limited tolerance at best, and open mistrust and racism at
worst, to one of mutual co-existence and acceptance.

4.6

Conclusion: Between carrying the intentions and
desires of “los antiguos” and being a “bad” Mapuche

Like many other indigenous peoples, the Mapuche have always privileged oral tradition
to transmit the wisdom and knowledge(s) acquired throughout the centuries from
generation to generation. Thus for contemporary Mapuche activists, interest in the
teachings of “los antiguos (ancestors) has increased since they began mobilization along
the lines of cultural difference. Many activists see contemporary mobilization as the
continuation of past struggles in which the ancestors resisted the expansion of colonial
forces or of the post-independence state. Moreover, activists have been able to connect
the goals of territorial autonomy with the need for Mapuche peoples, for example, to
recover the burial grounds where their ancestors rest.
As stated earlier in this chapter, collective identities do not emerge in a vacuum. Since
they are the result of shared experiences and mutual negotiation amongst social groups,
collective identities mutate and change over time. For the new generation of Mapuche
activists, current struggles for territorial autonomy are connected to the resistance of their
ancestors more than a century ago against the encroachment of the state on their
territories. Thus, contemporary activism is seen as recuperating the “lost” tradition of
resistance of past generations. From the perspective of the state, however, the connection
that activists make to that historical moment of resistance is misguided and it is indicative
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of a “bad Mapuche” that leads to the criminalization of their demands, something that is
addressed in some detail in chapter six in the context of territorial re-occupations.
Furthermore, leaders of the Confederación today link their model of political
representation and organization to the attempts by longko (leader) Kalfvcurá to form a
confederation of Mapuche societies in the first half of the nineteenth century.
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For many

activists, Kalfvcurá, seen as a great leader and a hero (also, as the “last Mapuche emperor
of Pampa and Patagonia”) from the time when the Mapuche were a free and independent
nation, symbolizes the continuity between current and past struggles for territorial
autonomy and a nation-to-nation treatment. Kalfvcurá has been praised for his diplomatic
skills in negotiating treaties with Argentinean authorities.
Claiming some connection to ancestors like Kalfvcurá, the new generation of leaders,
question the practices of some community elders and former leaders of Mapuche
communities. According to contemporary activists, these elders and former leaders have
until recently allowed too much interference by the state in the internal affairs of the
communities, particularly by accepting the patron-client relationship between the
communities and political parties, such as the Movimiento Popular Neuquino, for
example. Despite these tensions between contemporary activists and former authorities,
the Confederación (CMN) serves as an intermediary between many rural communities
and the state. The main difference between this new form of activism and previous forms
of political representation is that the relationship between Mapuche political authorities
and state officials is currently not taking place within a framework of collaboration, but
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Kalfvcurá (also known as Juan Calfucurá) was a Mapuche logko (chief) in the nineteenth century. In
1830, Kalfvcurá entered into a political alliance with then Buenos Aires governor, Juan Manuel de Rosas,
in order to fight other indigenous societies in the Pampas. By 1835, Kalfvcurá was well established in the
region of Salinas Grandes, located in part today’s provinces of Buenos Aires and La Pampa, and started
forming a Confederation of indigenous communities. In the next decade, Kalfvcurá’s influence extended
across Northern Patagonia, having control over two key components of nineteenth century economy: salt
(used mostly for preserving beef) and trade routes amongst indigenous societies. This influence allowed
Kalfvcurá and his allies to resist (and fight against) the attempts of the central government to expand its
area of influence and control. The Argentinean army and its indigenous allies defeated Kalvucurá in 1872,
under the presidency of Domingo F. Sarmiento. The logko died in 1873 and six years later, during the
Conquest of the Desert campaign, his dead body was taken to the National Museum of La Plata. Mapuche
activists have claimed, since 2002, the restitution of Kalvucurá’s remains.
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rather under deepening tensions and ongoing conflict. Despite these tensions, however,
and as the following chapter shows, activism within the Confederación has served to
articulate and sometimes solve conflicting claims between Mapuche activists and the
local state, as the struggles for the recognition of indigenous rights in the provincial
constitution of Neuquén illustrate. Thus, the importance of the CMN as a channel of
communication between the communities and state institutions should not be
underestimated. At the same time, however, one needs to keep in mind that while the
Confederación provides the only formal mechanism of representation for Mapuche
communities, there are some communities and a minority of Mapuche activists in
Neuquén who remain outside the Confederación. Those communities, in fact, may
continue to work closely with the local state, its Movimiento Popular Neuquino, or other
organizations.
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Chapter 5

5

Accommodated Citizenship. New Spaces for Mapuche
activism

Spaces for indigenous participation within the institutional framework of the state are
central to neoliberal multiculturalism. Mapuche activism in Neuquén makes clear that
such spaces are created through different political strategies. This chapter focuses on the
ways in which Mapuche activism in Neuquén has been able to extract a certain degree of
recognition from the state. It also addresses the new spaces for participation that have
become available for Mapuche peoples within the institutional structure of the state. In
Argentina, the recognition of indigenous rights has not been easy for indigenous peoples.
Indeed the main approach of the state to indigenous issues has been predominantly one of
historical invisibility in public discourse as well as in state policies aimed at assimilation
of indigenous populations. While institutions were created to deal with indigenous
issues, they have been placed in rather obscure and subordinated levels of the state
bureaucracy. Furthermore, such institutionalization has often responded to broader issues
of security and defence or they have been part of the social question agenda. In other
words, they have hardly been part of an open recognition of specific needs based on
cultural diversity. Yet, in the last three decades, indigenous mobilization in Argentina
gained increased relevance and visibility.
Indigenous activists and their communities have become political actors in their own
right, engaging with the state in new ways and addressing the limitations of existing
models of citizenship. The 1994 Constitution, which recognizes the multiethnic
composition of the nation and grants new rights to indigenous peoples, represents a
considerable departure from the previous politics of invisibility. This recognition,
however, took place at a moment in which the Argentinean state was consolidating new
forms of citizenship along the lines of the neoliberalism described earlier. Neoliberal
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multiculturalism highlights the tensions that exist between a process of formal
recognition of indigenous rights and the transformations that occur in the relationship
between state and indigenous peoples along the lines of neoliberal citizenship.
Furthermore, neoliberal multiculturalism has opened up new possibilities for the exercise
of citizenship because it assumes that indigenous subjectivities can be transformed in
accordance with the logic of neoliberalism. Finally, as a form of government, neoliberal
multiculturalism privileges the capacity of citizens to become responsible for their own
social inclusion. In sum, the exercise of citizenship (indigenous or otherwise) reorganizes
social responsibility in a manner that is compatible with the status quo and in a way that
avoids social conflict. In this context, political demands for redistribution or reallocation
of wealth become illegitimate. Thus, states often ignore indigenous activism that focuses
on reallocation of resources (e.g., territorial autonomy) while privileging indigenous
engagement in specific projects that states often control.
Recognition, accommodation, and also the appropriation of languages of resistance are
the result of what anthropologist Charles Hale (2002) has in mind when he describes
neoliberal multiculturalism as a cultural project that welcomes indigenous rights as long
as they do not threaten the authority of the state or its development regime. The key
emphasis of neoliberal multiculturalism is on having citizens govern themselves in a
“modern” and “rational” way. When indigenous activism creates conflict, neoliberalism
offers social and political exclusion. In a study on the ways in which the World Bank
language of participation is used as a form of government, Susanne Schech and Sanjugta
vas Dev (2007 175), refer to accommodation as those “new spaces” that are embedded in
existing power relations. But these authors also argue that these power relations can
always be “destabilized by alternative discourses and practices,” even when these
alternative discourses and practices run the risk of being incorporated by the institutions
that have created such new spaces. In sum, accommodation carries the tensions that exist
between being “invited” to participate (or to be “consulted”) and claiming a space to
contest the limitations of existing states and forms of citizenship.
Throughout this chapter, I show how Mapuche activists have secured and taken
advantage of new spaces of participation that, albeit limited, have provided these activists
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and the communities they seek to represent with a new platform to strengthen their claims
of territorial autonomy (the focus of the following chapter). Despite the compatibility of
neoliberal multiculturalism with new spaces that guarantee the participation of
indigenous peoples, however, this chapter also demonstrates how the creation of such
spaces is not taken for granted by Mapuche activists as each new opportunity to engage
with the state takes place in a wider context of ongoing conflict.
The reform of Neuquén’s Constitution, the negotiation between Mapuche communities
and the federal government under the incorporation of the former in the management of
the Lanín National Park, and the ways in which Mapuche activists used the Programa de
Desarrollo de Comunidades Indígenas (Development of Indigenous Communities
Programme, DCI in Spanish) to expand the reach of a local radio station to benefit
Mapuche communities in the region, serve to illustrate the complex nature of indigenous
demands and state responses under multicultural neoliberalism.

5.1 “Indigenous” or “Mapuche”? The politics of recognition
in the Neuquén’s Constitution

For the most part, indigenous policy-making in Argentina takes place at the provincial
level given the constitutional mandate of provinces to legislate on issues of education,
health, and land registration. Furthermore, the 1994 Constitution transferred control over
natural resources from federal to provincial jurisdiction. Since then, provinces define
which kind of use these areas are subjected to. Thus, for example, the province of
Neuquén has acquired the power to legislate over natural resources such as minerals,
natural gas, and hydrocarbons. The exploitation of these resources, alongside other
economic activities such as forestry, water management, and tourism often take place in
areas which indigenous peoples either live in or use for their subsistence. Since the
second half of the twentieth century, the exploitation of these natural resources has given
the province an impressive amount of wealth in comparison to the rest of the country.
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This prosperity, however, has not changed the living conditions of Mapuche
communities, particularly those located near or within the territories where such
resources are located. Indeed, Mapuche activists condemn the provincial state for
sanctioning economic activities that do not benefit their communities and also for making
such living conditions worse. Thus, this gap between the economic prosperity shown in
official statistics and the reality of everyday life in Mapuche communities also serves as
the background for Mapuche mobilization surrounding the constitutional reform in 2006.
In Neuquén, Mapuche activism was key for obtaining the recognition of indigenous
rights in the provincial constitution in 2006. Neuquén’s first constitution was established
in 1957, two years after the National Territory of Neuquén was designated as a new
province of Argentina. In comparison to its federal counterpart of 1853, the provincial
90

constitution contained articles that included somewhat progressive aims.

These

included planning and development institutions under the authority of the governor’s
office, the inclusion of the text of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human
Rights of 1948, the recognition of the “social function” of land, the establishment of
economic and social rights, and the possibility of referendums (Bucciarelli et al. 1993).
These provisions, in turn, proved to be key for the ongoing support of the Movimiento
Popular Neuquino (MPN), the political party that has dominated Neuquén’s politics since
the election of governor Elías Sapag in 1962. An intricate system of patronage
established with rural communities and selected families ensured the support of many
Mapuche.
When the provincial legislature declared its intention to reform the provincial constitution
in October 2004 and called for elections in October 2005 to form the Constitutional
Convention, broad sectors of civil society including the unemployed, unions,
neighbourhood associations, and Mapuche activists used the opportunity to engage in the
process. Such engagement took the form of mobilization in the streets and alliances with
opposition parties to counteract the government’s official agenda of reform. The outcome
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The constitutional reform of 1949 under Perón’s government included many socially progressive articles
as well. However, the constitution was abolished in 1955 by the military dictatorship that ousted Perón.
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of this mobilization was the reform of the provincial Constitution on February 17, 2006
in terms that did not exactly match the expectations of Neuquén’s governor, Jorge
Sobisch, and his party, the Movimiento Popular Neuquino (MPN), such as the intention
to give the province the power to give concessions to the private sector for the
exploitation of natural resources or the restrictions of indigenous rights to matters of
“respect of ethnic and cultural identity of indigenous peoples of the province within the
principle of equality under the law” and the right to a “multicultural and bilingual”
education (Rodríguez Duch 2006).
In terms of indigenous recognition, the reform echoes the federal Constitution in its
recognition of indigenous peoples “of Neuquén” as a fundamental component of the
identity and uniqueness of the province. Arguably, the constitutional recognition of this
identity also entails the legal obligation of the state to respect Mapuche forms of
government, autonomy, and other institutions of self-representation. Thus, despite the
centrality of Mapuche peoples in the province’s history, including references to the
contributions of the “Mapuche race” in official discourses of regional identity, until 2006
Neuquén did not have an explicit legal framework giving special rights to its indigenous
population. However, Mapuche communities have also realized that this recognition does
not always translate into effective policies that address their main concerns. In some
cases, this lack of support stems from the government’s refusal to bring into practice
existing legal commitments. By ratifying ILO Convention 169, for example, the state
assumed many new responsibilities vis-à-vis indigenous populations. Amongst these,
Mapuche activism has centred on demanding from the state the implementation of
consultation mechanisms in cases where development projects affect indigenous
communities. In other cases, the gap between the recognition of rights and their
implementation is clear when governments react to indigenous mobilization by
criminalizing their actions. This juridicialization of Mapuche activism is described in
more detail in the following chapter as it is often activated in cases of land reoccupations.
The mobilization by the Mapuche to gain the recognition of indigenous rights in the
provincial constitution offers a good illustration of the ways in which the Confederación
Mapuche de Neuquén mobilizes its supporters and articulates its demands for territorial
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autonomy. Rather than blunt resistance to the state, Mapuche activists engage in a
process of complex negotiations and exchanges, even when conflict and violence persist.
In the case of the constitutional reform, activists were quick to propose to the
Constitutional Convention in charge of modifying the text that it specifically recognize
the presence of “Mapuche peoples”, a move that went beyond the recognition of
“indigenous peoples of Neuquén” (pueblos indígenas neuquinos). For the Mapuche, the
wording was relevant as they try to transform the ways in which the relationship between
Mapuche and the state is described. In this sense, contemporary Mapuche activism is
projected in terms of the demands of a pueblo nación originario and no longer of an
“ethnic” minority. Thus, Mapuche activists believe that having the recognition of the
state as pueblo originario Mapuche can facilitate the establishment of territorial
autonomy, including the respect and recognition of the following: a Mapuche ancestral
territory (waj mapu); Mapuche rural communities as “territorial entities” under the
jurisdiction of Mapuche “philosophical” (traditional) authorities; the figure of logko as
state authority; a Mapuche education system (nor kimvn) and interculturality
(interculturalidad) as a main goal for Neuquén’s education system; the ownership and
control of Mapuche peoples over their natural resources; protection of Mapuche medicine
(baweh) and ancestral knowledges; a Mapuche justice system within its territories (nor
feleal); the Mapuche flag as a “cultural symbol” (wenufoye), an organ of political
representation and legislation (meli wixan mapu); the free, prior, and informed consent by
the Mapuche to all projects involving the exploitation of resources within Mapuche
territory; and finally, the recognition of Mapuzugun as official language of Neuquén
(CMN 2006b).
Thus, in terms of recognition, the differences in the wordings of the government’s project
and the CMN proposal show the tensions and contradictions that exist in Neuquén as a
result of the contradictory ways in which the Mapuche have been incorporated into
modern Argentina. In its proposal, the provincial government sought to designate
Neuquén’s “aboriginal (rural) communities” as symbols of a pre-existing culture from the
past that contributed to the formation of provincial and regional identities (Briones 2005).
In this context, the Movimiento Popular Neuquino has been opposed to the inclusion of
the terms “Mapuche” and “peoples” in the constitution, arguing that by doing so the state
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legitimizes potential claims of territorial secession from present-time activists who are no
longer seen as legitimate by the state. Others have claimed that by explicitly recognizing
the existence of the Mapuche in Neuquén as the only pre-existing indigenous peoples, the
state would give “too much” to an indigenous group that is seen as “Chilean” and foreign
in “Argentinean Patagonia.”
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While in international law (e.g., United Nations Charter) the notion of “peoples” has
carried specific connotations such as political sovereignty and state self-determination,
other legislation, such as ILO Convention 169 and the UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples of 2007, incorporate indigenous peoples’ right to free determination
within the framework of the existing states they currently inhabit. Armed with the idea
that self-determination (e.g., autonomy within the existing state) is a pre-requisite for
exercising self-representation and control over their natural resources located in
indigenous territory, Mapuche activists claimed that the government’s proposal did not
include the legal basis for such claims that the Mapuche can make as “peoples.”
Furthermore, by simply recognizing “aboriginal communities”, activists within the
Confederación (CMN) fear that the proposed wording would simply serve as a
“testimonial element” of Neuquén’s past –that is, a conception of “communities” as
survivors of a distant past, with traditions that are worth tolerating as long as they do not
interfere with the present. Moreover, according to activists, the official project negated
the present condition of Mapuche peoples and their organizations, including their current
demands and struggles. In short, by proposing the recognition in the Constitution of a
“pueblo nación originario Mapuche,” activists within the Confederación (CMN) sought
to secure a language, and a framework, more conducive to territorial autonomy. With this
objective in mind, the CMN went onto the streets of Neuquén city to demand from the
elected representatives of the Constitutional Convention that they include the recognition
of the pre-existence of Mapuche peoples and their forms of organization in the new
Constitution. For that occasion, the CMN presented a counter-proposal of reform to all
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This point was elaborated in more detail in Chapter 3 in relation to the “Araucanization of the Pampas”
position, which claims that the Mapuche are not a pre-existing indigenous people of Argentina but of Chile.
For an academic rebuttal of this position, see Lazzari and Lenton (2003).
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political parties involved in the convention. The Confederación proposed that the
Constitution recognize the pre-existence of the “pueblo nación originario Mapuche”, its
right to cultural identity, as well as to political, social, and economic organization through
its own institutions of self-representation.
The decision to take to the streets of Neuquén city responded, in part, to the broader
context within which the process of constitutional reform was taking place. This process
was initiated after the provincial legislature passed the “need for constitutional reform”
law in October 2004, and provided an opportunity for the Confederación Mapuche de
Neuquén (CMN) and other social movements to showcase their demands and oppose the
official plans. They did so by public demonstrations and by establishing alliances with
opposition parties to work on alternative projects of reform. In alliance with other social
movements and political parties, the CMN presented its own project for consideration
during the debates about reforms, once the election of delegates for the Constitutional
Convention was completed. The decision of the CMN to present its own project
concerning the recognition of indigenous peoples and rights in the Constitutional
Convention came after long debates given that, initially, opposition parties and other
social movements were opposed to the reform. Many of these social movements and
opposition parties decided to mobilize later. However, Mapuche activists saw new
opportunities for mobilization immediately. In the words of the CMN, “The decision was
not simple because the call for reform was a historical opportunity we always demanded.
Being part of this reform raised concerns from other social sectors that we were being
functional allies to Sobisch’s strategy [Neuquén’s governor] and that we would break the
plans of the opposition, which was to oppose the reform. However, the position of the
Traditional Mapuche Authorities that met in gvbamtuwvn (Parliament) was clear: No to
Sobisch’s plans and yes to Mapuche [rights’] incorporation in a new constitution. The
outcomes were uncertain but we were going to be protagonists of our own future.”
(2006b, 4)
According to Mapuche activists, the debates around the constitutional reform also
provided an opportunity to oppose the governor’s neoliberal agenda, particularly in
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relation to the privatization of natural resources.

92

In the words of one of the Mapuche

leaders involved in this mobilization, the context of the constitutional reform,
“… Opened a space to question the politics of negation that affect us as
peoples in this province and an opportunity to debate the rights of our
people and the defencelessness they encounter in relation to, for example,
our natural resources. It is not a mistake to assume that this reform is the
result of the interest of [governor] Sobisch to bring provincial legislation
closer to his interests, especially in those matters related to the
exploitation of natural resources and the privatization of energy sources
such as oil, in opposition to federal legislation. Sobisch recently extended,
until 2027, the concession of oil extraction for REPSOL-YPF, an
unconstitutional measure that he seeks to legitimate today by reforming
the constitution.” (Jorge Nahuel, quoted in Cayuqueo 2006)
Thus, control over natural resources, and oil in particular, was an important contentious
issue during the constitutional reform. In the presentation of the official project of
constitutional reform, governor Sobisch introduced oil companies as “strategic allies” for
the province. Thus, by modifying the Constitution, Sobisch’s political party sought to
give the provincial government the legal power to authorize the exploitation of
hydrocarbons or private or mixed (i.e., private/state) corporations, ending the exclusivity
that federal authorities have on this matter. Moreover, the official project attempted to
limit the legal responsibilities that oil companies had vis-à-vis the local communities
where they operate (Cayuqueo 2006). In this context of increasing conflict over
government’s proposals, Mapuche activists mobilized to prevent what could constitute, in
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The first Sobisch administration (1991-1995) is often described as a re-aligment of the Movimiento
Popular Neuquino (MPN) to the ideas of “modernization” embedded in the neoliberal project of the federal
government under Carlos Menem (1989-1999). The so-called “white current” within the MPN, under
Sobisch’s leadership, sought to create an alternative to the dominance of the Sapag family since the the
emergence of the party in the 1960s. While the MPN traditionally supported the principles of federalism,
provincial autonomy, and the defense the province’s interests in its national resources, Sobisch supported
the federal government in its policies, including the privatization of YPF, the national oil company with a
strong presence in Neuquén (Mombello 2005).
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their view, an attempt by the provincial government to privatize natural resources. Since
the discovery of oil in the late 1970s, the provincial government (for the most part under
the control of the Movimiento Popular Neuquino) has considered hydrocarbons a key
source of income and a strategic resource for development efforts and this reform finally
gave Neuquén the possibility of re-establishing an alliance between provincial authorities
and private oil companies. Mapuche activists, however, saw the government’s attempt to
modify the Constitution as a way to secure individual or sector-specific gains.
The relative, initial optimism with which the constitutional reform process began in
October 2004 soon disappeared when the Constitutional Assembly started deliberations a
year later on December 16, 2005. Between that time and January 7, 2006 the Assembly
received 141 proposals and declarations and 21 individual (personal) petitions according
to the guidelines of the law that passed the need for reform. According to the reform
process, for the next 20 days, these proposals could receive treatment in commissions and
if approved they would be debated in the plenary sessions. Only then, could it be decided
if a project approved by a commission was to be incorporated into the new constitution.
Following these procedural rules, on January 5, the Confederación (CMN) presented its
own project invoking the constitutional right of indigenous peoples to be consulted over
all matters pertaining to them. On January 19, a meeting took place for the first time
between the leaders of CMN and members of the Constitutional Assembly (CMN 2006;
CMN 2006b). This meeting provided a new opportunity for Mapuche activists within the
CMN to explain their proposal, which had been elaborated in the previous year in
consultation with Mapuche communities in a series of workshops and roundtables. By
agreeing to the meeting, Mapuche activists demonstrated once again their capacity to
negotiate and demand from the state a new form of relationship towards indigenous
peoples. In this case, CMN activists demanded once again the recognition of the
Mapuche as a pueblo nación originario with its own forms of organization and
cosmovisions.
On January 27, the channels of communication finally broke after a violent confrontation
between activists and police forces that took place when Mapuche leaders attempted to
enter the building where the Constitutional Assembly was in session. First, activists
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objected to the fact that the debate was centred on the recognition of “indigenous
communities” instead of “Mapuche peoples.” Second, they also argued that the project
under consideration did not contemplate Mapuche ownership over their own territories,
nor the right to self-representation. During the debates, Mapuche leaders were not
allowed to enter the building where the Constitutional Convention was in session.
However, some kona (warriors) who had press accreditation were able to keep the CMN
informed, in real time, about the official plans of the convention. The Confederación put
it in the these terms:
“Faced with a Convention mired in secrecy, it was necessary to find a way
to enter the building where Mapuche rights were threatened. Thus, the
kona played a fundamental role. Like in the past when our young warriors
infiltrated military posts to study the moves of the enemy, they carried out
a similar task today. Except that today bows and arrows are not
necessary. Today, they were armed with a voice recorder, a camera, a
video recorder, and their accreditation as journalists. They also had the
confidence that we could leave in the hands of the winka our rights and
existence. It was the result of this infiltration that it was possible to know
each intention of the Constitutional Convention.” (CMN 2006b, 8)
Finally, in their view, the emphasis of the reform project on “multiculturalism” negated
the existence of the Mapuche as a pueblo diferente (different people), and equated them
in practice with other instances of social organization in the province. They insisted they
be recognized as a people with the right to their own cultural identity, territory, and
autonomy (self-representation). Thus, with tensions increasing over the direction of the
discussions in the constitutional assembly, the outcome of the reform in relation to the
recognition of indigenous rights was uncertain.
If the momentary collapse of talks over the recognition of indigenous peoples was not
enough to alter the outcome of the constitutional reform, the Mapuche opposition to the
attempted economic reforms, particularly in the area of hydrocarbons, led to the decision
by the Movimiento Popular Neuquino to drop the debate on the issue even though it was
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central to the governor’s project. Thus despite the broad goals of the reform project, the
final constitutional text was to be much narrower in scope and this was in part the result
of the show of force and determination by Mapuche activists. They succeeded in
politicizing the process of constitutional reform.
In the end, however, a sort of intermediate route prevailed in terms of the recognition of
indigenous rights. In the days prior to the final decision on the inclusion of indigenous
rights, the CMN together with other social organizations organized a parallel convention
called the Plenary for Excluded Rights to keep the attention on issues that the official
convention was not debating behind closed doors. The sessions of the alternative
convention took place on the campus of the National University of Comahue, metres
away from where the convention was sitting, and it included organizations that were
excluded from the ongoing debates. The group included state employees, workers of
recuperated factories, university students, human rights groups (e.g., Asamblea por los
Derechos Humanos), Neuquén’s bishop, groups for the rights of persons with disabilities,
employees of National Parks, peace Nobel laureate Adolfo Perez Esquivel, film-maker
and presidential candidate Fernando “Pino” Solanas, the president of the National
Institute for Indigenous Affairs (Dr. Jorge Rodriguez), and the president of the
Commission of Indigenous Jurists (Dr. Eulogio Freites). After learning that the
constitutional convention did not include the proposals concerning the recognition of
indigenous rights, social movement leaders and their allies marched to the site and were
finally allowed to enter the building while the delegates were in session. In this context,
delegates decided to postpone the convention one more day in order to debate exclusively
the CMN proposal. The final text of article 53, which includes the recognition of
indigenous rights in the provincial constitution, was thus the result of hours of intense
debate and negotiation in a context of increasing tensions and social mobilization.
Between activists demanding the recognition of “Mapuche peoples” and the official
projects supporting the recognition of “indigenous communities”, the final constitutional
text included the recognition of pueblos indígenas neuquinos (indigenous peoples of
Neuquén). Despite reservations, CMN activists accepted the outcome, which recognized
their pre-existence for the first time in the province’s history. The CMN describes the
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moment where they learned that the delegates had agreed on a text that included the
recognition of indigenous rights:
“It is not possible to describe the emotions, the tears, and the selfcontained rage that pu logko and pu werken felt when Oscar Nahuel [a
delegate representing the opposition] came to the ruka Newen Mapu [the
CMN’s headquarters in Neuquén city] with the final text approved by the
convention […] These days are of joy, of reaffirmation, and of projection
in Nvwken Mapu (Neuquén), in Puel Mapu, in Gulu Mapu, in short, in
each point of the Wajmapuce where the pride of being a nation (Nación
Originaria) that struggles for its liberation emerges.” (CMN 2006b, 9)
In its article 53, the Constitution says that:
“The province recognizes the ethnic and cultural pre-existence of
Neuquén’s indigenous peoples as a fundamental part of provincial identity
and uniqueness. It guarantees respect of their identity and the right to a
bilingual and intercultural education. The province will recognize the
legal status (personería juridica) of its communities and the
communitarian property of the lands that they traditionally occupy, and it
will regulate the provision of other apt and sufficient land for human
development. These lands will be inalienable, non-transferrable and
exempt from any tax or injunction. It will also secure their participation in
the management of their natural resources and other matters that concern
them, and it will promote positive actions in their favour.” (Tribunal
Superior de Justicia of Neuquén March 3, 2006)
It serves as more than an anecdote, particularly after the incidents involving police
brutality, to note that at the moment of the approval of this reform one of the delegates of
the convention invited the logko of the Confederación to address the convention. The
MPN and its allies, however, blocked this possibility, something that illustrates, for the
Mapuche, the unwillingness of the provincial government to engage in a debate with
them as equal peoples. Despite the obstacles of the process, Mapuche activists claimed

152

their first political victory since their organization within the CMN. The CMN considers
that the provincial constitution improves the recognition of the national constitution in
three main areas: first, the articles with the recognition are included in the “Declarations,
Rights, and Guarantees” section of the provincial constitution and not as part of the
prerogatives of Congress as in the national constitution. This gives article 53 operative
powers with immediate legal effect. In other words, there is no need for the Legislature to
pass legislation to implement article 53. Second, the provincial constitution includes the
promotion of “positive actions” which implies not only the recognition of rights but also
the obligation to enforce them. Finally, the recognition of indigenous peoples, which in
Neuquén means the Mapuche peoples – the Province can no longer establish who is
indigenous and who is not -, as a “fundamental part of provincial identity and
uniqueness” gives the CMN the legitimacy to establish guidelines for interculturalidad
(CMN 2006b). Furthermore, this victory is the outcome of years of organization, a
reaffirmation of new forms of cultural identity within the communities and with the rest
of the population, the support most communities have given to the political and juridical
position of the CMN in numerous workshops, and the alliance established with other
social organizations in Neuquén.

5.2 Accommodation: New spaces for participation in
National Parks

As the previous section shows, recognition of indigenous rights in the provincial
constitution has not been easy for Mapuche activists. Indeed the constitutional
recognition of indigenous rights “from above” was, in part, the result of mobilization and
struggles “from below.” But the acceptance by the state of Mapuche demands for
indigenous rights in constitutional reform can also be seen as the continuation of a
tradition that sees the provincial government using Mapucheness as a way of reaffirming
a distinct regional identity, a move which in turn has facilitated electoral support for the
Movimiento Popular Neuquino (Briones 2005). Beyond the intentions behind the
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constitutional recognition of indigenous rights, it is important to discuss other venues in
which the relationship between indigenous peoples and the state takes shape in order to
explore the complexities that still prevail and the tensions that exist when Mapuche
activists advance their claims for territorial autonomy in a context of negotiation with and
resistance to the state. Two cases illustrate these tensions very clearly: the comanagement project of the Lanín National Park; and the appropriation of an official
development project, sponsored by the World Bank and supported by the state, for
political purposes, namely the redefinition of a community radio station (FM Pocahullo)
into a powerful communication tool (AM Wajzugun). While the co-management project
is the focus of this section, the creation of Wajzugun radio station is explored in the next.
In contemporary Patagonia, conservation areas under the jurisdiction of National Parks
have become a complex scenario for indigenous participation. Indeed, many of the
territories included in these areas serve today as the main stage where negotiation,
exchanges, and conflict between the Mapuche and state institutions take place. Many of
these complexities are the result of the historical context within which the National Parks
system emerged. In Northern Patagonia, for example, the creation of protected areas is
deeply connected to the military expansion over territories under Mapuche control that
took place in the late nineteenth century. While one of its most enthusiastic proponents,
Francisco Pascasio Moreno, emphasized the need to protect some natural landscapes
from human activities, the creation of National Parks responded to geopolitical
considerations as well, including the need to exercise direct state control over Mapuche
communities. Thus, since their creation, National Parks have restricted the use of those
territories under its jurisdiction, leading in many circumstances to the expulsion of
Mapuche communities living in those areas.
After the military conquest of Northern Patagonia, the central government carried out a
number of initiatives to sell off the newly acquired territories. Besides conducting public
auctions, the government also bestowed land on some members of the army that
participated in the occupation as a reward for the mission carried out. Federal authorities
also assigned lands for future colonization projects, the settlement of religious missions,
and the establishment of new townships. In short, the organization of protected areas
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provided the central government with an opportunity to have direct control of a vast
extension of land where many Mapuche communities were still located at the end of the
military conquest of Patagonia.
In the early decades of the twentieth century the state started creating the institutional
framework to administer and control these territories directly, particularly those in areas
of close proximity to international borders. In 1934, the federal government officially
began the institutionalization of conservationist practices in vast territories with the
creation of two National Parks: Iguazú in Argentina’s northeast and Nahuel Huapi in
Northern Patagonia. Thus, the trend of conservationism that started in the second-half of
the nineteenth century was given official, institutional status in the 1930s when the state
created the National Parks Administration office.
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In 1937, the central government

institutionalized four more National Parks in Patagonia: Lanín; Alerces; Perito Moreno;
and Glaciers.
The establishment of National Parks had some direct consequences for Mapuche
communities located within their jurisdictions. First, these lands became subject to very
strict National Parks regulations that privileged conservation, effectively breaking the
productive relationship between Mapuche communities and their land. Second, while the
property of private large estates was largely unaffected, many Mapuche communities
were relocated. In fact, once the National Territories became provinces, large estate
owners enjoyed the additional benefit of not having to pay provincial taxes (Bandieri
1993b, 228). Despite increasing claims by the provincial government to have
jurisdictional control over the areas of National Parks, the federal government has been
reluctant to transfer such control. In practice, the institutionalization of National Parks in
the 1930s and 1940s prevented any definitive solution to indigenous demands for
ownership of territories they inhabited. This was particularly the case of those
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Nahuel Huapi National Park began with a modest donation of land to the government in 1904 and it
expanded throughout the first half of the twentieth century. Currently, Nahuel Huapi is the largest National
Park in the region of Patagonia and consists of 7,050 square kilometres that extend into parts of the
provinces of Neuquén and Río Negro. Iguazú National Park, located in the province of Misiones, has an
area of 550 square kilometres.
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communities that were relocated when the parks were created. The “grey areas” of this
legal system were such that the National Parks Administration could make decisions
about how land was to be used according to their own provisions without having to
consult to its Mapuche inhabitants. Conservation efforts, however, have not been always
successful and many areas under the jurisdiction of National Parks have suffered from
over-exploitation of resources at the hands of private interests throughout the twentieth
century. Despite attempts by the National Parks Administration to limit extractive
activities, they continued to be carried out thus challenging the conservationist approach
that existed in the administration of protected areas. While large estate owners and
private businesses have carried out most of these activities, Mapuche communities have
also been accused by National Parks of putting too much environmental pressure on their
territories.
The limitations placed on Mapuche communities by National Parks to carry out any
meaningful economic activity (e.g., subsistence) often translated into a conflictual
relationship between Mapuche activists and the federal government, particularly with the
National Parks Administration. In the last three decades, however, National Parks began
to acknowledge the importance of establishing an alliance with indigenous communities
in order to secure the goal of conservation. Not all working within National Parks are
convinced of this paradigm shift, but for now Mapuche communities are starting to be
considered key allies in the management and conservation of protected areas. Indeed,
under the new paradigm the Mapuche are recognized as having a sort of “special
relationship of respect” to the territories they use and inhabit. As indigenous peoples,
they are now expected to defend conservation efforts – a role that Mapuche activists are
eager to adopt under some conditions. Thus, despite the ethnic essentialism that this view
imposes on indigenous communities, the alliance between environmentalism and
indigenous movements across the region has served to articulate new types of
mobilization and organization. The co-management of protected areas between National
Parks and indigenous peoples is a type of project that has given both parties involved the
opportunity to negotiate new terms of incorporation within the state. For Mapuche
activists in particular, co-management projects provide their communities with
opportunities to have some influence over their territories. In turn, supporters of co-
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management projects within National Parks see the paradigm shift as an opportunity to
bring their institution closer to transnational principles of environmentalism, indigenous
rights, and conservation.

5.2.1

Co-management in Lanín National Park

The decision of Mapuche activists to change the historical relationship of conflict with
National Parks responds, in part, to the intensification of extractive activities, the
privatization of state-owned land, and the public-private partnerships to carry out
development projects in protected areas. All these trends were more obvious in Patagonia
in the 1990s. These conditions, Mapuche leaders argue, have accelerated the need to
urgently secure new spaces of participation where communities can participate in the
decision-making process affecting the territories they inhabit. Such spaces of
participation and the goals of conservation also give Mapuche communities the
opportunity to protect biodiversity and their ways of knowing. Certainly much of today’s
Mapuche politics translates into participating in these new institutional spaces made
available by the state in order to secure their territorial autonomy.
One of the economic activities that was established in the 1990s in the region of
Patagonia is tourism. Indeed, Patagonia has been historically promoted as a place where
tourists can enjoy pristine mountains, ski resorts, and lakes. Since the 1990s, ethnotourism has been added to Patagonia’s “attractions.” Neuquén’s Secretary of Tourism, for
example, describes the new opportunities that emerge from ethno-tourism in the
following terms:
“Currently many Mapuche communities live in Neuquén territory,
especially in the Lakes region. Valuing their worldview and customs, they
encourage the visitor to see their land and share their traditions. The
richness of Mapuche culture is reflected in each manifestation of their
daily life. Religion, music, crafts, and food maintain the tradition of these
peoples alive. Over time, the Mapuche have maintained the identity of
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their products. Currently, weavings and woodwork constitute their main
crafts, which are elaborated with techniques inherited from generation to
generation (Secretaría de Turismo de Neuquén 2010).
In the context of the ongoing conflicts between the province of Neuquén and Mapuche
leaders, this statement by a government’s agency may seem contradictory. However,
upon closer scrutiny, the provincial government does not oppose all aspects of
Mapucheness. Indeed, as the previous chapter shows, Neuquén’s dominant political
party, the Movimiento Popular Neuquino, has maintained close ties with Mapuche
communities at least since the 1960s. While these ties between Mapuche communities
and the provincial government were severed after the arrival of a new wave of Mapuche
activists in the 1980s and 1990s in the Confederación Mapuche de Neuquén, successive
governments have celebrated certain aspects of Mapuche culture, for example, crafts,
music, food, and “worldview,” while ignoring and invisibilizing others, including
territorial autonomy. Moreover, ongoing conflicts are never mentioned. For Mapuche
activities, these silences are insulting and they argue that most philosophical and religious
categories of Mapuche cosmology are linked to their relationship to land and the
harmony between people (che) and the territories they use or inhabit.
The institutionalization in the early 2000s of the co-management project within Lanín
National Park presented Mapuche activists with the opportunity to address historical
conflicts with National Parks, and also with the central government. This new space for
Mapuche participation within the institutional structure of the state, however, was not
simply an invitation that responded to policy changes alone. Indeed, the co-management
initiative only emerged after Mapuche activists occupied the National Park
Administration offices in the town of San Martín de los Andes in 1999. During this
occupation, they demanded the approval of a policy resolution regarding a territorial
conflict with one of the communities located within the jurisdiction of the Park.
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end, Mapuche activists proposed to frame the discussion in terms of the notion of
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The area under dispute was located in the region of the Huechulafquen Lake where one of the
communities living there faced an eviction order.

To this
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“protected indigenous territory,” asking Parks to recognize the rights of Mapuche
communities to exercise some measures of control over the territories they inhabit. In
May 2000, Mapuche authorities and Park officials agreed on a redefinition of the terms
under which the National Park Administration conceived the use of land under its
jurisdiction. As a result, they agreed to incorporate the notions of territory, comanagement and the connection between protection of biodiversity and cultural
difference. In July 2001, the National Parks Administration (NPA) formalized the comanagement committee with representatives from the NPA, the Confederación Mapuche,
and the Mapuche communities within the Lanín National Park.
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As Mapuche activists see it, the institutionalization of the co-management initiatives such
as the one in Lanín National Park serves to legitimize their struggles around territorial
autonomy. In their view, these new spaces of participation created within the structures of
the state serve to bring Mapuche communities closer to their goal of exercising effective
control over the territories they use and/or inhabit. This is a major reason why it has been
important for Mapuche activists that the National Parks Administration recognizes the
concept of territory as one embedded in cultural as well as legal elements, thus expanding
the narrower notion of land. Furthermore, it has been important for activists and Mapuche
communities to have the recognition by National Parks that the Mapuche have a
fundamental relationship with their environment in their daily practices and ancestral
knowledge. In short, National Parks, activists argue, cannot protect cultural diversity and
Mapuche identity without recognizing the centrality of territorial autonomy in order to
achieve this.
Co-management provides the opportunity for a new type of relationship between the state
and Mapuche activists. It is also a reflection of the complex ways in which contemporary
indigenous activism in Argentina takes place. In the case of Mapuche activism in
Neuquén, moments of struggle and mobilization go alongside new spaces for
participation offered by the state. While activists recognize the limitations of such offers,
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National Parks Administration, Resolution 063 (July 4, 2001). The same resolution establishes local
committees and rules for their operation.
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they nonetheless often in order accept to challenge colonizing practices (e.g., clientpatron relations, cooptation) from within. While these instances of participation within
the state are not entirely new, neoliberal multiculturalism has made them the principal
mechanism to accommodate indigenous mobilization. For the communities involved, the
goal of gaining control over territories they use or inhabit, or those they historically have
claimed, becomes a more concrete possibility under co-management. In short, comanagement projects appeal to both the state and indigenous activists.
The Co-management project supports the idea of shared jurisdiction over the Lanín
National Park, which requires to Mapuche communities and park authorities to agree
about rules and other criteria for the administration of these lands. The principles that
sustain co-management projects are not exclusive to Lanín National Park. Indeed, the set
of agreements that sustain co-management are consolidated as the result of an active
transnational development agenda and meetings between indigenous peoples and NGOs.
In the case of the Lanín co-management initiative, the work of the International Union for
Natural Conservation during its Fourth World Congress held in Barcelona in October
2008 as well as the Second Latin American Congress of Parks and Protected Areas held
in Bariloche, Argentina a year earlier played an important role. Moreover, the discussions
that took place at these two events coincided with debates taking place at the United
Nations that led to the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, approved on
September 13, 2007.
Co-management is also regarded by Mapuche activists as an opportunity to overcome the
failures of past government initiatives to provide an adequate institutional framework for
indigenous participation.
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By having the opportunity to have a voice on matters related

to the administration of the park, Mapuche communities believe they can exercise their
right to define the terms under which development in their territories is conceived. Since
the implementation of the Lanín co-management project, for example, Mapuche
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The example of the Pulmarí Corporation, established by the federal state, to address territorial conflicts
between the Army and Mapuche communities, is a case in point. Pulmarí is addressed in the following
chapter.
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communities in the area have been able to participate in managing camping sites, raising
funds for the community and giving some of its members new work opportunities among
other tourism-related activities. Co-management has also been used as a framework to
work towards new intercultural urbanization projects. In one of these projects, as the one
in San Martin de los Andes, Congress handed over lands for the construction of the first
97

barrio intercultural (intercultural neighbourhood).

The barrio intercultural consists of

a housing project that includes homeless non-Mapuche families and members of one
Mapuche community from the area.
For Mapuche activists, though the experience of participating in the co-management
project has been positive, it is also a limited approach to achieve their goal of territorial
autonomy. In practice, they argue, co-management does not go beyond a superficial level
of participation for Mapuche communities, as it does not secure them collective
ownership of their territory. The Confederación Mapuche explains these limitations as
follows:
“Mapuche communities, their land, territories, resources, and knowledge
are not recognized [by National Parks] as an end in themselves but as
objects that serve a final end: protected areas and their conservation. In
the best of cases, the communities are recognized as co-administrators
leaving them without their right to arrange their territory according to
their own beliefs. Thus, co-management can only be accepted as a
transitional phase in the process of territorial restitution” (CMN 2009).
As stated earlier, under neoliberal multiculturalism these new institutional spaces for
participation are implemented by states to advance development goals, including the
reduction of public administration, the decentralization of decision-making, and the
delegation of responsibilities to civil society (CMN 2009). In this context, Mapuche
activists have started to argue that under this paradigm, co-management programs are too
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Congress was able to do this because San Martin de los Andes is located within the area under (federal)
National Parks jurisdiction.
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limited and not conductive to territorial autonomy because it does not given them tools to
consolidate self-representation and control over the territories they inhabit. In a workshop
on protected areas held in Buenos Aires in August 2007, the Confederación Mapuche and
other indigenous leaders highlighted the following additional limitations to comanagement strategies:
“1. Co-management as it is applied today reaffirms the principle of
absolute sovereignty of states, particularly over their natural resources.
Indigenous peoples around the world question this principle and reaffirm
our absolute right to ownership, control, and administration of our
natural, genetic, and cultural resources.
2. Co-management does not imply in practice the recognition of our
fundamental right to our territory, to autonomy, or our recognition as preexisting peoples. Co-management is turned into a mechanism of
integration into the global market threatening our lives and cultures.
3. Co-management is subject to only one jurisdiction […], thus
contradicting our own normative system and our idea of man-nature
relationship.
4. Co-management is subordinated to the absolute legal jurisdiction of the
state […].
5. Finally, co-management is only part of experiments that remain
marginal” (CMN 2009, 4).
Because of these limitations, Mapuche activists have sought to reframe their demands
around the notion of “Mapuche governance” of protected areas, including National Parks.
Activists bring the ideas of “governance by indigenous peoples and local communities”
from the World’s Congress on Nature celebrated in Barcelona in 2008 as a way to move
beyond co-management. The idea of Mapuche governance implies the restitution of
protected areas created for the purposes of conservation in indigenous territories to the
communities that inhabit them and their institutions. In short, this idea of governance is
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based on the self-government of indigenous territories, also known as Indigenous
Territories for Conservation or ITC, and which are assumed to share the following
characteristics:
“1. Ancestral occupation determines [the boundaries of] the territory.
2. This territory is designated as protected area, totally or partially, as a
result of the decision of indigenous peoples that inhabit them thus
exercising their right to self-determination, or as a result of a state
decision after it has secured the free, prior, and informed consent of the
communities involved
3. The ITC is based on the territorial rights of the indigenous community,
peoples, or nation.
4. The ITC requires the full recognition of the right of indigenous peoples
to land, territory, and resources of traditional use as well as the right to
manage and control those areas.
5. The communities that inhabit this territory or the institutions to which
they delegate their representation have the right to manage this territory”
(CMN 2009, 9).
The Confederación Mapuche proposed the transition from co-management to Mapuche
governance in May 2009 and it is currently generating increasing debate within the
National Parks Administration where the solution, as leaders put it, may ultimately not be
technical but political. In other words, it is up to the government’s will to implement this
proposal. One of the major difficulties in negotiating with the state about the reach of comanagement resides in the uncertainty about implementing this project in the broader
context of ongoing conflict between the communities and the provincial and national
state. More recently, the future of co-management in Lanín National Park is uncertain. In
fact, on January 20, 2012, the National Parks Administration passed a resolution ending
Mapuche participation and the co-management activities altogether. This was a unilateral
decision that triggered a strong response from Mapuche activists. On January 23, they
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occupied the headquarters of Lanín National Park once again to demand that resolution
be nullified. The action ended with the ousting of the park’s director and the removal of
the contested resolution. Under a new administration, the National Parks Administration
created a co-management Department with the participation of the nine Mapuche
communities that live in the area. Since then, the continuation of co-management gives
the communities involved and Mapuche activists the possibility of carrying on economic
activities, and other tourism-related projects, such as trekking guides, horse riding
lessons, and management of admission tickets to different areas of the park.
In conclusion, co-management has provided a clear opportunity for Mapuche activists to
negotiate with the state despite the fact that many challenges remain for its
implementation. Aware of these limitations, activists use these new spaces of
participation because they provide an opportunity to engage in conversations with the
state as a pueblo nación originario that claims territorial autonomy. The next chapter will
make clear, however, that these opportunities for participation do not translate into a
significant change of policy by the state on territorial autonomy or towards indigenous
peoples. Hence, indigenous activists also implement strategies of appropriating spaces
created with state support for different goals. The transformation of Pocahullo FM radio
station to Wajzugun AM is a case in point.

5.3 Appropriation as resistance: From Pocahullo to
Wajzugun

As the struggle for the constitutional recognition of indigenous rights and the pressure to
alter the terms under which Mapuche communities participate in the Lanín National Park
co-management project show, state initiatives are subject to change as a result of
indigenous mobilization and organization. Indeed, this relative openness that state
institutions have vis-à-vis some indigenous claims characterizes, in part, neoliberal
multiculturalism as a form of governing cultural difference. In turn, these programs or
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initiatives of accommodation can be appropriated through resistance and negotiation
(Escobar 2008; Blaser et al 2010; Ilcan and Lacey 2011). In this context, the notion of
negotiation seems more appropriate than resistance to understand the ways in which
indigenous activists deal with the limitations of neoliberal multiculturalism (Hale 2004;
2002). Resistance does not always imply outright opposition or rejection. Instead, it
involves an active process of negotiation and contestation, as Gavin Smith (1989) has
reminded us.
The participation of Mapuche communities in the World Bank-sponsored Indigenous
Communities Development project is a clear example of how state-sanctioned initiatives
can be appropriated to strengthen ongoing struggles for territorial autonomy. As stated
earlier, in practice, these struggles take the form of negotiation and confrontation with the
state. This section explores the transformation of a local community-run FM radio station
with limited reach into an intercultural AM station run by Mapuche and non-Mapuche
with a wider reach to serve the purpose of Mapuche mobilization in Neuquén. This
transformation is the result of the re-appropriation by Mapuche activists of the intended
goals of the aforementioned World Bank project. The creation of Wajzugun has also
made possible the consolidation of a more autonomous media project that serves to
consolidate new forms of mobilization in Neuquén, namely, by connecting remote
communities for the first time. Radio Wajzugun, however, is not the only media project
in which Mapuche activists are currently involved. In Neuquen city, for example,
Mapuche youth groups run news web sites and other media and entertainment projects,
such as Kona Producciones. According to some authors (Tabobondung 2010; Blaser et al
2010), media production has been serving as a way in which indigenous activists create
new, autonomous spaces to share mutual experiences and perspectives with the purpose
of connecting communities located at great distances. Media production is also a way for
activists to ensure that the ongoing struggles of indigenous peoples are not ignored.
The consolidation of these community-based communication efforts was further
entrenched when the Confederación Mapuche obtained funding for a new building and
equipment to transform FM Pocahullo into AM Wajzugun. These funds, in turn, had their
origin in a World Bank-sponsored project, executed by Argentina’s Ministry of Social
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Development. The Proyecto de Desarrollo de las Comunidades Indigenas (Indigenous
Communities Development Project or DCI after its Spanish name) has been, in fact, one
of the rare opportunities for Mapuche activists to obtain funds channelled via state
institutions. This project had its origins in 1997 when the World Bank funded a program
aimed at strengthening the “management capacity” of indigenous organizations and
peoples in Argentina. The emphasis of this program was on the “comprehension” of
World Bank-funded programs, and it was executed from January 1997 to December 1998
(World Bank 2004, 2). Within the framework of this program, indigenous organizations
were able to submit proposals for funding initiatives for “sustainable development of
communities that owned their land” (World Bank 2004, 2). In October 1998, the World
Bank agreed to provide technical and financial support to establish Áreas Indígenas
Piloto (Pilot Indigenous Areas or AIP for its Spanish name), in order to facilitate the
“management capacity, use and control over the territory and natural resources, avoiding
capital-intensive activities, and promoting activities based on the ancestral culture,
benefiting the indigenous communities that live in these areas” (World Bank 2004, 2).
One of the three AIPs selected for funding was the Pulmarí region in Neuquén, where
most communities recognized the representative role of the Confederación Mapuche.
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The relatively vague objectives of this World Bank-funded project perhaps contributed to
the ways in which indigenous organizations conducted what Escobar (2008) calls “a
creative appropriation” of the program’s goals. In some cases, the author argues, this type
of appropriation can lead to subversion in terms of intended goals. Aligned with
principles of neoliberal multiculturalism, the DCI project stated as its main goal, “the
establishment of the bases for community development, and the protection and
management of natural resources in the lands of indigenous communities” (World Bank
2004, 2). Furthermore, the World Bank explained that this main goal includes: “the social
and cultural strengthening of indigenous communities; the improvement of indigenous
capacities for a sustainable management; and the increase of the management capacity
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The other two communities supported by this Project were the Diaguita-Calchaquí in Tucumán and
Kolla in Salta.

166

within the communities and in relation to the articulation with all other levels of
government and other actors included in the pilot areas (AIPs), and towards [other]
indigenous peoples in general. The project will develop ‘models’ from which to extract
lessons that could serve the future extension of the program to other indigenous areas.”
The three components that the World Bank identified for this project help to further
elucidate the content of the stated objectives. The first component is the “social and
cultural strengthening of indigenous communities” and includes all those activities that
tend to the strengthening of the “capacity of self-development and the promotion of
activities closely related to traditional knowledge and cultures” (World Bank 2004, 3).
The second component is the “sustainable use of natural resources” in which indigenous
communities prepare “Management Plans” via “socio-cultural and environmental
assessment; evaluation of resources; planning for the management of soil, water, and
forests; and specific mechanisms to reduce environment risks” (World Bank 2004, 4).
Finally, the third component is “Project Management” which is established to “guarantee
the efficient management of the overall project, at the central and local levels” (World
Bank 2004, 4). Thus, the project includes a discourse that sets up some basis for
establishing principles for the regulation of indigenous issues. However, there is nothing
in the project that supports the politicization of Mapuche activism. While projects such as
these leave aside issues of indigenous politicization, ongoing conflicts – including those
relating to ownership and control over ancestral territories – have proven to be one of the
main obstacles for the implementation of this project as the World Bank document itself
suggests.

In Neuquén, the opportunity for Mapuche activists to take part in a project of alternative
media is a result of the presence of a community-run local FM station located in San
Martín de los Andes and of the central role it played in supporting the mobilization of
Mapuche communities in the region. Moreover, the transformation of Pocahullo into
Radio Comunitaria Intercultural Wajzugun has served the ongoing building of alliances
and support not only between the Mapuche activists and Mapuche communities but also
amongst the communities themselves by giving them a space to share their experience.
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Furthermore, this project illustrates well the conditions under which indigenous
organizations are sometimes able to alter the ways in which a state-sponsored program
with transnational financial support operates.
Initially owned by four members of a local opposition political party, the Unión Cívica
99

Radical, Radio Pocahullo started transmitting in San Martin de los Andes in 1990.

After the electoral defeat of its owners, Pocahullo was put up for sale, but it was finally
transformed into a co-operative, owned and operated by its employees and local leaders
of social organizations. One hundred and fifty listeners donated funds, thus contributing
to buy the equipment from the previous owners. In the 1990s, changes in tax legislation
forced Pocahullo to register as a not-for-profit civil association to avoid paying what its
members identified as excessive amounts of money. Since its transformation into a
community-run radio, volunteers, a steering committee of three directors, local residents,
and invited guests have been managing Pocahullo.
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The transition of Pocahullo from a

privately-owned radio station to a community co-operative illustrates the ways in which
social activists were willing to defend not only a source of income but also a cultural
media project they believed in. This transition, however, was only the first step towards
the intercultural media project that the creation of Wajzugun made possible.
Pocahullo, in fact, was very popular in working-class and poor neighbourhoods of San
Martin de los Andes, a city known for its high-end tourism industry and constant
conflicts between private interests related to the industry and the Mapuche communities
located in the peripheries of the city. In the 1990s many in San Martín de los Andes
started to see Pocahullo as a space in which they could participate and mobilize to press
the local government for improvements in the provision of public services, such as
drinking water, sewers, and natural gas. Furthermore, it was through this presence in the
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The Unión Cívica Radical party was the main opposition party to the Movimiento Popular Neuquino.
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The workers of Pocahullo received their income from advertising as well as from fundraising events
within the local community. Many of its volunteers also had other more steady sources of income. Some
volunteers, for example, were taxi drivers and elementary school teachers. Thus, when funds were scarce
Pocahullo co-operative members tended to help those who solely depended on the radio for their income.
The contributions to those in need were decided in assemblies.
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poor neighbourhoods that Pocahullo started assuming a central role in the social
organization and mobilization of the urban poor. In time, Mapuche communities in the
region started seeing Pocahullo as a powerful communication tool as well, particularly
when they faced their own struggles to secure control over the territories they currently
use or inhabit.
As mentioned above, San Martin de los Andes is one of the most important centres of
tourism in Northern Patagonia. Chapelco, for instance, is one of the well-known ski
resorts in the area, attracting thousands of international and national tourists all year long.
But Mapuche communities living nearby, in an ancestral territory that includes Chapelco,
have hardly benefited from the influx of tourism. On the contrary, some Mapuche
families from the Curruhuinca community have been directly affected by contaminants
coming from the ski resort. Some of these families live downstream by the Quitrahue
Creek that passes through Chapelco and Curruhuinca territory. For many years, these
families have been mobilizing to bring awareness to tourists about the high levels of
pollutants found in the creek, and the problems these cause to them. Such mobilizations
have included mass protests and road blockages, particularly on the way to the ski resort.
Pocahullo has served as an important vehicle for social communication and mobilization,
amplifying the awareness of such conflicts in other communities, which in turn have
learned about and joined the ongoing protest. Thus, small-scale Pocahullo has had an
important role in fostering a collective Mapuche identity by serving as a key tool for
connecting different communities in the area. In fact, a first step to consolidate the
political project of Pocahullo was the installation of the Red de Comunicación Rural
(Rural Communication Network), which consisted in bringing small radio equipment to
each rural community and organizing workshops to show residents how to operate them.
Each station, in turn, was connected to Pocahullo and served as an important tool for
rural communities to stay informed and reach for help in moments of need, from extreme
weather conditions in the winter to road blockages to voice political demands (La Vaca
2005).
Using World Bank and state-sponsored DCI project funds to support the transformation
of Pocahullo into Wajzugun, Mapuche activists created a new tool to facilitate their
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mobilization and organization around territorial autonomy and also to consolidate the
work done by Pocahullo to consolidate popular, local networks. Given the historical
background of Pocahullo, the establishment of Wajzugun also served Mapuche activists
to consolidate political alliances with community leaders and other social movements. By
facilitating the communication amongst remote Mapuche communities in the region,
Wajzugun served the political purpose of activists and facilitated their mobilization. In
practice, the establishment of Wajzugun had an impact on three specific areas. The first
visible impact, once funds became available, was the construction of a new building to
host the new radio station. Located near the city’s downtown, a place visited by
thousands of tourists every year, Wajzugun’s bulding serves as a reminder of Mapuche
presence in the area. More importantly, this new space was constructed not only to hold
the new equipment to run the radio station but the building also holds offices and other
meeting rooms that serve Mapuche and non-Mapuche activists in the region. On its
second floor, the two-story building offers a space to accommodate overnight guests thus
facilitating its use as a place of political gathering. In the context of long distances and
lack of this type of infrastructure, the availability of a new building as a space for
gathering and organizing has served Mapuche activists to coordinate their efforts more
effectively. The second major impact of the transformation of Pocahullo into Wajzugun
relates to the increased in funding for Mapuche activists and Pocahullo co-op. Given the
financial constraints under which Pocahullo operated in the past, the extra funding
channelled to Wajzugun served to increase the pay of its workers. Furthermore, the
establishment of Wajzugun took place in the context of the passing of Law 26522 by
Congress in 2009. While controversial, this media services law has set up the new
framework under which audio-visual communication licences are given by the state. In
one of its articles, the law establishes the parameters for the granting of new licences to
public universities and indigenous peoples. It also establishes new possibilities for public
funding. While this law’s constitutional standing was challenged in court, Argentina’s
Supreme Court of Justice dictamined its validity in October 2013. When I interviewed
members of Wajzugun in 2009, they linked their efforts to convert Pocahullo into
Wajzugun with the spirit of this federal media law. Given the shifting political alliances
between the Kirchner administration and social movements, by 2013 it is difficult to see
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whether continuing financial support to projects like Wajzugun will persist if they do not
adopt a pro-government stance. In other words, the future of Wajzugun as a political tool
of Mapuche activism is uncertain. The third and final visible impact of Wajzugun relates
to the consolidation of the radio station as an intercultural, popular project that serves not
only the purpose of advancing Mapuche claims for territorial autonomy but also
objectives held by other social groups, such as local unions, the poor, and unemployed.
Taken together, these three visible impacts the emergence of Wajzugun created have
taught Mapuche activists important lessons in terms of the possibilities that exist when
appropriating existing state-supported opportunities for their political claims.

5.4 Conclusions

This chapter has discussed the ways in which Mapuche activists engage with the new
opportunities for participation that become available to them. What is clear is that these
opportunities are often the result of their own mobilization and work with other social
activists. In other words, indigenous activists may be “invited” to participate but only
after they mobilize for their own political goal of territorial autonomy, as the case of
Neuquén’s constitutional assembly, the Lanin National Park co-management project, and
the appropriation of a development project goals illustrate. Mobilization, however, does
not always result in accommodation and recognition of indigenous rights.
As the following chapter shows, multicultural citizenship and the recognition of new
spaces for indigenous participation do not always entail the decolonization of state
practices, resource redistribution, or social justice. Mapuche struggles to secure control
over the territories and resources they rely on seem to mark the limits of neoliberal
multiculturalism in Northern Patagonia. By demanding collective rights to territory and
challenging the state as a pueblo nación originario, Mapuche activists attempt to
challenge the limitations of neoliberal multiculturalism. The chapter also describes
aspects of the strategy of land occupation by Mapuche activists to pressure the state for
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further recognition of territorial autonomy as well as the state’s reaction and
criminalization of indigenous demands. The contradictions of neoliberal multiculturalism
thus become evident through the reluctance of state practices to recognize and secure
indigenous control over the territories they use or inhabit. In fact, since Mapuche activists
have adopted the strategy of supporting recuperaciones territoriales (territorial reoccupations), it has become evident that the politics of multicultural tolerance embedded
in neoliberalized forms of indigenous citizenship have reached a limit.
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Chapter 6

6

Territorial autonomy in times of neoliberal
multiculturalism

Throughout this dissertation, I have been arguing that contemporary Mapuche politics in
Northern Patagonia must be understood as a process that involves negotiation as well as
ongoing conflict with the state. In some contexts, those instances of negotiation and
conflict lead to particular forms of accommodation and new spaces for indigenous
participation within the institutional structure of the state. Furthermore, territorial
autonomy must be seen as a central component of indigenous citizenship claims (Yashar
2005) and the consolidation of neoliberal multiculturalism (Hale 2002). As the previous
chapter has shown, there are instances when new spaces of indigenous participation
offered by the neoliberal citizenship regime (often as a result of indigenous mobilization)
have been relevant for Mapuche activists in their quest for territorial autonomy and
cultural recognition. The fact that those spaces are offered as a result of political
mobilization makes them an interesting point of departure for analyzing how Mapuche
activists respond once they are “invited” to participate. However, Mapuche activism
today is not limited to these spaces. In the context of the expansion of extractive
industries in Northern Patagonia since the 1990s, Mapuche communities have been
involved in defending the territories they use or inhabit and in demanding the recognition
by the state of new places as Mapuche territory to secure control over them.
The mobilization around demands and protection of territory is also, as Karen Engle
(2010) suggests, a way for indigenous peoples to attach the defence of a territory to their
existence as peoples, a connection that neoliberal multiculturalism attempts to break.
Engle argues, for example, that legal mechanisms and other attempts to defend
indigenous culture often fail to realize that tolerance vis-à-vis cultural heritage does not
address, “the underlying economic, social, and political inequalities of which indigenous
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peoples generally bear the brunt” (2010, 143). In other words, indigenous culture is often
defended, under neoliberal multiculturalism, as what she calls “intangible” heritage,
ignoring the fact that land (and the conflicts that surround it) forms the material basis of
indigenous cosmologies. Moreover, the author argues that while some indigenous
activists have engaged in pursuing the protection of cultural heritage, “they have not
acquired the type of self-determination or autonomy that indigenous movements have
sought since at least the 1970s” (2010, 148). Furthermore, Engle suggests that, “to the
extent that intangible heritage contains a relatively “thin” concept of culture (e.g., dress,
festivals, art, and the like), it falls well short of constituting a threat to the neoliberal,
multicultural state” (2010, 149). The author concludes that these regimes of protection
have a “disciplinary effect” in which, echoing the work of Charles Hale, any attempts to
“transgress the boundaries of neoliberal multiculturalism” end with isolation and
dismissal provoking a separation of cultural heritage from “the very indigenous peoples
from whom it is thought to emanate” (2010, 149).
This chapter elaborates on the political strategy of land reoccupations carried out by
Mapuche communities as a way to activate their claims for territorial autonomy. The
chapter also focuses on the main state response to this strategy, namely, the
criminalization of Mapuche demands, including arrests, imprisonment, and violence. The
goal of this chapter is two-fold: first, to show how Mapuche collective identity is shaped
in this context of ongoing conflict; and, second, to show how the limitations of neoliberal
multiculturalism operate in specific settings. With this discussion I hope to explore how
the collective political identity of the Mapuche is embedded in a broader political context
of changing citizenship regimes and state forms of government over indigenous peoples.
The chapter begins by addressing the centrality of territorial claims for indigenous
peoples as well as the significance that Mapuche activists give to the notion of territory.

6.1 The centrality of territorial claims
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In Northern Patagonia, struggles over territorial autonomy shape Mapuche collective
identity and inform the ways in which political organization takes place. Furthermore,
Mapuche activists today see territory as essential for their survival as a pueblo nación
originario. Their demands for increasing control over the territories they use or inhabit
and for recognition of territories they claim as ancestral land place Mapuche activists at
odds with state institutions. Nonetheless, they engage with the state in negotiations
hoping that the conditions for securing territorial autonomy will be met sooner or later.
And this is precisely the tension that exists today between states and Mapuche activists.
On the one hand, the state and Mapuche activists create opportunities that build upon
notions of indigenous participation, multiculturalism, and interculturalidad. On the other,
however, when Mapuche activists carry out their claims for territorial autonomy (via land
reoccupations) the state reacts by criminalizing the demands and by tightening the
boundaries of legitimacy of indigenous claims. Such boundaries of legitimacy or what is
and what is not legitimate to claim are compatible with the limitations acknowledged in
neoliberal multiculturalism and neoliberal regimes of citizenship. These limitations
include the politicization of indigenous peoples that may challenge both state power and
its smooth incorporation to global capitalism.
The new generation of Mapuche activists that consolidated their leadership in the 1980s
and 1990s has constantly argued that the formation of the modern state in Argentina is a
direct result of the dispossession of Mapuche territories and of the genocide of their
people in the late nineteenth century. The twentieth century, they argue, witnessed
repeated attempts by the state to incorporate their communities as subordinate to other
social sectors, and has excluded them from the political order. As one Mapuche activist
pointed out, in the 1970s urban Mapuche living in Neuquén city realized that in order to
conduct new claims to the state they would need to strengthen their ties with their
“territories.” By these territories, activists meant Mapuche rural communities, including,
but not limited to, those that were recognized as such by the provincial government.
As explained in previous chapters, indigenous reserves or communities in Neuquén were
officially recognized in the 1960s. This recognition came in part as a result of the
regrouping of Mapuche families that took place in the first half of the twentieth century.
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While in some cases these regroupings were a voluntary act in the aftermath of violent
confrontation with the national army, in some cases Mapuche families were forced to live
in areas determined by the state. The de-territorialization through military campaigns, and
re-territorialization in reservations of Mapuche families always responded to the need of
state institutions to govern Mapuche subjects. In the 1960s, for example, the
establishment of Mapuche reservations throughout the province responded to the need for
the Movimiento Popular Neuquino (MPN) to keep direct channels of communication
with rural populations to guarantee their ongoing political support, especially during
elections. The relationship between Mapuche communities and the MPN, however, also
needs to be understood in the wider context of a new relationship between the state and
“the people” that was being forged a few years earlier under Peronism. Furthermore, by
the late 1970s these communities and other areas of southern Argentina where Mapuche
families lived were increasingly exposed to new forms of capital accumulation.
In particular, the impact of the decreasing importance of cattle raising for the regional
economy that began in the 1940s – a predominant economic activity for Mapuche
families –was mitigated with the discovery of oil wells in 1977. Since then, the
government adopted development strategies in the province that included support for
mega-development efforts in the form of large dams which attracted labourers from
outside the province, the intensification of mining operations, and the expansion of
tourism. A few years later, these changes in capitalist accumulation and development
programs converged with the new economic strategies that began taking place with the
first set of neoliberal policies under the military dictatorship (1976-1983). The
privatization of some of these extractive industries, particularly those related to
hydrocarbons, mining, and hydro-electricity that took place in the 1990s resulted in a new
sense of political urgency for Mapuche activists and their communities. Territories were
now conceived as a fundamental part of Mapuche identity. Thus, contemporary claims
for territorial autonomy should be understood in light of the intensification of extractive
industries in Northern Patagonia as well as the ways in which Mapuche activists engage,
resist, and negotiate with the state.
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In attempting to look at the ways in which the political organization and mobilization of
the Mapuche in Northern Patagonia takes place around the struggle for territorial
autonomy, this chapter builds on the examination of the multiple ways in which the
neoliberalization of state expectations and practices towards indigenous activism affects
Mapuche communities when they adopt strategies of territorial re-occupation that have
become central to Mapuche activism in present-day Neuquén. I begin by briefly outlining
the ways in which Mapuche activists have linked a collective political identity with
claims for territorial autonomy. The chapter then looks into two interrelated processes
that are experienced in the everyday life of Mapuche communities and their leaders: first,
I look into the strategy of recuperaciones (land re-occupations) carried out by the
communities themselves and supported by activists in order to materialise their quest for
territorial autonomy. In this section, I provide some details on two cases that gained the
attention of Mapuche and non-Mapuche alike not only in Neuquén but at the national
level. Second, I explore the criminalization of Mapuche politics, thus illustrating the
practical limitations activists, their organizations, and community members face when
they attempt to actualie their demands that exceed expected institutional compliance.

6.2 Mapuche claims for territorial autonomy as a new
politics of place

Under a new leadership and armed with novel understandings of the political based on
Mapuche ways of knowing, activists within the Confederación Mapuche de Neuquén
have been embarking on a mode of mobilization that privileges the defense of what they
call “ancestral territories.” While contemporary Mapuche activism in Northern Patagonia
has focused on the recognition of new indigenous, collective rights and an increasing
participation within state institutions, mobilization has also entailed a politics of
recuperaciones territoriales (territorial re-occupations). In the context of resource
extractivism, for example, Mapuche activists and communities have adopted reoccupation strategies as a way to secure more meaningful negotiations around territorial
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autonomy. In doing this, they are engaged in a new “politics of place” (Escobar,
Rocheleau, and Kothari 2002). In Territories of Difference, anthropologist Arturo
Escobar argues that place is “an important source of culture and identity” (2008, 7) in
which most people around the world find a sense of groundedness and boundaries. In
doing so, Escobar argues, people give meaning to their everyday lives (2008, 30).
Furthermore, places and their defence, are important in the lives of most people today as
they face the expansion of globalized forms of capital accumulation and the development
of extractivism. In this context, some places become new targets and assume new value
under these development strategies. As geographer Sarah Radcliffe has shown, the
expansion of neoliberalism throughout Latin America has been marked by the existence
of a contradictory tension between recognized collective rights, on the one hand, and
“market-based models for resource access and livelihood” on the other (2005, 325). This
tension is certainly evident in Northern Patagonia today, where the expansion of
“monocultural landscapes” (Escobar 2009) in the form of pine plantations, oil extraction,
gas fracking, and high-end tourism are attracting national as well as transnational capital
and affecting the resource-rich territories Mapuche communities use or inhabit. The
notion of indigenous territories, however, goes beyond a geographical area clearly
separated and isolated from others. In practice, indigenous activists conceive their
territories as a set of social relations between the different elements of nature and not
merely as an area that can be neatly mapped out:
“Territory is a ‘social, cultural, and ecological space’. It does not depend
on sketched lines on a map. Therefore, it includes all things that belong to
the land: water; sub-soil; air space; its occupants; plants; animals; and
all other resources located in it. [The notion of territory] is not limited to
lands that are permanently occupied. On the contrary, it includes those
lands used for everyday activities. As a ‘habitat,’ it includes all social and
cultural aspects. This characteristic, in turn, gives a territory the public
(political) dimension of indigenous ownership” (Juan M. Salgado, quoted
by CMN 2010, 25).
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For activists, defending the territories that are claimed, used, or inhabited by the
communities is central to the survival of the Mapuche as a pueblo nación originario:
“The authorities of each community and the Confederación Mapuche de
Neuquén are the entities that have conducted the process of recognition
and defense of those rights that have been silenced and systematically
denied by the state, particularly the fundamental right to a territory, which
is a central demand of Mapuche peoples. The absence of a territory
prevents the practice of other rights related to the life and existence of our
peoples” (CMN 2010, 19).
Conceived as such, territories are seen as a source of livelihood and culture. From this
conception of territory, Mapuche activists have imagined specific kvme felen (life
projects), which include self-representation, interculturalidad, and a collective identity:
“It is important to explain and understand the meaning of kvme felen for
the Mapuche peoples. Guiding principles emerge from this notion so each
territorial identity [e.g., communities] can have a framework of reference
to design their own [life] plans. As we have argued, our projection as
peoples requires the defense of territories that we traditionally inhabit and
the exercise of autonomy as nación originaria (indigenous nation).
Peoples, territory, and autonomy are the principles that make possible our
kvme felen” (CMN 2010, 33).
Furthermore, a territory is a space for consolidating traditional Mapuche rakizuam
(thinking) and kimvn (knowledge) in order to secure kvme felen or buen vivir (the good
life). Thus, Mapuche activism, as carried out by organizations such as the Confederación
Mapuche de Neuquén, entails what Escobar characterizes as “the defense of place-based
conceptions of the world and practices or world making” (2008, 67). Nonetheless, this
form of activism that defends a particular construction of place (i.e., “Mapuche ancestral
territories”) is continuously reorganized, redefined, and framed according to specific
power struggles. By organizing around claims for territorial autonomy as a pueblo nación
orginario, Mapuche activists are able to form a politics of place in which they assert a
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new logic of difference and possibilities vis-à-vis mainstream society and the state that
have rendered Mapuche peoples invisible.
The alternatives offered by this form of political activism to legitimize indigenous
territories are open-ended. It is also impossible to determine what will occur if and when
Mapuche communities reach an acceptable point of control over the territories they use or
inhabit. But for now, Mapuche activism is focused on securing higher levels of control
over these territories with the hope of recasting the full enjoyment of a kvme felen.
Therefore, the urgency of land re-occupations, Mapuche activists insist, has to do with
the realization that rights recognition and more spaces for participation within state
institutions do not guarantee an end to the logic of capital accumulation and extractivism
and their impact on natural resources located in their territories. Thus, taking advantage
of the offers presented to them under neoliberal multiculturalism does not mean
abandoning other forms of activism. The politics of territorial re-occupations is a case in
point.

6.3 Testing the limits of neoliberal multiculturalism: the
politics of recuperaciones territoriales
The further exposure of Northern Patagonia to new forms of capitalist accumulation since
the 1990s has affected the ways in which rivers, forests, tourist attractions, and land are
conceived in the region. Indeed ownership over some of these resources has become one
of the most prominent sources of contestation. Private interests, state institutions, and
Mapuche communities often find themselves in permanent conflict over the goals for
such places. For Mapuche activists, the need to mobilize to defend, secure access to, and
control territories their communities use or inhabit comes from this pressure of capitalist
interests in the area. Such pressure manifests itself as the ongoing extension of latifundios
(large estates), resource extraction (e.g., oil extraction, mining), and high-end tourism.
Mobilizing to secure collective ownership and control over these territories under a
Mapuche cosmovision (i.e., kvme felen) becomes, for activists, the best way to challenge
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the advance of capitalist expansion over the places they use and inhabit. In practice, it
also entails the building of a new political collective identity as Mapuche mobilization
enters into a phase of negotiation, accommodation, and conflict with state institutions
(e.g., courts, police, National Parks, Social Development agencies, legislative bodies).
For Mapuche activists, territory is an inherent part of their condition as peoples and as
such, this notion extends beyond a narrow focus on land. As such, the idea of indigenous
territory escapes reductionist appeals to individual or even collective ownership because,
under Mapuche understanding, territory challenges the logic of capitalist accumulation
and property regimes embedded in it. Furthermore, the right to a territory for the
Mapuche cannot be understood in separation from the ways in which they conceive the
relationship between nature and ce (peoples): human beings are conceived as a
fundamental part of nature and are responsible for keeping environmental balance in
nature, not above it (CMN 2008). One activist puts it in these terms:
“[Autonomy and control over ancestral territories] is a fundamental
question for us because it sustains the political project of the
Confederación Mapuche de Neuquén. The key objective is the recognition
as peoples. We believe that by securing the recognition of the
Confederación as a political and juridical subject we shall be able to
claim the implementation of our collective rights by the state […] Our
understanding is that there are no ‘peoples’ if there is no development
over a territory. We have to break away from the concept of land. The
state reduces the concept of land to the surface and only focuses on the
boundaries of a community. The state does not want to recognize the more
integral concept of a territory. A territory includes not only the resources
of the soil but also all its biodiversity. Today’s dispute and resistance to
the political claims of the Mapuche has nothing to do with culture. It is a
question of economic interests. At the centre of those interests, we find
natural resources” (AZ, Interview 2009).
The mobilization around territorial autonomy is also, according to Mapuche activists, an
issue of cultural vindication as well as self-defence against the advance of corporate
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private interests over their territories. When the CMN and the communities start to adopt
the tactic of recuperaciones in the 1990s, they successfully capture the attention of
government officials, the local and national media, and society in general. Facing strong
opposition from the provincial government, the local media and business groups, a main
challenge for the Mapuche is to link these territorial re-occupations to the broader issues
affecting everyday life of women and men living in rural communities. Furthermore,
while Mapuche struggles were initially framed in terms of human rights and social justice
in the 1970s and 1980s, they have been recently reframed as indigenous rights, reflecting
in part changes in local and international legislation and discourses. Organizing around
territorial re-occupation takes a considerable amount of coordinated effort on the part of
Mapuche communities and urban activists. Given the structure of an organization like the
Confederación Mapuche de Neuquén (CMN), activists learn about local and regional
historical grievances and circumstances that eventually translate into a decision by a
community (or group of communities) to start a process of territorial re-occupation.
While generalizations are not always pertinent to understand how the conversation
between community representatives and urban activists within the CMN are conducted,
activists acknowledge that they often start with a community informing CMN leaders
about their decision to re-occupy a given territory. Activists often respond by supporting
the community’s claims, discuss specific aspects of the strategy (e.g., when to begin the
re-occupation, how to mobilize supporters, how to address the media), and link the
specific territorial re-occupation with a “global politics of the Mapuche peoples” and with
“more structural questions, such as our relationship with the state” (AZ, Interview 2009).
Re-occupations in Northern Patagonia began soon after the reorganization of the CMN
under new leadership in the 1990s. An exhaustive overview and study of all territorial reoccupations taking place in Neuquén alone exceeds the objective of this chapter. Indeed,
most of the 57 Mapuche communities in Neuquén are involved in one way or another in
some territorial dispute. And some communities are involved in more than one dispute.
The following section focuses on what Carasco and Briones (1996) called a
“paradigmatic” case: Pulmarí. After introducing the conflict of Pulmarí, I link it to one of
the more recent cases of territorial reoccupation in the same area of the province, near the
town of Aluminé. By focusing on the events that took place in 2009 in the community of
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Quillén-Currumil, my objective is to illustrate the ways in which the strategy of territorial
re-occupation takes place in practice.

6.3.1

Pulmarí

The re-occupation of Pulmarí in the mid-1990s was, according to Carrasco and Briones
(1996), one of the most “paradigmatic” cases of the new logic of organization and
mobilization of Mapuche activists in Neuquén. Similarly, the response by the state (and
government officials) also served to illuminate the limitations encountered by indigenous
mobilization under multicultural neoliberalism. As territorial re-occupations have become
more prevalent in the new century, it is pertinent to reflect on the experience of Pulmarí
to understand what adopting a new collective political identity has meant for Mapuche
activists in practice.
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The re-occupation of Pulmarí is significant for historical reasons.
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Indeed, the

establishment of Pulmarí illustrates very clearly some of the strategies adopted by the
state in relation to the newly conquered territories after the military campaigns in the socalled Conquest of the Desert. For the Mapuche living in this region of Neuquén, Pulmarí
has had an important place in collective memory. Before the arrival of the national army,
communities in the region used this territory as a transit zone, connecting lof
(communities) from puelmapu (east of the Andes) and gulumapu (west of the Andes).

101

Located in the Department of Aluminé in the province of Neuquen, the area of Pulmari has an extent of
approximately 113,000 hectares. 67,9000 hectares are under the jurisdiction of the federal government as
these lands have been transferred to the army. The remaining 45,000 hectares are under provincial
jurisdiction, forming the Natural Reserve of Ñorquinco. The Corporación Interestadual Pulmarí (CIP)
currently administers these 45,000 hectares. The CIP, created in the late 1980s, has been the centre of
intense negotiation, conflict, and accommodation between the provincial government of Neuquén, the
federal government, Mapuche communities (Currumil, Catalán, Aigo, Plácido Puel, Ñorquinco and
Hienguihual), and activists.
102

According to Curruhuinca-Roux (1984), the Mapuche living in Pulmarí established sporadic contact
with religious missions around 1680. The region remained under Mapuche control until the late nineteenth
century, serving as a key area of communication between the gulumapu (West of the Andes) and puelmapu
(east of the Andes). In the 1850s, the region was under the political authority of longko Kajfvkura (see
Chapter 3).
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The Conquest of the Desert ended this use with the usurpation of the land from the
Mapuche. Some of the immediate consequences of the military campaigns included the
donation of some of these lands to high-rank army officials, their use as a form of
payment to British investors who provided loans to carry out the conquest, or selling
these lands in public auctions. Most of Pulmarí’s territory thus ended up in the hands of
the Compañía Estancia Los Ingleses S.A., a British investment group interested in the
logging industry. The estancia (large estate) remained in private hands until the 1940s,
when the federal government under General Perón expropriated and nationalized
Pulmarí, transferring it to National Parks jurisdiction before placing it under the control
of the national army. The main use of the territory was to raise mules but it also had a
strategic location given its proximity to the border with Chile. An additional particularity
of Pulmarí has been its status as an area under federal jurisdiction (i.e., national army) in
a territory that became the province of Neuquén in 1955. Throughout this process, many
Mapuche families were forcefully displaced to other areas nearby thus forming some of
the communities that were recognized by Neuquén’s government in 1964. Carrasco and
Briones (1996) have shown how the lands given to these communities were scarce and of
inadequate quality for Mapuche families to sustain their livelihood. Mapuche activists
claim that since then, the communities living in the region have held onto the hope of
having Pulmarí back. However, as military dictatorships continued to control the political
life of Argentina, the hopes of recovering Pulmarí remained only as a distant goal.
As explained earlier, the return to democratic rule in 1983 provided a more adequate
context for a new generation of Mapuche leaders to begin a process of re-organization
and mobilization. This process culminated in the early 1990s with their control of the
Confederación Mapuche, an organization created decades earlier with the support of the
provincial government, the Catholic Church, and Mapuche families. The Alfonsín
administration’s (1983-1989) decision to gradually transfer control of Pulmarí to the
Mapuche communities living in the region raised expectations. In 1988, the federal and
provincial governments ratified the creation of the Corporación Interestadual Pulmarí
(CIP), a public corporation with provincial and federal representation. According to the
Pulmarí Statute, its main goal was,
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“… The exploitation of properties located under its jurisdiction or those
which are placed under its administration by legal mechanism. This
administration can be conducted in activities such as: agro-forestry;
cattle; mining; industrial; commercial; and tourism. [Its goal is to
facilitate] the development of the province of Neuquén and,
fundamentally, the indigenous communities of the area: Catalan; Aigo;
Puel; and Currumil. The Corporation, with the specific activities
mentioned notwithstanding, will keep under its jurisdiction the necessary
spaces to attend to the operational necessities of the Argentinean army
and contribute to its logistical supplies” (CIP 1988, quoted in Carrasco
and Briones 1996, 165).
In practice, however, activists have noted that the Corporación Interestadual Pulmarí
simply consolidated the control of the state over these territories, subordinating the needs
of Mapuche communities to the imperatives of private interests. In administering
Pulmarí, for example, the CIP is entitled to give concessions to private business.
Furthermore, a series of fraudulent concessions and the ongoing denial of meaningful
benefits to Mapuche communities created the bases for the territorial conflicts in the mid1990s.
Representation within the CIP also became a contentious issue between the province,
federal government, and Mapuche activists. According to the CIP’s statute, a board of
eight directors must decide how the Corporation is to make use of the spaces under its
jurisdiction. The members of the board represent different jurisdictions: two from the
Ministry of Defence; one from the Ministry of Finance; one from the Army, three from
the provincial government and one representing Mapuche communities. An issue of
contention emerged when the provincial government was, in practice, appointing the
Mapuche representative, a clear violation of the CIP’s statute. Indeed, from 1989 to 1995
the provincial government and Mapuche communities were in constant conflict over the
selection of a legitimate representative for the Mapuche. The contention also involved
allegations of corruption on the part of the government-appointed representative. In
addition, more conflicts emerged in relation to the communities that had the right to be

185

represented in the CIP. While the statute of the CIP considered only four communities
(Aigo, Currumil, Catalán and Puel), Mapuche leaders started to demand the recognition
of two other communities: Salazar and Ñorquinco (Moyano 2007).
The immediate causes that explain the Mapuche decision to re-occupy territories in
Pulmarí can be found in the restrictive criteria used by the Corporación Interestadual
Pulmarí in granting Mapuche communities access to use Pulmarí lands for grazing. The
need to re-occupy Pulmarí seemed more urgent, according to Mapuche activists, given
the restrictions under which non-Mapuche residents (and private businesses) were
granted such access and given more generous deals (e.g., financial loans). Furthermore,
Mapuche communities were often charged a fee to access grazing pastures, to collect
wood for stoves, or to gather piñones (nuts from the Pewen tree). The latter point is
significant because collecting piñones constitutes a tradition of community building
amongst the Mapuche (Carrasco and Briones 1996).
Facing the lack of access to pasture lands for their cattle, a main source of income for the
community, the communities decided to act. Urban Mapuche activists decided to support
the re-occupation, reminding all Mapuche and non-Mapuche alike that, as things stand,
life in the communities is not ideal. Limited to a scant extension of inadequate land, cattle
produce the quick degradation of soil. In the harsh winters of Patagonia, conditions get
worse as Mapuche families do not have access to mallines, an area of permanent or
temporary fertile soil located at lower altitudes. However, estancieros (large estate
owners) or government corporations often occupy these areas. As a result, cattle owned
by the Mapuche often die. To avoid this, Mapuche families are forced to continuously
move the cattle back and forth during the summer and winter. Even the Mapuche who
carry out this practice, locally known as trashumancia, see it as abusive to animals, as it
exposes animals to starvation, intense cold, and death. During the summer, for example,
cattle must be taken to valleys or lands located in higher altitudes. In the winter, cattle are
taken to valleys or lowlands. Mapuche families also talk about the burdens that this
practice places on their families. Given the constant need for helping hands, many
teenagers, including boys and girls, do not continue with their education beyond primary
school.
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The conflict in Pulmarí was paradigmatic because despite sporadic episodes of social
protest, the federal government under the Carlos Menem administration (1989 – 1999)
did not encounter an all-encompassing social mobilization that challenged the legitimacy
of the neoliberal policies it was advancing until the second half of the 1990s. Needless to
say, Argentinean governments rarely confronted the mobilization of indigenous peoples
as such. While the global financial crises of the mid-1990s affected the Argentinean
version of neoliberalism severely, it was the deterioration of social welfare and the
increasing mobilization of the unemployed and other social sectors that helped break the
legitimacy of the neoliberal policies governments supported. Thus, Mapuche
mobilization in the mid-1990s must be understood in this context of increasing social
mobilization, particularly in the provinces where the socio-economic crisis hit the hardest
(Salta and Jujuy in the north and Neuquén in the south).
After many requests to meet with representatives of the Corporación Pulmarí (CIP) went
unanswered and the suspicion of wrongdoing in the allocation of concessions to private
interests increased, the Mapuche communities of Aigo and Salazar, supported by CMN
activists, occupied CIP headquarters in May 1995. Their immediate demand consisted of
the right to access pasture lands in the winter and in its response, the provincial
government agreed to grant access to some areas of Pulmarí (Lolen, Chichería, and
Piedra Gaucha) for the communities. The occupation of CIP headquarters came to an end.
A few months later, with the imminent arrival of winter, the communities of the Pulmarí
area decided to re-occupy the areas of Piedra Gaucha, Lolén and Chichería after the
CIP’s promise to access this zone never materialized (Carrasco and Briones 1996). This
time, the communities brought their cattle. Under a new leadership, these communities
were able to justify their actions in terms of a “re-occupation of ancestral territories” that
have historically belonged to the Mapuche. The Confederación Mapuche, now in an open
confrontation with the provincial government, was able to provide some of the logistics
for the recuperation of Pulmarí and also certain guidelines to conduct the re-occupation
according to ceremonial Mapuche practices. The use of the wenu foye, the flag used by
Mapuche organizations in Chile, was an important example. The flag had been recently
adopted by the CMN to emphasize a collective identity of the Mapuche as a pueblo
nación originario that extends beyond international borders. The re-occupation also
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strengthened the Mapuche as a pueblo nación originario, according to activists,
particularly through the consolidation of xawvn (community meetings) and
“political/philosophical authorities” (e.g., logko, inan-logko, werken, kona).
The events of 1995 were only the initial stages of a conflict over Pulmarí that continues
until today. They are significant because Pulmarí was the first case of a territorial reoccupation conducted by Mapuche communities and supported by CMN activists under a
new leadership. The Pulmarí conflict has re-emerged ten years later. In 2006, Mapuche
communities and the Confederación Mapuche decided to re-occupy another area of
Pulmarí. In the ten years between the first re-occupation and the events of 2006, Mapuche
communities and activists have faced eviction orders, criminal charges for usurpation,
and setbacks in negotiating with government authorities the terms under which the reoccupation could come to an end. When eviction orders were carried out, Mapuche
communities responded with public demonstrations and more re-occupations (e.g.,
Pampa India, in 2000, La Cuyana, in 2003). Meanwhile, the conflict of Pulmarí has, since
then, been addressed primarily through the courts. This later point, related to the
increasing criminalization of Mapuche mobilization, is developed below.
The re-occupation of parts of Pulmarí since 1995 is important in the process of Mapuche
organization and mobilization for a number of reasons. First, some Mapuche
communities were eventually allowed to stay in some areas, and this relative success of
Pulmarí provided some confidence to other communities to continue with the strategy of
re-occupations of ancestral territories. Second, many communities started to come
together and work with similar goals, realizing, for example, that Pulmarí and reoccupations affected them equally. Thus, as a result of the re-occupations, the
communication among communities increased. In some cases, for example, communities
decided to boycott local schools by not sending their children. This decision gained the
support of the provincial teachers union, which proved to be one of the main allies of
Mapuche activists in Neuquén. Finally, Pulmarí has demonstrated how, in practice, the
objectives of urban activists and the needs of communities can converge. This
convergence has been indeed a main goal of the new generation of activists that emerged
in the late 1970s and 1980s. While re-occupations take place in the rural context
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involving primarily the communities affected, the process is sustained and supported by
the Confederación Mapuche, which provides the language of rights to territorial
autonomy. Thus, one of the key elements of contemporary Mapuche activists consists in
linking the immediate, everyday concerns of the communities with the broader goals and
concerns of a pueblo nación originario.

6.3.2

Quillén-Currumil

In 2006, Mapuche communities and activists within the Confederación Mapuche decided
to re-occupy and gain access to over 10,000 hectares of the Pulmarí estates. This time, the
re-occupation began the takeover of the estancia headquarters used by the army. Once
again, the immediate demands included the need of the communities for pasturelands and
the request to the Pulmarí Corporation (CIP) to stop granting concessions to private
interests. These concessions, given for 99 years, were a source of permanent conflict
between the CIP and Mapuche communities. Since the first re-occupations in Pulmarí in
the mid-1990s, many areas remained under the use of Mapuche families (while charges
for usurpation remained in court). In some cases, the CIP eventually acknowledged the
need of some Mapuche communities and established the legitimacy of the occupation.
However, this recognition was legally considered only as another private concession and
not as granting collective ownership for Mapuche communities. The state, in fact,
retained its ownership over these lands. Hence, the political source of the Pulmarí conflict
never dissipated and by 2006 the communities were ready again to revamp their strategy
of territorial re-occupation. With this decision, 54,000 out of the 113,000 hectares that
belong to Pulmarí came under Mapuche control. Since then, Mapuche activists and the
communities have been struggling to secure the legal recognition to this de facto
occupation.
For many years, the re-occupations of Pulmarí have placed Mapuche communities in
direct confrontation with the Pulmarí Corporation as well the provincial and federal
governments over the meaning of Mapuche rights. To some extent, the more recent
decision in August 2009 by the Mapuche community of Quillén-Currumil (Currumil, for
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short) to re-occupy ancestral territories is another phase of the Pulmarí conflict that began
in the mid-1990s. Although the lands under immediate dispute are located outside of the
zone of Pulmarí, the connection to the Pulmarí events has to do with the changes that
took place within the community as the strategies of re-occupation and a new kind of
Mapuche activism, namely the influence of the Confederación Mapuche, expanded into
this area. Lof Currumil is located 10 kilometers southwest of Aluminé and consists of a
group of approximately 60 families, living in an area of 2,603 hectares. Just to place this
number in perspective, the closest estancia (large estate) owned by one family (Estancia
Lagos Mármol) consists of 14,484 hectares. However, Currumil was not involved in the
re-occupations of Pulmarí until the mid-2000s. Currumil, in fact, only adopted the
strategy of re-occupations after the community celebrated a xawvn (community
assembly) where new authorities were elected. After Pulmarí, many members of the
communities began to question the authorities for remaining too close to Neuquén’s
government and the ruling party, the Movmiento Popular Neuquino (MPN). The
intensification of these criticisms and the division of the community between those who
saw a benefit in staying close to the interests of the MPN and those who found in the
activism of the Confederacion Mapuche a more attractive program of action (and
discourse) resulted in a change of authorities and political strategies to negotiate and
resist the state. In the context of the formation of a new kind of Mapuche political
identity, Currumil became one of the most recent examples of what Mapuche families
and new leaders are willing to do in their quest for territorial autonomy. One member of
Currumil refers to the reasons for the decision to carry out the territorial re-occupation in
the following terms:
“If we talk about when the urgency to recuperate our territory emerged,
we can say that the need has always been there. The necessity for
invernada (grazing lands for the winter) is present since they cornered us
here. It is present since the estancieros (large estate owners) have been
encroaching on the territory surrounding us. Some of them have moved
the wire fencing closer to our community. Our parents and our
grandparents also had this urgency. We need pastures for the summer and
the winter […] This feeling of struggle to recuperate our territory has
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been transmitted to us. We all have our putakece (ancestors). They have
transmitted Mapuce kimvn (wisdom) and they have told us that at some
point these territories were free” (AY, Interview 2009).
In June 2009, the immediate motivation behind the decision of the Quillén-Currumil
community to re-occupy the 2,500 hectares located nearby was the need to access grazing
lands:
“In our meetings, we have been discussing our lack of access to winter
pasturelands. We did not know where we would take our cattle. In
previous winters, we could bring some animals to lands that were under
the control of estancieros and they would charge us a determined amount
for each animal. But some families could not afford these fees and this
year we decided not to pay. Other families were not granted access. On
June 24 we planned for a xawvn (meeting) to celebrate our wüñoy
tripantu. On that day, we celebrate the renewal of life. This term literally
means the return of the sun. All nature renews itself. Each newen (force
existing within each element of nature, including humans) has a lethargic
period but with this renewal, they awaken. For us, June 24 is a very
special day. […] When we met, we exchanged our views about the lack of
territory for our community and we heard rumours that estancieros in the
area wanted to start selling off parts of these lands. On that day, we
decided to start a process of re-occupation” (AY, Interview 2009).
For Mapuche activists, territorial re-occupations have special meaning and they have a
place in the ways of knowing the world. This strategy also serves to consolidate ongoing
processes of Mapuche identity formation:
“On that morning of the re-occupation I was in the town. Someone called
me and told me that there was a surprise and that I should come to
Currumil. I never imagined that the community would finally carry out the
recuperation. When we arrived at our community ruka we noticed that it
was empty. And then we noticed that our flag was in the area under re-

191

occupation. My friend and I started to cry. We knew what this meant.
When we went there, we saw many families of Currumil. […] We
remained in that place for two months. We built a new ruka, which is the
first thing a Mapuche does when we recuperate part of our territory. A
ruka is an important part of the everyday life of a Mapuche. By building a
ruka, we officially recognize an area as Mapuche territory. We recognize
that space as our own. This came to an end two months later, on August
25th” (AY, Interview 2009).
Another recent cause of the conflict was the delay in fulfilling national legislation that
mandates provincial authorities to closely study the needs for territory of indigenous
communities and an examination of all ownership titles of the lands in conflict. The claim
for these lands, however, has been historical. Indeed, many families within the
community recall the time when they were able to access these lands and use them during
the winter for feeding their cattle. The area was also an important meeting space for
different Mapuche communities surrounding the region. With nearly 2,500 hectares of
breathtaking scenery but poor soil conditions for feeding their cattle, the QuillénCurrumil community could no longer endure the burden of having to pay for the use of
lands for pasture to private landowners of the area. Such was the practice before the reoccupation. From their perspective, the right of the Mapuche to territorial autonomy and
the lack of response by the state on the matter justify their decision to occupy those lands.
But the re-occupation of Estancia Podestá was short-lived.
On August 25 2009, for the first time since the self-proclaimed “Conquest of the Desert”
in which the national army ended the de facto indigenous autonomy in northern
Patagonia, elite forces of the provincial police entered the officially recognized territory
of a Mapuche community in response to their attempt to re-occupy the adjacent estancia,
currently under private ownership (Estancia Podestá). Members of Currumil argue that
parts of the territory under dispute have been illegally taken from the community
throughout the years. While evictions took place in the past, Mapuche activists recollect
that this was the first time that security forces entered the territory of any community
officially recognized by the state. Moreover, it was the first time traditional authorities
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(e.g., logko, werken) were arrested since the Pulmarí events of 1995. For this, the violent
reaction by the police and the incursion into community territory was unexpected. From a
broader perspective, the events of that day were also the result of the increasing climate
of violence that local private interests and their alliance with the government are creating
around Mapuche mobilization. Sociedad Rural de Neuquén (Neuquén’s Rural Society),
for example, called on its members (large landowners) to “defend private property with
arms” if necessary and accused Mapuche activists of having links to “terrorist”
organizations (Pagina/12, 2009). The hiring of former police officials to evict Mapuche
communities in other parts of the province, the increasing concerns of a “Mapuche
invasion” into private farms, the increasing criticism of Neuquén’s governor to the
original mandate of the Pulmarí Corporation, and the number of editorials of the main
conservative national newspaper La Nación legitimizing the use of force and the
criminalization of Mapuche occupations have also contributed to shape a tense climate
which places Mapuche communities against a plethora of politically and economically
powerful actors (Consejo Asesor Indígena 2009). Hours after the violent eviction, the
Confederación Mapuche denounced the provincial government in these terms:
“It is urgent that governor Sapag understands and takes responsibility for
what is happening. He is using the worst of options, police violence and
jail, to a rightful and legitimate claim that only has a solution in dialogue.
But there is no ‘social dialogue.’ For the Mapuche, there are only sticks
and prisoners. Sapag declares himself as a ‘slave of the law’ but he
applies the law for one side only, in favour of the Rural Society and land
speculators, interested in their personal interests” (CMN 2009b)
For members of Currumil participating in the re-occupation, the events surrounding the
violent eviction relate to a long history of racial discrimination as well:
“This is the first time they [the police] enter the territory of a recognized
community. It was terrible because they respected no one. When we came
running from the reoccupied territory to our houses in the community, we
saw that the police shot horses and women. We saw how our friend,
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Estela, was shot in the face. And they insulted her. But when we are
defending our rights, we are passionate. We felt strongly about defending
our rights and we faced them. Estela defied them: ‘shoot again, I am not
afraid of you.’ The cop told her: ‘shut up, india de mierda’” (AY,
Interview 2009).
In one sense, the Mapuche of Currumil were defeated in their attempt to re-occupy part of
a territory they have used in the past and need in the present so the cattle, their main
livelihood, do not die. There is nothing glamorous in being brutally repressed, beaten,
taken to a police station with no possibility of reaching legal counsel, and being charged
with trespassing a territory that is the source of Mapuche identity and livelihood. But the
Mapuche I interviewed in Currumil (and other communities as well) often speak of the
ways in which these circumstances help them to prioritize their life in the community,
their political goals, and their relation with the state. In the words of AY,
“On that day, we organized many small ceremonies; we established
contact with our different newen to gather strength. We did this so the
kona (warriors) did not think that we have lost or that we were defeated.
We wanted to do this to give them hope that we had the hope and the
strength to go back (weeping). We fought it hard that day. It was all very
spontaneous. We did not plan for every detail. But if someone saw it from
the outside, someone could think that terrorists have trained us! We all
found our strength that day. We all did our job. I was impressed at the
abilities of those kona riding their horses! They grew up riding horses.
They were impressive. We had no preparation. It came out that way. It
was spontaneous. For one moment, the majority of women had to fight for
the safety of our logko. And the kona were always there to lend us a hand.
(AY, Interview 2009).
Finally, the decision to re-occupy a territorial space often places the community or
communities involved in a position in which this decision has to be defended, even to
activists that are not part of the community. Moments of tension between the
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communities and activists of the Confederacion Mapuche are not new or unexpected.
Indeed, they are part of the ways in which a political identity for the Mapuche is formed.
There is no collective identity that is pre-defined by Mapuche activists without the
participation of the communities and vice-versa. The following episode illustrates the
tensions that can emerge when re-occupation and the violent evictions thereafter are
taking place:
“Each one of us has a role to play […] This role cannot be defined from
the outside. Each lof (community) has its own way of reaching its goals.
Each lof is unique. After all this happened, something ugly happened. I
hope to be able to have a conversation with one CMN activist. When we
met to discuss how we were brutally repressed, that person came off as
trying to impose certain views in an authoritarian manner. We had our
meeting to discuss the recuperation with the Confederación Mapuche.
Many were saying that it was bad that we responded to the police
aggressions by throwing stones. Many people that were not from Currumil
were against this. And this activist tried to impose a pre-establish view.
We did not interpret this as something coming from the CMN, but from
one person. On that occasion, many kona were asking that we say sorry
for what they have done (throw stones). But I ask myself: ‘why are we
apologizing!?’ What happened to us did not happen to any other
community. We did not have an example to follow. At that moment, I
thought that we did not have to apologize. We are defending our territory!
We have to apologize to no one. If we thought that defending our territory
in this way was the right thing to do, so be it. When we speak of autonomy,
we are also speaking of the autonomy of each community. To join the
Confederation does not entail that we say ‘yes’ to everything the
Confederation asks. There has to be disagreement, like in every other
organization. The need to defend that space for disagreement is what
finally led me to become more involved in the politics of my community”
(AY, Interview 2009).
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And finally, AY also points out a possible source of these tensions between urban
activists and the communities, which are important to mention as another dimension of
the politics involved in Mapuche mobilization today:
“I used to think that the main problem is that they [activists] are urban
and that we are ‘Mapuche de territorio’ (from territory). I live in the town
nearby so I was reluctant to become an authority of my community
because I always thought that authorities must live in their territory. But
this new reality makes me be more flexible. We are currently trying to
create a statute of Mapuche autonomy so the wigka (non-Mapuche) does
not have to tell us that because we live in urban spaces we cannot take
part in the decision-making process of the communities. We are now
saying that even if we live in towns, we are still part of our community.
The decision to recuperate territory came from Currumil and that should
be respected. Sometimes, one of the mistakes weken from the CMN make
is that they do not put themselves in the place of the Mapuche who live in
the territories” (AY, Interview 2009).

6.4 Criminalizing Mapuche activism

In Northern Patagonia, contemporary Mapuche mobilization is encountering increasing
levels of police repression in the name of “law and order.” While state repression has
been more constant and visible against the Mapuche in gulumapu (Chile), Neuquén is
experiencing an intensification of conflict around the control and use of the region’s vast
territories (and resources). The events of 2009 in Currumil serve to remind Mapuche
activists that their public demonstrations and re-occupations, even in the context where
spaces for indigenous participation are available, can face violent opposition by state
forces if (when) their demands are deemed illegitimate. In a context of neoliberal
multiculturalism, the analysis of the politics of negotiation, contestation, and
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accommodation in which Mapuche activists are involved must include an overview of the
ways in which Mapuche mobilization has been criminalized by the state. This is the topic
of this sub-section.
The ongoing criminalization of contemporary Mapuche activism can find some of its
sources in the past. In some ways, the possibilities for criminalizing Mapuche demands
are embedded in the politics of “invisibility” towards indigenous peoples that were so
characteristics of the process of state formation in Argentina. In this context, Mapuche
activism is often contested on the basis that their demands are “un-authentic” and that, as
Mapuche, they do not belong in Argentina but in Chile (Briones and Delrio 2009). In
Northern Patagonia, the dichotomy between “authorized” and “unruly” Indians,
characteristic of neoliberal multiculturalism, is being recast in novel ways under the
Kirchner administration, a point that is addressed in the Concluding chapter. In the words
of anthropologist Charles Hale:
“The rise of cultural rights creates a series of authorized spaces, both in
civil society and the state itself, which spokespeople and representatives of
the broader indigenous population come to occupy. They do not
necessarily submit or conform to the state’s purposes; much to the
contrary, they are forced to operate within certain constraints, both
material and symbolic, associated with the spaces themselves. These
spaces carry with them a basic dichotomy between two ways of being
Indian. The authorized Indian has passed the test of modernity, substituted
‘proposal’ for ‘protest,’ and has learned to be both authentic and fully
conversant with the dominant milieu. Its Other is unruly, vindictive, and
prone to conflict” (2006, 220).
For Mapuche activists, the increasing degree of violence coming from state institutions
shows a clear contradiction between the recognition of indigenous rights and the ways in
which they are treated by the courts system. Furthermore, they believe these conflicts
emerge from the tension that exists between Mapuche claims for territorial autonomy and
the emphasis development projects place on extractive activities, high-end tourism, and
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the preservation of privately owned large estates. Indeed, most territories under dispute in
Northern Patagonia have a relation to natural gas reserves, oil extraction, forestry,
tourism, or pasture lands, to name a few. The expansion and consolidation of some of
these practices have indeed pushed the Mapuche to adopt strategies of territorial reoccupation more often as this is the only way they see to slow down the advance of
private interests into territories they claim, use, or inhabit. In other cases, Mapuche
communities like Quillén-Currumil have gone further and have been involved in attempts
to reoccupy lands in order to secure their main source of income, namely by trying to
secure access to pasture land for their cattle.
In the case of Neuquén, the government has responded to Mapuche mobilization under
the leadership of the Confederación Mapuche in two important ways. On the one hand, it
has been using its social policies and the clientelistic networks of its ruling party for
delivering subsidies or handing out items to Mapuche families to cover basic needs (e.g.,
clothing, food items). By doing this, the government has been able to frame Mapuche
demands as a socio-economic problem coming from a population in need of social
assistance. In doing this, the provincial government attempts to bypass intermediary
organizations such as the Confederación, dealing directly with Mapuche families living
in the communities. Mapuche activists often point to the challenges that the government’s
strategy presents, namely, the need to become a meaningful representative of Mapuche
communities in a context of poverty and deprivation in some of the communities. In other
words, Mapuche activists cannot always help Mapuche families to cover their immediate
needs and the government’s welfare assistance programs are a viable alternative for
many. By focusing on social assistance programs, however, the state does not address
Mapuche claims for territorial autonomy and self-representation. This approach is
unsurprisingly embedded in the ways in which provincial and federal governments
government have dealt with social organizations. Indeed, the tendency of populist parties
like the Movimiento Popular Neuquino at a provincial level and the Peronist Party at the
national level to activate the clientelistic apparatus of the state to deal with indigenous
people’s claims has been a constant feature throughout the years.
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What is often open to debate in terms of the populist approach is whether these policies
tend to serve a radical purpose of redistribution or if they are practices that ensure the
political control of the party in power without going beyond ameliorative forms of social
assistance. Within this perspective, governments may respond to Mapuche demands by
offering social assistance and state-funded programmes that promote elements of
Mapuche culture in the market place, such as ethno-tourism or artisan products but
without addressing the claims of territorial autonomy, self-representation, and the
existence of a pueblo nación originario. While an in-depth discussion about the
commodification of Mapuche culture by state-sponsored development projects exceeds
the limits of this chapter, it is pertinent to mention that most local governments in
Northern Patagonia offer some kind of support in the commercialization and promotion
of Mapuche products and have used elements of Mapuche-ness to promote a sense of
provincial identity. This approach, Mapuche activists often claim, encourages them to
look “folkloric” and to look the other way when it comes to claims for territorial
autonomy and self-representation.
The second way in which the state responds to Mapuche claims is by establishing new
limits within which indigenous activism may take place. Some of these limits seem clear
for Mapuche activists in the experiences of accommodation described in the previous
chapter. State institutions offer spaces of participation to Mapuche activists but they are
expected to downplay more radical demands such as territorial autonomy. And activists,
who behave inappropriately according to the state, see their demands questioned,
constrained, and marginalised. In some cases, they face direct coercion from the state
apparatus. Divisions amongst Mapuche pursing different paths of activism are becoming
increasingly clear along these lines, especially those who participate in organizations
such as the Confederación Mapuche that are sceptical of offers of participation made by
states but nonetheless take them. In this context, activists walk a fine line between
accepting spaces open for their participation within the institutional structure of the state
and marginalisation from policy decisions that affect them and their communities. These
options, however, are not consolidated and Mapuche activists understand that in the
complex scenario of Argentina’s federal politics, their positions have to change according
to the ways in which state they believe claims for territorial autonomy can be secured. In

199

other words, the alliances they establish, the discourses they adopt, the political strategies
they carry out, and the institutional spaces they decide to join always depend on the ways
in which the state (local, provincial, federal) exercises its prerogatives via-a-vis
indigenous peoples.
At a time when the federal government under the Kirchner (2003 – 2007) and Fernández
de Kirchner (2007 to present) administrations has avoided large-scale punitive force
against social movements and other forms of social protest, Neuquén and other provinces
have not followed suit. The judicialization of Mapuche activism has emerged
predominantly as a response to territorial re-occupations. In 2012, the United Nations
Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples visited Argentina and published a
Report on the general situation of indigenous peoples in the country (UN 2012). In it,
James Anaya, the author, identifies three major areas of concern facing indigenous
peoples: land tenure and natural resources; access to justice system, evictions, and social
protest; and social and economic conditions. In its section on land tenure and natural
resources, the Report highlights the historical dispossession suffered by indigenous
peoples at the hands of estancieros (large estate owners) and companies in the farming,
oil, and mining sections operating in territories claimed by indigenous communities. It
further adds that the majority of indigenous communities have not received appropriate
legal recognition of the lands they historically have used or occupied (UN 2012, 7). In
terms of access to justice, evictions and social protest, the Report provides an overview of
the linguistic, cultural, and economic barriers indigenous communities face in the court
system. National and international law concerning indigenous rights often go ignored,
especially “in regard to their rights and land and natural resources” (UN 2012, 12).
Furthermore, the Report documents the ways in which the courts have “tended to favour
the private property rights of individuals or corporations over collective forms of
indigenous ownership” (UN 2012, 12). There are only a few instances where courts have
ruled in favour of indigenous communities (e.g., recognition of the right to be consulted
for the Wenctru Trawel Leufú Mapuche community in 2011). In general, legal
uncertainty has resulted in a high number of evictions from orders issued by provincial
courts, “in which members of indigenous communities have been accused of seizing

200

private land… In some cases, the homes and property of members of indigenous peoples,
including their livestock and crops, were destroyed during the eviction operation” (UN
2012, 12). Finally, the Report acknowledges the ways in which indigenous communities
have resisted eviction, or used peaceful protest to make their predicaments public.
However, it also mentions how governments have responded by criminalizing acts linked
to these protests: “many indigenous individuals are prosecuted for alleged offences
committed in connection with these protests” (UN 2012, 13). The section on social and
economic conditions addresses the “serious marginalization” of many indigenous groups
and certain regions (UN 2012, 13).
According to Mapuche activists, state-sponsored violence towards Mapuche communities
has been a rarity since the return to democratic rule but the intensification in the last
decade has been clear. The criminalization of Mapuche demands also takes place in the
context of discursive constructions that see such claims as illegitimate. It is worth noting
that these discourses that see Mapuche mobilization as unfounded and illegitimate do not
emanate exclusively from state officials. Throughout my fieldwork, for example, I
encountered these prejudices coming from many non-Mapuche living near the zones of
conflicts. However, while rejection of Mapuche claims is widespread, there are also
organizations that support their demands and document them.
As Patricia Richards (2010) demonstrates for the Chilean case, the narratives that
construct Mapuche demands as illegitimate include what she calls “the terrorist
narrative”, “trivialisation narratives”, and “the assimilation narrative.” The first narrative
constructs the Mapuche as terrorists, legitimising the coercive response of the state. In the
second set of narratives, the discourses tend to question Mapuche demands as
illegitimate. In the Argentinean case, these narratives usually resonate with the argument
of araucanización, which deems Mapuche populations as Chilean with no legitimate
claims as indigenous peoples in Argentina.
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In Northern Patagonia, it also common to

have provincial governments questioning whether certain Mapuche communities are
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The Mapuche have also been known as Araucanians.
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indeed indigenous to that province. For example, Neuquén’s government has dismissed
claims for some communities to register as Mapuche on the grounds that some of its
members are from other provinces of Patagonia. Finally, the third narrative recognizes
the presence of the Mapuche and deems some claims as legitimate. Nonetheless, this
view also argues that the Mapuche should scale down their demands for territorial
autonomy or self-representation. In Argentina, as in Chile, the solution is seen in the
assimilation of Mapuche communities to national institutions. In the Argentinean case,
the vehicles for this incorporation have included the Peronist Party (or any of its regional
variations, such as the Movimiento Popular Neuquino), the school system, and the
Catholic Church. This type of discourse entails the view that the Mapuche need to
change, in order to assimilate to mainstream culture, if they want to survive. In what
follows, I use Richards’s categorization to illustrate the narratives that deem Mapuche
claims as illegitimate. While the selection of these narratives is arbitrary, they do reflect
some of the local attitudes towards Mapuche mobilization.
When I visited the Quillén-Currumil community in October 2009, I was quickly
introduced to the women and children who had suffered police brutality a few weeks
earlier. Hours later I was given a few samples of the rubber bullets used on the day on
which elite police forces put an end to the re-occupation and entered the recognized
territory of Currumil. What members of Currumil could not grasp, they mentioned, was
the fact that the province recognized their rights in a recent constitutional reform (see
previous chapter) but at the same it relied on the court system to criminalize their
attempts to make those rights effective. The events of Pulmarí and Quillén-Currumil
ended with logko, weken and other community members facing criminal charges. The
new politics of Mapuche organizations such as the Confederación Mapuche does not go
unchallenged by the state. Despite the formal recognition of their rights, Mapuche
activists are often accused of criminal activities, rhetoric of foreign interference is
invoked, and local elites express their concerns that private property is under threat. This
response by state institutions informs, in part, the ways in which Mapuche activists
engage with and resist state institutions. For example, in 2009 the province of Neuquén
alone had close to forty-five court cases against Mapuche individuals or families for
usurpation and damage to private property (e.g., wire cutting). While many of these cases
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end up with the acquittal of the accused, Mapuche activists spend months dealing with
the court system. In this context, since 2009 Mapuche communities and activists have
teamed-up with human rights organizations to create the Observatory of Human Rights
for Indigenous Peoples (Observatorio de Derechos Humanos de Pueblos Indígenas,
ODHPI).
Since its foundation, the ODHPI has published annual reports documenting the process of
legal recognition in Northern Patagonia, the shortcomings in implementing such
recognition, and the instances of criminalization conducted by the state against Mapuche
communities and activists that claim their rights (ODHIP 2010; 2011; 2012). The last
report, for example, provides some figures related to the criminalization of Mapuche
demands. In Neuquén, the courts have used three types of criminal charges against
Mapuche individuals: usurpation; insubordination to a judicial order; and obstruction of a
public act (impedimento de acto funcional). The latter two are considered crimes against
public administration (ODHIP 2012, 29). In the province, the report accounts for 42
criminal trails involving 241 Mapuche and 83% of current trials involve any one of the
three types of criminal charges mentioned above. Since 2005, the report continues, there
have been 60 court proceedings against Mapuche individuals as a consequence of their
activism for the implementation of constitutionally recognized rights. Since then, 347
Mapuche have been charged (ODHIP 2012, 29).
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The peak in the number of criminal

charges against Mapuche activists took place in 2009, when the bulk of fieldwork for this
dissertation was conducted. The ODHIP links the peak of prosecutions against Mapuche
activists to the call from large estate owners and private corporations “to defend private
property” mentioned earlier. This is also the year of the violence that took place in
Currumil. The report denounces reduction of the “Indian question” to an issue of
“criminal law” (ODHIP 2012, 31).
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From the 347 Mapuche that have been charged, 9 (3%) have been acquitted, 97 (28%) have been
dismissed, 177 (51%) are under preliminary proceedings, and 64 are facing trial. Since 2005, no Mapuche
has been found guilty on any of these charges (ODHIP 2012, 32).
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The Observatory is a result of ongoing efforts by Mapuche leaders in Neuquén to create
institutions that represent and address the legal aid needs of the communities. The rights
and freedoms of indigenous peoples recognized by national and international legislation
as well as the increasing challenge the criminalization of Mapuche protest poses for the
communities, have made the Observatory a key institution for Mapuche political
organization. One of the challenges that the Observatory tries to address is the fact that
when involved in court cases, Mapuche communities or their leaders cannot access the
same kind of legal services and expertise that large-landowners or government agencies
do. In response to this, Mapuche activism now includes a legal dimension that was not so
central in the mobilization of previous years.

6.5 Conclusion

Under the political leadership of the Confederación, Mapuche communities have revisited the terms under which they relate to state institutions. Communities have also
come to rely less on the clientelistic networks that connected them with government
officials in the past and to make political claims in complex ways. Such claims may lead
to the creation of new spaces of indigenous participation within the structures of the state
but they may also lead to territorial re-occupation in order to secure their goal of
territorial autonomy or to simply secure their main sources of livelihoods. These demands
on the state for materializing recognized rights remind Mapuche activists of the
contradictory nature of state forms under neoliberal multiculturalism: formal recognition
of rights and criminalization of indigenous demand are compatible with each other.
The territorial re-occupations of Pulmarí and Quillén-Currumil show that local
communities will adopt the strategy of territorial re-occupations if they agree on the
immediate need to negotiate with the state in this way. The state’s response, however, is
not always the expected one. While Pulmarí was fairly successful in terms of the control
over grazing lands that local Mapuche communities were able to secure and the
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consolidation of the Confederación Mapuche as a legitimate political representative of
the communities, the recent Quillén-Currumil episodes demonstrate that territorial reoccupations also lead to a long path of criminalization and time in court defending what
should be defended by political means.
While territorial re-occupations may provoke the violent reaction of the state,
participation of Mapuche communities in initiatives such as the co-management project
of the Lanín National Park shows the other important dimension of the neoliberal state
and its understanding of multicultural citizenship and ethnodevelopment. Conceived as
an ideal framework to transfer responsibility from state institutions to (a now ethnicized)
civil society, the neoliberalization of the state in indigenous matters does not address
issues of historical injustices or current inequalities of access to land that would help
materialize the Mapuche quest for territorial autonomy. However, without territorial
autonomy, the decolonization of the state-Mapuche relationship becomes a distant goal.
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Chapter 7

7

Conclusions

“Movements in complex societies are disenchanted prophets […]
Movements are a sign; they are not merely an outcome of the crisis, the
last throne of a passing society. They signal a deep transformation in the
logic and the process that guides complex societies. Like the prophets, the
movements ‘speak before’: they announce what is taking shape even
before its direction and context has become clear” (Melucci 1996, 1)

7.1 Indigenous peoples and the state in minority contexts

The intensification of indigenous mobilization throughout Latin America in the last three
decades must be understood in the context of changes in state formation and
consequently, in the dominant forms of citizenship. Despite the continuities with the past
that are often evoked by activists, there is a good deal of recent transformation that
explains the resurgence of indigenous peoples as political actors. Indigenous leaders, for
example, often recognize that the democratization of the region played an important role
in their organizations’ capacity to relate to the state in new ways. They can now do so
more openly and directly. Furthermore, the transnationalisation of capital and state
functions has also provided indigenous groups with the opportunity to be in contact with
allies beyond national boundaries. The formal recognition of the multiethnic character of
national societies in state constitutions and new rights recognized in international
legislation provide additional forms of legitimacy to indigenous demands, including the
rights to a bilingual education and interculturalism, access to and collective ownership of
territories indigenous peoples use or inhabit, and the right to determine the development
of indigenous communities in their own terms. Indigenous autonomy is recognized at
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different levels, in different legal texts. However, a gap between recognition and
implementation exists and indigenous peoples have organized to demand states they live
up to their commitments. In some cases states have ignored these claims. For the most
part, however, states have usually responded by opening new spaces for indigenous
participation.
The circumstances under which indigenous peoples mobilize also depend on the ways in
which state formation and its relation to indigenous peoples have taken place. In this
regard, the literature on indigenous politics has not paid sufficient attention to the
dynamics of indigenous activism in contexts where indigenous peoples are a minority.
The Southern Cone countries of Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, and, to a certain
105

degree, Brazil, are a case in point.

A possible reason that explains this is the

inadequacy of mainstream theoretical approaches that privilege open confrontation and
public demonstration of indigenous movements at a national scale. These approaches,
while valid for other contexts, are of limited value for the study of indigenous activism in
minority contexts because they tend to ignore the local dimension of indigenous
mobilization and the ways in which such activism involves a complex process of
negotiation, accommodation, and confrontation with the state. This study suggests that
indigenous organizations and political activism adopt different forms when population
numbers are low. Needless to say, numbers do not determine the characteristics of
indigenous mobilization but activists understand that in a minority context they must
adopt the strategies that are available to them, and these may be different from those
available to indigenous organizations in majority or near majority contexts.
One existing limitation in current approaches to indigenous movements lies in their
teleological assumptions that place movements in a continuum between “marginality”
and “success” in terms of their capacity to influence state policy or government reaction
at the national level. In practice, however, as Lucero and García have suggested,
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The Brazilian case is interesting because despite its low population numbers, the interest in indigenous
peoples has focused on indigenous human rights and environmental issues. For the most part, however, the
literature on indigenous issues in Brazil has not addressed the process of indigenous political activism its
relation to state formation. A notable exception is the work of Alcida Ramos (2002; 1998).
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indigenous activism tends to look more like “palpable networks of association and
relations of meaning” which also have the capacity to influence the terms of indigenous
citizenship thus engaging with the state in politically meaningful ways (2007, 325).
Arguably, the forms these “networks of association” adopt and the “relations of meaning”
they produce depend largely on the historical context in which they take form.
In the Argentinean case, and for the Mapuche in particular, the focus on political
organization and mobilization needs address more carefully the local context.
Furthermore, the study of the local dimension of indigenous activism in Argentina needs
to take into consideration the ways in which provincial politics intervene in national and
local aspects of indigenous politics (Briones 2005). As this study shows, Mapuche
activism in Northern Patagonia adopts different forms depending on the province in
which it takes place. The shift from large-scale movements and their impact, or lack
thereof, on national politics to small-scale, local processes of negotiation,
accommodation, and resistance to state practices serves to weaken the assumption that, in
order to be strong or relevant, an indigenous movement needs to articulate a “nationally
cohesive political force” (Lucero and García 2007). In minority contexts, indigenous
activism engages in national indigenous politics at the local level by negotiating and
challenging the terms of indigenous citizenship under neoliberal multiculturalism. In
short, locality matters. In contexts such as Northern Patagonia, local dynamics of power
have a profound impact on indigenous collective identities and on the ways in which
political activism takes place. In short, local circumstances and specific episodes of
indigenous activism are the result of broader changes in and engagement with the
patterns of state formation (e.g., neoliberalization of the state) and citizenship (e.g.,
neoliberal multiculturalism).
The analytical shift from analysing indigenous activism at the national scale to paying
closer attention to local dynamics of negotiation, accommodation, and contestation
highlights an important dimension of neoliberal multiculturalism that is often overlooked:
the uneven effects of indigenous citizenship and the multiplicities of ways in which
indigenous peoples themselves contest it and/or find accommodation in it. Geographer
Sarah Radcliffe (2005), for example, observes that given the uneven impact of
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neoliberalism on different localities, resistance to it often takes place alongside
“reworkings” and “compromises” on the part of indigenous activism and states.
Furthermore, the author suggests that discourses and practices associated to neoliberal
multiculturalism have outcomes that go beyond the conditions under which states choose
to adopt them (Radcliffe 2005, 328; also Postero 2005, 16-17). In this sense, the
contributions of this study to the ongoing debates on multicultural recognition and
neoliberalism in Latin America highlight the governmental dimension of neoliberal
multiculturalism as a process that entails, not just the possibilities for recognition and
redistribution that Donna Van Cott (2006) has studied, but also new opportunities to
exercise control over indigenous populations and the political demands of indigenous
activists. While my study suggests neoliberal multiculturalism in Argentina has more in
common with Charles Hale’s work (2004, 2006, 2011), the ongoing process of
accommodation, conflict, and resistance that Mapuche communities in Northern
Patagonia experience should warn us that the limitations of neoliberal multiculturalism in
one place may have not much in common with the experience of indigenous peoples in
other regions. In this sense, the more nuanced argument presented by Lucero (2007),
García (2005), Radcliffe (2005), and Postero (2005) seem to be more compatible with my
own argument for the Mapuche. While neoliberal multiculturalism may not serve to
transform unequal power relations, it may nonetheless open new and empowering
opportunities for indigenous activists. In short, its effects are uneven and contradictory.
And while Van Cott (2006) argues that multicultural recognition may serve to limit the
effects of neoliberal reforms in South America, my study on the Mapuche suggests that
such distinction is problematic, particularly in light of the recent transformations of state
forms and its regimes of citizenship.
The politics of multiculturalism of the neoliberal state addresses indigenous demands in
various ways, for instance, by creating spaces within government bureaucracies that
respond to long-term indigenous claims. As Antonio Lucero points out, neoliberal
multiculturalism “creates new terrain for state incorporation of and negotiation with
indigenous peoples” (2007, 233). Nevertheless, state-sponsored multiculturalism, which
is understood as the official albeit limited form of indigenous rights recognition, is a
result of dominant power relations. However, despite the unequal relations of power that
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inform this type of recognition, multiculturalism is open to some of the historical
demands of indigenous peoples. As such, the risk is high for indigenous activists who
participate in a process where “reforms soften the harder edges of resistance, all to
maintain a status quo where the most vital distributive issues of power and wealth remain
largely untouched” (Lucero 2007, 233).
Cultural difference, then, and ethnic pluralism under neoliberal multiculturalism are
recognized and welcomed but not always in the terms indigenous activists hope. The
historical roots of poverty and racism, for instance, are not confronted (Hale 2002).
Territorial autonomy, as a project of indigenous self-determination within the state, is
rejected. Seen as a form of government over ethnicized subjects, neoliberal
multiculturalism privileges some kinds of indigenous activism and identities over others.
In this context, the neoliberalization of multiculturalism implies “an appropriation of
indigenous rights” in order to articulate “agendas favouring neoliberal economics,
decentralization, and citizen responsibility” (Andolina et al. 2009, 3).
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Indigenous

politics in contemporary Argentina needs to be understood in this context in which
neoliberal multiculturalism has transformed the content and reach of citizenship. Thus, by
keeping in mind the tensions that exist between indigenous claims and official
recognition of collective rights, one can better understand why Mapuche activism in
practice adopts the form of accommodation, negotiation, and contestation vis-à-vis state
institutions and practices.
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The World Bank, for example, is perhaps one of the most visible institutions that devote programs,
funds and “know-how” to the idea of “indigenous development.” Considered as part of a broader idea of
“development from below”, the notion of indigenous development is not new. In articulating development
projects for rural areas, for example, the World Bank often assumes some of the political and social
constraints that exist acknowledging that they are related to unequal access to land, an important source of
inequality and conflict. One of the main criticisms of this perspective is directed at the notion that
development projects can, despite those obstacles, take place in abstraction “from histories of political
struggle over rural poverty and land use” (McAllister 2009, 650). This view often leads, in McAllister’s
terms, to an inadequate understanding of “the processes governing the lives and hopes of the rural poor in
such contexts” (2009, 651).
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7.2

Towards a new Mapuche politics

Since the late 1970s, new forms of Mapuche leadership have emerged posing new types
of challenges to the state and challenging the historical discourses of invisibility that have
characterized modern state formation in Argentina. In Neuquén, a new type of Mapuche
leadership and activism was consolidated when a new generation of activists took control
the Confederación Mapuche de Neuquén, an organization created with the sponsorship of
the provincial government and the Catholic Church in 1971. The initial goal of this
organization was to represent the interests of the rural Mapuche communities officially
recognized by the province in the 1960s. In practice, however, it also served the electoral
needs of the dominant populist political party, the Movimiento Popular Neuquino (MPN),
connecting Mapuche families to the provincial state via clientelistic relationships. In a
practice that still persists, local electoral support to the MPN was rewarded with welfare
assistance to the communities that was mediated by selected families, usually those of the
cacique (chief). The category of chief, however, was contested by the new generation of
activists who adopted instead the notion of logko, as explained in more detail in chapter
4.
For years, Mapuche families used these mechanisms to access basic needs for their
communities, such as clothing, food, and shelter. That form of relating to the state,
however, was increasingly questioned by a new generation of urban Mapuche leaders. In
Neuquén city, these activists started to build affective relationships with their
communities and slowly began demanding a greater leadership role in them. Thus, the
capture of the Confederación by some of these activists in the early 1990s was the
outcome of years of networking and thorough work within their communities. And while
the content of their discourse on territorial autonomy has seen changes since then, this
generation of Mapuche activists has always privileged the centrality of “ancestral
territories” in their struggles. Furthermore, for years, these activists fought against the
lack of internal democratization of the Confederación and they eventually won. They
have also expanded the existing conception of Mapuche territory to include urban spaces
and have, thus, promoted a notion that goes well beyond the geographic boundaries of
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rural communities. Many of these changes, in turn, have resulted in new demands that I
have characterized here as territorial autonomy.
The forms of mobilization and strategies adopted by the “new” Confederación Mapuche
have played an important role in informing the relationship between the state and
Mapuche communities. Not always able to carry out large-scale uprisings, including
blockades of main roads that usually gain nation-wide attention through the media,
Mapuche activists started to support the decisions of many communities to re-occupy
lands considered ancestral Mapuche territory. While these re-occupations are not the only
tactics employed, they have turned the Mapuche into visible political actors in their own
right.
Contemporary Mapuche activism in Northern Patagonia is also part of more general
indigenous struggles for broadening the terms of citizenship by demanding that states
incorporate the recognition of cultural difference of a pueblo nación originario. Such a
demand for recognition is still an incentive for mobilization, although the bulk of
Mapuche activism today concentrates on the implementation of concrete measures to
secure territorial autonomy and self-representation. Activists recognize, however, that
recognition does not necessarily address years of historical subordination and
institutionalized racism. In the last three decades, they have been negotiating with state
officials and have adopted a rights discourse thus giving the state a privileged role in their
claims: rights can only be granted by states. Mapuche activists agree that the language of
rights can be patronizing. The way out, they argue, is in decolonizing the state, not in
ignoring it. By decolonizing the state, activists seek to radically define their relationship
with the state. But in order to decolonize the state and social relations in general,
Mapuche communities must secure territorial autonomy, a goal that is beyond the
limitations of neoliberal multiculturalism.

7.3

Territorial autonomy: to what end?
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“You are a transitional generation, said Aunt Lydia. It is the hardest for
you. We know the sacrifices you are being expected to make. It is hard
when men revile you. For the ones who come after you, it will be easier.
They will accept their duties with willing hearts. She did not say: Because
they will have no memories, of any other way. She said: Because they
won’t want things they can’t have” (Margaret Atwood 1985, 111).
These words by Canadian author Margaret Atwood from her classic work The
Handmaid’s Tale serve as a warning for activists about the fate of future generations if
the boundaries of neoliberal multiculturalism are not contested. As long as citizenship
regimes maintain their capacity to dismiss “inconvenient” demands that are deemed too
radical, for example, demands for territorial autonomy, Mapuche activists will need to
find new ways to radically alter their relationship with the state that support such
regimes. Needless to say, changes in this relationship and struggles for territorial
autonomy do not represent a homogeneous and unique position in Mapuche activism.
Since the Kirchner administrations came to power in 2003, a number of Mapuche
activists have abandoned the ranks of the Confederación Mapuche to join the government
as they believe that working alongside a government they see as politically progressive
and committed to the plight of indigenous peoples will lead to faster and more permanent
solutions to their claims. In my last visit to Neuquén in April of 2013, I observed
profound divisions amongst Mapuche activists as a consequence of new political
alliances between the provincial and federal governments. While political divisions
between the province and the federal state had served Mapuche activists in the past, the
new alliance put them at odds with all instances of government. Internal divisions,
common to all social movements, are also part of the movement of the Mapuche. Despite
these divisions that can either strengthen or weaken Mapuche activism in the long-term,
Northern Patagonia has seen the rise, strengthening and consolidation of other
organizations that advocate for the rights of Mapuche communities. In short, new
possibilities in Mapuche activism and new ways of engaging and contesting the state
emerge as changes in the political context occur. In practice, claims for territorial
autonomy and the strategies adopted to reach this goal are the outcome of productive
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tensions that exist within Mapuche communities, between communities and activists, and
in the complex interactions between the Mapuche and the state.
It is unclear whether the demands for territorial autonomy and self-representation will
ever reach a point when Mapuche organizations determine that it is time to work on what
they call “life projects” sustained by Mapuche cosmologies and ways of knowing. In
other words, territorial autonomy will not immediate translate into the fulfilment of other
Mapuche goals. On the contrary, territorial autonomy will emerge as the result of the
complex negotiation, accommodation, and contestation between activists and the state.
Furthermore, the question as to whether the political organization of Mapuche
communities in its current forms will be effective to secure an eventual radical
transformation of the state and dominant social relations under the existing framework of
neoliberal multiculturalism and global capitalism remains unanswered. As this
dissertation has shown, the process of Mapuche mobilization and organization around
claims for territorial autonomy is not independent from the political, historical and
ideological context in which it takes place. While Mapuche activism is linked to broader
struggles for more inclusive forms of citizenship, democracy, and development, the
process cannot be seen or conceptualized as pure resistance. Far from suggesting that
Mapuche politics in contemporary Argentina is characterized by passivity, as the idea of
accommodation alone may suggest, my argument has been that Mapuche organizations
know how to engage with the state in politically significant ways. The emphasis on kvme
felen (good life), mapuce kimvn (wisdom), and interculturalidad are simply signs that the
path Mapuche activists have decided to take is long but irreversible.
The context within which Mapuche activists in Northern Patagonia mobilize for
territorial autonomy differs greatly from Atwood’s near dystopian future. On the one
hand, Mapuche activists recognize that current forms of accommodation are part of the
ongoing sacrifices many communities “are expected to make.” On the other hand, in their
every-day encounters with the state, many Mapuche activists are told to wait and “accept
their duties with willing hearts.” In the past few decades, however, Mapuche activists
have continued to hope that their defence of territorial autonomy gives future generations
the foundations for a more just society.
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7.4 The political significance of local indigenous activism

This study, focused on Mapuche activism in Northern Patagonia, provides important
lessons for our understanding of indigenous activism in contexts where indigenous
peoples are a considerable minority of the national population. I have shown and argued
that in these contexts, indigenous peoples engage with the state and its forms of
citizenship in complex ways. This engagement involves instances of negotiation,
accommodation, and conflict. Furthermore, all these instances are informed by the
formation of new collective political identities.
My focus on the local level makes possible a study that privileges the understanding of
the concrete ways in which state practices and indigenous activism encounter each other.
In this encounter, characterized by unequal power relationships, activists are able, in
some cases, to influence state initiatives for their own goals. Neuquén’s constitutional
convention, the co-management projects within National Parks, and the creation of an
intercultural AM radio station are examples of accommodation within state-sponsored
initiatives. Control over these spaces by indigenous activists, however, is precarious and
contradictory as state priorities and the priorities of activism change. For example, the
fate of co-management projects within National Parks is uncertain. In April 2013, the comanagement project at the Lanín National Park no longer included the participation of
the Confederación Mapuche and of many of the communities that had initially been
involved. However, as co-management strategies seemed to fail at Lanín National Park,
opportunities for a new co-management at the Nahuel Huapi National Park emerged. The
significance of this new opportunity is that it has brought Mapuche activists in Neuquén
in closer relation with Mapuche organizations in Rio Negro, and their collaboration is
challenging the provincial boundaries of indigenous politics in Northern Patagonia.
With very few exceptions, political scientists have, until recently, responded slowly to the
significance of emerging indigenous politics in the Americas. Furthermore, studies of the
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political significance of localized activism in contexts where indigenous peoples are a
minority remain beyond their scope. By adopting an interdisciplinary framework that
privileges the political significance of cultural processes and collective identity formation
to understand state formation, citizenship, and collective action, and by adopting
ethnographic methods that highlight the relevance of the local, I have contributed to
closing this gap. This interdisciplinary study of local, everyday processes of negation,
accommodation, and confrontation places indigenous activists and their ways of knowing
at the centre of the analysis. As a Mapuche activist once told me, “I do not know how to
explain to you the value that we give to our territory. It is our culture, our identity.”
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